Libye: le renforcement des relations entre le maréchal Haftar et la Turquie se poursuit

Initié en avril dernier, le rapprochement entre Ankara et l’homme fort de l’est libyen s’est poursuivi lundi 25 août avec la visite à Benghazi du chef des renseignements turcs, Ibrahim Kalin. Une première pour un responsable turc de ce niveau depuis 2020.

Le maréchal Khalifa Haftar, qui contrôle les parties est et sud de la Libye, a reçu ce lundi 25 août dans son quartier général de Benghazi le chef des renseignements turcs, Ibrahim Kalin, arrivé à la tête d’une haute délégation militaire. Pour l’occasion, son hôte était lui entouré de ses deux fils, Saddam et Khaled Haftar, récemment promus à la tête de l’Armée nationale libyenne (ANL) : alors que le premier en a été nommé vice-commandant général, le second en est devenu le chef d’état major.

Syria’s Agreement with Israel Is Not as Promising as Advertised

The world is celebrating the anticipated signing of a security agreement between Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Israel, hailed as evidence of Sharaa’s moderation and a departure from his radical Islamist past. However, this narrative is misleading. Islamist doctrine permits, and even encourages, temporary truces—up to 10 years—with adversaries until conditions favor a stronger position. This strategy is modeled on the Prophet Muhammad’s Treaty of Hudaybiyyah with the Quraysh of Mecca in 628 CE. Hamas has repeatedly proposed 10-year truces with Israel as an alternative to peace or a two-state solution.

What it’s like to be a TB patient in Somalia

Working as the medical coordinator for Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Somalia, I see every day how conflict and poverty damage people’s lives. One of our biggest challenges is tuberculosis (TB), which affects many children. TB is not just an illness—it takes away energy, health, and sometimes lives. I see its impact on children like Ahmed*, a 5-year-old I met recently at Mudug Regional Hospital in Somalia.

How Israel Could Exploit Iran’s Ethnic Division to Wage War From Within

With Iran still reeling from its 12-day war, Israel retains a hidden weapon in its arsenal against the Islamic Republic—disaffected minorities who also seek to overthrow the government.

Analysts and former Israeli officials tell Newsweek that discussions toward endorsing such activities are gaining traction as tensions continue to simmer across the Middle East.

Iran Update, August 25, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected recent calls by Iranian reformist officials to reform Iran’s domestic and foreign policies.[1] Khamenei delivered a speech on August 24 in which he claimed that “Iran’s enemies” failed to defeat Iran during the Israel-Iran War and are now trying to do so by “creating discord in the country.”[2] Khamenei claimed that agents of the United States and Israel, along with “heedless speakers and writers,” are creating division.[3] Khamenei may have used the term “heedless speakers and writers” to refer to reformist officials who have recently called on the regime to reform its domestic and foreign policies. Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called on August 13 for the regime to make concessions to the Iranian people, strengthen societal resilience, and reduce tensions with the West.[4] The Iranian Reformist Front separately issued a statement on August 17 that called for political reforms and foreign policy shifts, including suspending uranium enrichment under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight.[5] Khamenei rejected this and similar calls to engage with the United States in his speech on August 24, stating that the conflict between Iran and the United States is “unsolvable.” Khamenei additionally rejected direct talks with the United States but did not explicitly rule out the possibility of indirect negotiations.

Security Deal With Israel Is Likely, Syrian President Says

Latest Developments

  • Talks in ‘Advanced’ Stage: Interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa told representatives of Arab media outlets that Syria and Israel are in “advanced” talks on a security pact based on the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, adding that the chances that a deal will be reached are high. Sharaa emphasized that he did not believe it was the right time for a peace deal between the two neighboring states, which have technically been at war since 1948, but added that he “will not hesitate to take” any agreement that benefits Syria.
  • Syria to Provide Security Guarantees for Economic Investment: Details of the deal have been discussed during at least two U.S.-mediated meetings between Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaibani in July and August. Based on reports of the deal taking shape, Syria would agree to a complete demilitarization of the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, prevent the entry of any weapons or terrorists that could threaten Israel’s security, and establish a humanitarian corridor to the predominantly Druze Suwayda region. In return, Syria will be rehabilitated by the United States and allied Gulf states after having suffered economically during more than a decade of civil war.
  • Syria Aims to Stop Continued IDF Operations: Damascus is also pushing to restore the disengagement line established after the October 1973 war as part of the deal. After Sharaa’s Islamist forces overthrew the regime of former President Bashar al-Assad in December, the IDF took control of the Syrian side of the UN-patrolled buffer zone. Since then, Israel has conducted raids against terrorist cells in southern Syria, as well as airstrikes to protect the Syrian Druze minority against attack by pro-government forces.

Understanding China’s New Counterterrorism Ambitions in Africa

Abstract: China has recently been pursuing a much more aggressive stance in African security affairs, including playing a more engaged role in counterterrorism (CT). Where is China engaged in CT in Africa, and by what means? What challenges would China face in engaging more robustly in African CT? Most importantly, why is China newly expressing interest in engaging in the African CT landscape at this particular moment? In the main, this piece argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing’s primary motivations for entering the African CT space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical “economics-first” approach. Recognizing that engaging in African CT is a high-risk but potentially high-reward activity (which other global powers have recently engaged in with mixed results), Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of CT assistance—less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships—that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa. Yet, China faces challenges in its African CT pursuits, including reconciling whether its cautious ethos can stomach the turbulent landscape of African terrorism; how to deal with a saturated African CT space; and how not to fall victim to the same pitfalls as other global powers that have recently engaged in African CT. Nevertheless, if China can prove that its cautious non-military-first approach is fundamentally different from existing CT value propositions from external states, Beijing could deeply rival, and potentially replace, Washington as the partner of choice for security cooperation in Africa.

Tactical Victories in Ukraine Peace Talks Will Only Lead to Strategic Defeat

The summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska and subsequent meeting of the U.S. president with his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders in Washington have given rise to new hopes that an end to the Russia-Ukraine war may finally be in sight. After all, for the first time in several years, the parties have begun to discuss the practical parameters of a settlement.