On 10 August the U.S., Armenia, and Azerbaijan marked one year after the White House summit and restated work on TRIPP—a corridor from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan across Armenia. The route is not built. Armenia’s Constitutional Court hears the U.S. framework on 15 September; a new Armenian constitution and a 2027 referendum are also tied to Baku’s peace terms.
The author rejects “why Arabs can never be democratic” as Orientalist essentialism (Said). Ask instead which institutions, rents, and power balances have so far blocked transitions—without treating 22 unlike states as one culture. Bellin and Sadiki are used to put discourse and coercive institutions ahead of an “Arab mind.”
Proposed mix, not one cause: Khaldunian asabiyyah recast as modern clientelism (Morocco’s “bak sahbi”); oil and aid rents that buy compliance without taxation-for-representation (Ross); Sharabi’s neopatriarchy; colonial security states plus Cold War and counterterror backing; cohesive armies that fear opening. Culture is not the independent variable.
Tunisia after 2011 is the counterexample: an Arab-Muslim society ran competitive politics, then reversed—proof of possibility and fragility, not destiny. Youth and digital protest can punch holes in narrative control but not replace parties and unions. Democracy, following Sen, is treated as a universal value whose fate is the distribution of power, which can change.
Alors même que les Américains commémorent la douleur des attentats du 11 septembre, au même moment, les Houthis du Yémen, sous la coordination le long de l’«axe de la résistance», mettent sous contrôle absolu, le détroit de Bab el-Mandeb et l’ensemble de la côte yéménite de la mer Rouge.
The Kremlin is conducting a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns targeting Europe, and NATO states must understand and forthrightly discuss both these ongoing Russian campaigns against Europe and the evolving character of the near-term Russian conventional threat in order to design and execute holistic responses. European governments increased their willingness to publicly attribute and discuss ongoing Russian kinetic attacks against Europe after the German government officially attributed the August 5 Leipzig airport drone attack to Russia.[1] European states and leaders still too often refer to Russian actions with language that impedes effective responses, however, and have not taken sufficient action of their own to deter the escalating Russian campaign against them. European governments must develop a shared conceptual framework to understand ongoing Russian campaigns, an essential step toward creating a coordinated policy plan to respond to and deter Russian actions. NATO has recognized the changing near-term Russian conventional threat and has identified the need for rapid European rearmament and adaptation drawing on lessons from Ukraine to meet this threat, although action is lagging behind words. European states must accelerate and improve these rearmament and adaptation efforts and must prepare for the risk of a limited Russian conventional attack on a shorter timeline than the 2028-2030 window that many NATO states currently discuss. NATO and European states can defeat the ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns and deter the growing Russian conventional threat, but only on the basis of a shared understanding of the problem that will enable them to design and execute coordinated policy plans with the necessary sense of urgency and without panic. This paper presents an initial assessment of the current and near-term Russian threats, priority lines of effort for NATO states, and necessary future analytical work by ISW and other organizations.
Alors que la stratégie russe visant à étendre son influence au Sahel s’effondre, Moscou change de cap pour employer les mêmes tactiques consistant à attiser la contestation envers la démocratie et à promouvoir la cause du régime militaire dans les démocraties des pays côtiers d’Afrique de l’Ouest.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his UAE counterpart, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, affirmed their commitment to continue advancing Syria-UAE relations in a way that helps fulfill both countries’ aspirations for development and for building a more “advanced and prosperous” future.
Authorities should view the end of UNIFIL not as a prelude to a security vacuum, but as a chance to establish a workable U.S.-led transition mechanism that brings in Arab, European, and international partners, with the ultimate goal of helping Lebanon exercise full sovereignty over its territory without the support of foreign forces.
From elections and party politics to local government, media and construction, Prime Minister Edi Rama’s hold on power now faces a new test.
In June of this year, a book setting out an ambitious vision for Albania’s physical transformation was published: The Albanian Files. Featuring a foreword by Prime Minister Edi Rama, the book brings together around 520 projects by 60 international architectural studios — from skyscrapers and luxury apartment buildings to hotels, resorts and developments proposed in coastal and environmentally sensitive areas. One of its contributors is Dutch architect Reinier de Graaf, a partner at the internationally renowned architecture firm OMA. In a deliberately provocative letter in the book, de Graaf suggests dispensing with elections altogether and having Rama continue as “president for life — maybe even King.”
À la mi-juillet, l’Arabie saoudite a relancé sa guerre contre le gouvernement yéménite d’Ansarullah et le mouvement houthi :
«Les forces dirigées par l’Arabie saoudite ont bombardé lundi l’aéroport international de Sanaa, au Yémen, relançant ainsi la guerre contre les Houthis yéménites, officiellement connus sous le nom d’Ansarullah, alors qu’un cessez-le-feu tenait relativement bien depuis 2022.
IFIMES reads Tokayev’s Bishkek SCO speech as “responsible middle-power” policy: use the SCO’s “Shanghai spirit” and even a UNGA resolution on its principles, but treat the UN as irreplaceable. Kazakhstan would link China, Russia, the EU, the U.S., Turkey, and the Gulf rather than pick a bloc.
Tools cited include the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor (more than raw transit: logistics, industry, digital customs), deep China ties moving from energy to AI and manufacturing, 2026 as a digitalization year, a proposed UN water body and SCO water centre, and a new constitution plus unicameral Kurultai from 1 July 2026.
Nuclear identity is Semipalatinsk and the 2006 Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone (20th anniversary statement, 8 Sept 2026). The piece also flags EU/Western Balkans interest in the corridor. The test, it says, is keeping autonomy while China supplies capital and tech. That is the institute’s interpretation of Astana’s line.