Sudan’s Defence Minister, Yassin Ibrahim Yassin, called on Friday to mobilise retired officers and soldiers to support the army in its ongoing conflict against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which started 41 days ago.
The Head of the Sovereign Council Sudanese Army Commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has suspended Foreign Minister Ali al-Sadiq over criticism of his failure to fulfil his duties following the armed conflict with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Saudi Arabia and the US said both warring Sudanese sides violated the short-term ceasefire, according to a joint statement Sunday released evening.
The Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) agreed to and signed a seven-day agreement on a short-term ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements on May 20 in Jeddah.
In an interview with Le Figaro on 29 December 2022, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune deplored the deployment of Russian Wagner Group mercenaries to his country’s neighbour, Mali.
Tebboune was quoted as saying that the money that the Malian government spent on contracting Russian mercenaries should have been placed into the development of the country and the Sahel region.
Ongoing violence between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has raised concerns about the possible ramifications for Libya, both politically and in terms of the country’s fragile security situation.
Since 15 April, hundreds of people in Sudan have been killed while more than 4,000 have been injured due to fighting between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
After being ruled for decades by Omar al Bashir, pro-democracy protests in 2019 created a democratic opening that was eventually filled by military strongmen.
The United States has accused Russia’s Wagner Group of providing surface-to-air missiles to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one side in Sudan’s ongoing conflict that has displaced nearly 1.3 million people.
Libya’s political uncertainty has become a knot that can’t be untied, particularly after the long-awaited 24 December 2021 elections failed.
Since then, the North African country has witnessed the formation of a parallel government, several bloody clashes that claimed dozens of lives, a legitimacy race between political rivals, and is now on the brink of having a third government.
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Les ruées vers l’or saharo-sahéliennes contemporaines sont absentes des radars des études sur les relations entre ressources naturelles extractives et conflits en Afrique, dominées notamment par les travaux sur les rentes pétrolières et sur le pillage des minerais des Grands Lacs. Dans les années 2000, la hausse des prix des matières premières associée aux réformes néolibérales promues par la Banque mondiale a conduit à un regain des activités extractives en Afrique. Une abondante littérature a accompagné ces développements, soulignant les dangers potentiels d’économies fondées exclusivement sur l’extractivisme (pétrolier essentiellement) ou cherchant des alternatives juridiques pour en juguler les défauts. L’accent a été mis sur l’aspect macroéconomique de cette exploitation ou, au niveau local, sur les aspects négatifs de pratiques peu soucieuses des travailleurs et de l’environnement (sur les nouveaux codes miniers et la « malédiction des ressources », voir par exemple Campbell [2009] et Magrin [2013]). Moins nombreux ont été les travaux empiriques menés pour tenter de saisir au plus près du terrain la réalité des transformations engagées dans les territoires locaux par ces développements, et notamment les multiples mobilisations et conflits suscités [Engels et Dietz, 2017].
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L’histoire des échanges transsahariens montre que l’inhospitalité de l’environnement et du climat ne les a jamais entravés. Leurs animateurs ont en effet toujours su s’adapter et même contourner les obstacles qui se présentaient à eux comme l’instauration de frontières.