La crise de Gibraltar

Lire la crise de Ceuta simplement comme un « afflux spontané de migrants depuis le Maroc » ne permet pas d’expliquer la structure politique qui entoure l’événement. L’accord trilatéral de 2020 entre les États-Unis, Israël et le Maroc a lié les revendications territoriales du Maroc, la normalisation avec Israël et le soutien diplomatique des États-Unis dans une même relation d’échange. Par la suite, les relations israélo-marocaines sont passées de la diplomatie à la coopération en matière de renseignement militaire et de défense, suivie par la reconnaissance de la souveraineté marocaine sur le Sahara occidental. En 2026, les forces armées des deux pays en étaient arrivées à opérer selon un plan de travail conjoint. À peu près au même moment, des arguments ont commencé à apparaître ouvertement du côté israélien selon lesquels Israël devrait soutenir le Maroc dans la «récupération de son Nord», c’est-à-dire de Ceuta et de Melilla, par la diplomatie, des opérations informationnelles et une influence politique à Washington.

Exclusive: Palestine Action facing new rigged ‘terrorism’ trials

A judge has threatened defendants with a ‘terrorism connection’ if they even attempt to explain to jurors why they targeted a weapons factory.

As the British state seeks to destroy Palestine Action, a new trial is underway in which a judge has threatened defendants with a ‘terrorism connection’ if they explain the motives behind their activism.
It is one of three such trials in which the government has muzzled defendants, blinded jurors and banned local media coverage to guarantee convictions.

Maroc : 111 migrants arrêtés après tentative vers Ceuta

Les autorités marocaines ont procédé à l’arrestation de 111 migrants irréguliers à Fnideq et ses environs suite à une tentative de traversée massive vers Ceuta, a indiqué samedi un communiqué officiel citant un responsable sous couvert d’anonymat.

Netanyahu’s Réprise Of The ‘Iraq WMD Deceit’: Re-Launched To Promote War On Iran – OpEd

Key Takeaways
The piece argues that the US entered and continued the Iran conflict with critical gaps in air-defence interceptor stocks (requiring years rather than months to replenish due to China-controlled rare-earth materials) and that optimistic official claims about oil flows through alternative routes and manageable energy shortages lack credible evidence.
Iran is portrayed as resilient, retaining substantial offshore oil stocks, showing no signs of economic collapse under blockade, and prepared to escalate rather than capitulate if pressured further, while the prolonged standoff imposes rising military and economic costs on the US and Gulf producers.
Drawing on Israeli analysts and former officials, the article questions whether the war was truly a necessary preventive strike against an imminent nuclear threat or an opportunistic campaign driven by exaggerated claims, noting contradictions between Netanyahu’s public assertions and more cautious Israeli and US intelligence assessments that found no solid evidence of active weaponization.
President Trump took Secretary of War Hegseth’s military cheerleading (‘U.S. military potency is awesome’) at face value, only belatedly to discover that the U.S. is out of interceptors in a war that hinges on air defences. ‘The restock mathematics is just as cold. Four years to refill the stocks (not four months), because components include rare earth materials that are controlled by China’.

Saudi Money, Turkish Weapons, Pakistani Manpower: Munir Looking To Lead Somewhere – Analysis

Key Takeaways
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement of 7 August 2026 is a defensive political-military framework among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan that institutionalises coordination, joint exercises and defence-industrial cooperation rather than an immediate “Islamic NATO.”
Pakistan stands to gain most in strategic profile, financial support, access to Turkish technology and broader regional influence (including through arms exports such as the reported Libya deal), while Saudi Arabia seeks security diversification and Türkiye expands its defence-industrial reach.
For India the pact is neither an automatic anti-India alliance nor something to ignore; New Delhi should monitor Pakistan’s expanding external networks, strengthen relevant military capabilities, and deepen its own substantial economic and strategic ties with Saudi Arabia while maintaining engagement with Türkiye.
The signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026 marks an important development in the evolving security architecture of West Asia. The agreement, signed in Mecca by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, provides that an armed attack against one signatory will be regarded as an attack against all three. The three countries have, however, repeatedly emphasised that the arrangement is defensive in character and is not directed against any particular state. Recent statements from Türkiye indicate that the pact is intended to institutionalise political and military coordination, joint exercises and defence-industrial cooperation.

La restructuration de l’ordre moyen-oriental dans une perspective de rivalité entre grandes puissances

Situé au carrefour géopolitique de l’Europe, de l’Asie et de l’Afrique, le Moyen-Orient contrôle les principales régions de production mondiale de pétrole et de gaz, ainsi que les trois principaux points de passage maritimes internationaux : le détroit d’Ormuz, le détroit de Mandeb et le canal de Suez. Depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, il est le théâtre central de la compétition stratégique entre les puissances mondiales. L’ordre hégémonique unipolaire instauré par les États-Unis après la fin de la Guerre froide — reposant sur trois piliers : la puissance militaire, financière et diplomatique — a commencé à s’effondrer rapidement après le rapprochement de Pékin en 2023 entre l’Arabie saoudite et l’Iran. Avec le recentrage stratégique des États-Unis vers l’Est, la concrétisation du rapprochement saoudo-iranien et la recherche collective d’une autonomie stratégique par les États du Golfe, l’ordre régional est entré dans une période de profonds ajustements, marquée par une restructuration historique.

From exception to model: Albania as a laboratory for European migration policies

The Rama-Meloni agreement takes on a significance that goes far beyond the management of repatriations on behalf of the Italian state, and therefore of Europe. More than a simple bilateral agreement, the protocol has become a political and legal precedent, anticipating some of the rationales currently at the heart of the European debate on the externalisation of migration

The Migration Wave That Embarrassed Morocco and Rattled Europe

What’s happening in Ceuta? What were the conditions or factors that contributed to it?

Sarah Yerkes: Last week tens of thousands of migrants, primarily Moroccans, attempted to cross into Ceuta and (to a lesser extent) Melilla—small Spanish enclaves in North Africa. The vast majority were either forcibly or voluntarily returned to Morocco, and more than eighty did not survive the journey, although that number is likely to grow.