Despite Syrian President Bashar al-Assad being welcomed back onto the international stage, all is not well at home.
His country is broken into three parts, which, at best, are in a state of uneasy coexistence and at worst are stuck in a low-intensity active conflict.
In the country’s northwestern Idlib province, Assad’s forces are engaged in near-daily shelling along the frontlines and Russia has recently resumed airstrikes after a long lull.
Idlib is ruled by a former al-Qaeda offshoot, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which analysts describe as undergoing a transformation aimed at cementing its rule in the province.
"Around 4.5 million people are crammed into the country's northwest in the last opposition-held pocket of Syria" The group has Turkey’s tacit backing, which sees HTS as a source of stability in the province and as a moderating influence on the more radical, transnational jihadist groups in the area.
The Syrian regime has expressed its desire to reclaim the province, but ever since a March 2020 offensive ended in a disastrous defeat at the hands of Turkey, the territory has not changed hands.
If Assad truly wishes to control all of Syria, he will first have to deal with HTS and its strange bedfellow, Turkey.
Could HTS be evicted from northwest Syria?
Starting in 2016, Assad’s forces, backed by Russian airpower, began to turn the tide in Syria and reconquer swathes of the country held by the opposition.
In cities like Aleppo and Daraya, Assad used the same tactic: starve them out. His military forces would besiege the city, preventing food and other basic supplies from reaching the civilian population and fighters alike in a form of collective punishment described as a crime against humanity.
Once brought to the brink of starvation, residents of opposition-held areas were given a choice: surrender or leave. Many civilians and opposition fighters took the latter choice and were taken by green buses to other opposition areas until regime forces arrived and the cycle started anew.
“It’s a continual policy to go after groups that are politically problematic, security threats or are violating the rules and guidelines they set out,” Gregory Waters, a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute, told The New Arab.
This process of power consolidation has created an Idlib that is starkly different from what it was five years ago when myriad jihadist groups competed for the reins of power.
Today, HTS has no rivals of significance. The group has built institutions and has restrained other groups from launching attacks against anyone but northwest Syria. This process of power consolidation has only been accelerated since the devastating 6 February earthquake which struck Syria and Turkey, experts say.
“The [6 February] earthquake has had a big impact on HTS’s drive to centralise certain functions, like the directorate of development and housing … the earthquake really galvanised them to have a functioning state system,” Waters said.
"The Syrian regime has expressed its desire to reclaim the province, but ever since a March 2020 offensive ended in a disastrous defeat at the hands of Turkey, the territory has not changed hands" As a result of the group’s increasing “moderate” rule and defacto control of the area, it has increasingly become a partner to a begrudging international community, particularly to Turkey.
“From the Turkish perspective, the [HTS] presence in Idlib is a disturbing reality. HTS is intertwined with the 3 million [people] in Idlib. The Turks have tried to strengthen moderate voices and weaken dogmatics in HTS,” Ömer Özkizilcik , an Ankara-based Syria analyst, told TNA.
Turkey sees HTS rule as a stabilising force in the area, and fears that if the regime launches another offensive against the group, it would push millions of refugees towards its borders.
“As long as Turkey stands its ground, Idlib is relatively safe. From the Turkish perspective, another offensive on Idlib would mean 2 more million refugees, which Turkey cannot accept,” Özkizilcik said.
A cornerstone of recently re-elected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was securing the return of at least a million Syrian refugees to northern Syria.
Amidst a rising wave of xenophobia in Turkey against the over 3 million Syrian refugees living in the country, Erdogan’s promise for getting Syrians to go back to Syria is one of significant public interest.
The possibility of an Ankara-Damascus reconciliation seems increasingly remote, as a 10 May quadripartite meeting aimed at bringing the two closer together ended with the two sides at a stalemate.
Barring a reversal in policy towards rapprochement with Syria, it is likely that Turkey will depend on HTS as a partner in stabilising the areas meant for “safe” return of Syrian refugees.
This is particularly true given that the areas that the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) control in northern Syria are lawless and rife with human rights violations, as the militias that make up the SNA engage in looting and other abuses.