Amid the military escalation between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia in recent days,[1] Yemeni journalist Hani Salem Mashour published an article in the London-based Emirati daily Al-Arab in which he held Saudi Arabia responsible for the situation. He argued that Riyadh’s conciliatory policy toward the Houthis over the past two decades enabled them to grow stronger and deepen their ties with Iran. As a result, they became a major military force that can now threaten international shipping, strike deep inside Saudi Arabia, and even confront the U.S. directly. Mashour added that the Houthis are now a reality and can no longer be defeated through military means alone. Therefore, efforts should focus on containing their expansion beyond Yemen’s borders and weakening their ties to Iran—similar to the strategy currently being pursued against Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMU) militias in Iraq.
The following are excerpts from his article:[2]
“…Iran’s breaking of the Saudi-imposed air blockade on the Houthi-controlled areas, followed by the Houthi defiance to the point of firing at Saudi fighter jets, revealed [the futility] of Saudi Arabia’s policy, [which involved] maintaining the ceasefire for years and was primarily intended to prevent the recurrence of the Houthi strikes on the Kingdom’s economic lifeline, like the attacks on the Aramco facilities.[3] The recent developments show that the ceasefire did not eliminate the threat but merely suspended it temporarily, and that the Houthis used the years of relative calm to rebuild their military capabilities and strengthen their ties with Iran before turning back to test the rules of the conflict again. The lesson to be learned [from this] is that any arrangement that fails to address the root causes of the crisis in Yemen and redefine the balance of power on the ground will remain a temporary arrangement that may collapse at its first real test.
“The Saudi gamble was based on the assumption that time would weaken the Houthis and that the ceasefire would gradually transform them from an ideological movement into a political actor that could be contained within the framework of the Yemeni state. In reality, exactly the opposite happened. The Houthis viewed the ceasefire as an opportunity to rebuild their strength, expand their arsenal, reorganize their supply lines, and deepen their ties with Tehran. From the Houthis’ perspective, the ceasefire was not a path to peace but rather a period of preparation for another round of confrontation.
“More than twenty years ago, the warning was that handling the Houthis through a policy of containing them rather than defeating them would produce an armed entity outside the authority of the state, one resembling North Korea in its political and military structure—that is, a state[-like entity] with an army, missiles, a war economy, and an ideological discourse that recognizes none of the rules governing the regional order.
“What was once regarded as an exaggerated assessment has now become a reality unfolding before everyone’s eyes. The Houthis are no longer merely a Yemeni movement. They have become a military force capable of threatening international shipping, striking deep inside Saudi Arabia, confronting the U.S. directly, and receiving an Iranian air bridge—and neither the Yemeni state nor the region is able to impose its will upon them… The question is no longer how to defeat them, but rather how to prevent their expansion beyond Yemen’s borders and how to sever their connection to the Iranian project, recognizing that they have become a fait accompli that cannot be overcome by military force alone.
“[Therefore, there is need to adopt] the policy that is [now] being implemented in Lebanon and is expected to be applied in Iraq [as well]: reducing the Iranian influence while treating the local forces as an existing reality that cannot simply be abolished by political decree.
“The Middle East does not write its history through wishful thinking but through the consequences of policy. What has happened in Yemen is not the product of the past few months, nor is it the result of the 39-Day War [i.e., the recent U.S.-Israeli war against Iran between February 28, 2026 and April 8, 2026]. It is the outcome of two decades of flawed calculations, delayed initiatives, and a policy of conciliation [based on] the belief that buying time is equivalent to making peace. Time has proved the opposite. Every year that passed without a decisive resolution added another building block to the Houthis’ project until they became an entity that is difficult to dismantle, much as North Korea has become in East Asia.”
[2] Al-Arab (London), July 7, 2026.
[3] On September 14, 2019, the Houthis attacked two facilities of the Saudi state-owned oil company Aramco in the Abqaiq area using cruise missiles and drones. The attack forced the facilities to shut down and caused an immediate reduction in Saudi oil production.