Israeli tanks thrust closer to the heart of Gaza City on Monday, pressing a ground offensive hours before talks between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump, who has hinted at a diplomatic breakthrough in a bid to end the war.
After nearly two years of failed diplomatic efforts, Washington presented a 21-point plan to Arab and Muslim states last week that calls for a permanent ceasefire and the release of remaining hostages.
The Ugandan woman spoke of the months she spent in Albania as the worst time of her life. “Like prison,” she said.
“We didn’t have ID cards, we didn’t have employment permits, we didn’t have passports. Any identification document was withheld and we couldn’t move,” she said.
As Nizam* sped toward Italy on a crowded migrant boat, he filmed what he believed was the final stretch of his harrowing journey.
The 21-year-old house painter from Bangladesh held up his phone, framing his face before panning to roughly 50 others packed onto the white fiberglass vessel. Behind him, a man covered his eyes with his hands, seemingly in tears, while another, smiling, patted him on the back. The boat’s stern sat low as it cut through the twinkling Mediterranean.
The fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 revealed the ongoing significance of multiple foreign fighter organizations in Syria, groups that proved instrumental in Hayat Tahir al-Sham’s (HTS) campaign for Damascus. Among them were two primarily ethnic Uzbek fighter groups that originated in Central Asia: the Imam Bukhari Battalion (Katibat Imam al-Bukhari, KIB) and the Tavhid and Jihad Battalion (Katibat Tavhid va Jihod, KTJ). Smaller numbers of Uzbeks and other Central Asians joined Malhama Tactical, Muhojir Tactical, and Katibat al Ghuraba al Turkistan, which also supported HTS.1 a HTS voiced no objections as these organizations’ leaders gave media interviews in Damascus, celebrating their victory, and posted images of their involvement across dozens of social media channels. These Uzbek-led groups are among some 10,000 fighters, many from Russia and China, who lent critical support to HTS for over a decade.2 In spring 2025, HTS emir Ahmed al-Sharaa proposed integrating such foreign fighters into the new Syrian military, a process that has now begun.3 Yet, little is known about these entities, why and how they have operated in Syria for so long, or what role they might play in the post-Assad Syria.
Abstract: Al-Qaida has evolved considerably over the past four decades. Today, it is no longer a hierarchical organization with charismatic leadership, but rather a decentralized network of franchise groups dispersed throughout Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and beyond. The group has not conducted spectacular external operations (EXOPS) for many years, but instead has been focused on patiently rebuilding, dedicating its resources and manpower to forging relationships with regional affiliates and championing their grievances, which are often locally focused. Al-Qaida Central, including its senior leadership, has been attenuated, but the organization’s branches in Somalia and the Sahel are gaining momentum, and there is growing concern that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is also looking to rebound. All of this is occurring against a backdrop of decline in the overall tempo of Western counterterrorism efforts, signaling the end of more than two decades of the Global War on Terrorism. Even in its diminished form, 24 years after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida and its global network of affiliates pose a serious latent security threat, including to the West, which takes these groups for granted at its own peril.
Syria’s transitional government is cracking down on the production of Captagon — an illicit synthetic stimulant that flourished under the sponsorship of the Bashar al-Assad regime until its fall in December. But production and trade of the drug are continuing, particularly in parts of Syria not yet under the control of the new administration.
Environ 50 000 anciens membres de l’État islamique (EI) et leurs familles sont actuellement détenus dans 27 prisons et centres de détention à travers le Nord-Est de la Syrie. Ils ont été les théâtres, au fil des années, de tentatives d’évasion, dont certaines ont abouti à la libération de djihadistes qui sont ensuite venus renforcer les rangs du groupe terroriste.
The Lebanese government’s efforts to secure a monopoly over weapons are advancing, but can it ignore Iran?
The decision of the Lebanese government on August 5* to officially endorse the state’s monopoly over weapons was an important milestone. Yet it was also incomplete, because it didn’t really address a dimension that has been largely overlooked in public statements, namely that, today, Hezbollah’s weapons are effectively controlled by Iran.
Knitting law and politics together into a constitution that serves as a repository of hard-won agreements is a matter of trust and bargaining, rather than foresight. But Syria’s will need both.
In March 2025, interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa issued a constitutional declaration to govern the country’s transitional phase. The goals inferred were clear: to assure Syrians that order and justice would be restored, that their rights would be recognized, and that the Syrian president would guide the country away from its dark experience with oppressive dictatorship.
Hizbullah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem said in an address aired on Al-Araby TV (Qatar) on September 19, 2025, that Saudi Arabia should turn a new leaf with the resistance. He called for dialogue that addresses problems and fears and is based on the principle that Israel – not the resistance – is the enemy. He urged freezing past disagreements so the focus can shift to confronting Israel. Qassem added that pressure on the resistance only benefits Israel, warning that if the resistance did not exist, these countries would eventually be targeted. He said that the resistance in Palestine serves as a dam against Israeli expansion.
