Tainted metal scrap sourced from conflict zones can ultimately become finished steel used by some of Europe’s top firms.
The Syrian Investigative Reporting for Accountability Journalism Association (SIRAJ) and El País co-published a set of edited versions of this investigation.
As news of more mass atrocities committed by the United Arab Emirates-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) circulates, the Islamic State has again called for jihad in Sudan. In this week’s Al Naba newsletter, the global jihadist organization made its second call to arms for Sudan this year, while also encouraging foreign fighters to migrate to the country.
This is the first entry in a three-part blog series discussing the evolution of al-Qassam Brigades’ content, dissemination strategies, and the relevant policy implications for combating terrorist content online.
Al-Qassam Brigades Propaganda Content: Evolution Since October 7
Al-Qassam Brigades Propaganda: Evolution Since October 7 — Part 2 Dissemination
The al-Qassam Brigades (AQB) have long maintained an effective online propaganda apparatus. Following crackdowns on mainstream platforms like Twitter (X), Facebook, and YouTube, the group pivoted to self-hosted websites (Figure 1), dedicated apps (Figure 2), and a network of official and unofficial Telegram channels. AQB’s Telegram presence was established in 2015 and remains critical to the group’s sharing of propaganda to a wide audience. This infrastructure focused on exploiting self-hosting content and the inconsistent moderation practices of key platforms such as Telegram. This dissemination approach has been established over years, becoming the backbone of AQB’s surge in propaganda content during and following the October 7 attacks.
At the ceremony in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, the leaders of European and Arab states gathered behind US President Donald Trump. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) seemed somewhat lost on the sidelines of the peace show. Trump praised him, saying he was “very smart and he is doing a fantastic job for his country.”
Syria needs an economic reconstruction program. Desperately. Yet nearly a year after the fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad, there is still no talk of putting together a comprehensive economic reconstruction plan, whether in Damascus or among the obvious international stakeholders. Without clarity and wide-based consultation on the country’s new economic framework, there is a distinct risk that the cronyism of the Assad-era economy will reappear, undermining social equity and generating political discontent, and that violence will reemerge as “a central mechanism for the redistribution of power and wealth among competing forces,” as it did during the long civil war.
The convergence of interests between the US, Pakistan, and the Taliban means that a compromise between them to this end can’t be ruled out no matter how unlikely it might appear to be right now.
Trump’s recent reaffirmation of his plans to return US troops to Afghanistan’s Bagram Airbase was rejected by the Taliban, which was to be expected for appearance’s sake at this point while talks are reportedly underway, but another obstacle comes from Pakistan’s opposition. It recently released a joint statement with China, Iran, and Russia condemning the US’ plans. Nevertheless, since Pakistan would benefit from them and openly backs his Gaza plan, its statement shouldn’t be taken at face value.