Ben Sales, du Times of Israel, évoque le «moment d’Israël en Amérique latine»1. Il soutient que «Jérusalem capitale d’Israël est une idée accueillie avec enthousiasme par des dirigeants latinos de droite (sic), désireux de suivre l’exemple de la Maison Blanche, de gagner le soutien des électeurs évangéliques (mégasic !) et de bénéficier de la technologie israélienne».
Despite being 1,000 miles apart and in different time zones, Turkey and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) maintain a military partnership that operates in direct violation of a standing UN arms embargo. Turkish combat drones initially helped SAF reverse the tide of the civil war. However, by late summer, counter-momentum by rival forces erased those gains, forcing Sudanese Chief of Staff Yasir al-Atta to travel to Ankara to request expanded, urgent military assistance from his Turkish counterpart, Selcuk Bayraktaroglu. But what is Turkey doing intervening in Africa?
Le conflit entre la Turquie et Israël s’intensifie, passant du plan diplomatique et économique au domaine judiciaire.
À l’heure actuelle, la Turquie a non seulement bloqué tous les canaux commerciaux et économiques avec Israël, mais elle a également engagé des poursuites contre Netanyahou et 35 autres hauts responsables israéliens devant ses propres tribunaux. Le 21 août, le ministre turc de la Justice, Gürlek, a annoncé publiquement que la Turquie avait officiellement demandé à Interpol d’émettre des avis de recherche rouges à l’encontre des personnes susmentionnées. Les tribunaux turcs ont finalement prononcé un total de 4596 ans de prison à l’encontre de Netanyahou et des autres accusés.
L’entité sioniste génocidaire est confrontée à une crise. Son agent des États-Unis, Trump, victime du chantage du syndicat d’Epstein, est au plus bas dans les sondages. Et la guerre d’Israël contre l’Iran, menée en détournant l’armée américaine, s’annonce comme une défaite catastrophique.
Key Takeaways:
The 7 August 2026 Mecca Pact (Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan) treats an attack on one as an attack on all and adds exercises, intel, tech, and defence industry—building on the 2025 Saudi–Pakistan deal. The author calls it an emerging mix of Saudi money/energy, Turkish arms and NATO know-how, and Pakistani manpower plus a declared nuclear capability—not a second NATO. The three do not share one threat map (India vs Greece/Cyprus/Israel/Iran vs Gulf/Iran).
For Albania and Kosovo the point is Ankara’s “strategic depth”: the Balkans as a corridor from the Eastern Mediterranean to Central Europe, not a side story. Turkish aims (influence, markets, corridors, arms exports) overlap with Albanian aims (sovereignty, NATO/EU, holding off Serbia) but are not the same. Friendship and religion are not a security doctrine.
Prescription: keep Euro-Atlantic integration as the spine; treat Türkiye as a partner on drones, air defence, cyber, and training—not a substitute for the U.S., NATO, or the EU. Build an Albania–Kosovo defence ecosystem so the two republics produce security instead of only consuming it. Serbia will watch Turkish weight; interests, not “natural alliance,” should set the terms.
Key Takeaways:
Trump and Treasury Secretary Bessent say Hormuz could be “worthless” in about two years as oil moves by land—pipelines and, for now, thousands of trucks on a 1,500 km Iraq–Syria run to Baniyas. Analysts call that rhetoric. Energy Aspects’ Richard Bronze and former NSC official Robert McNally: extra pipes help crude; they will not retire the strait or the other cargo that uses it.
Existing pipes were already near full before the February war: Saudi Petroline up to 7 million bpd (5 million for export; +2 million under study); UAE Habshan–Fujairah 1.5 million, a doubling targeted by 2027. On the table: revive Kirkuk–Baniyas (~300,000 bpd), keep Kirkuk–Ceyhan (~1.5 million, now ~half used), Basra–Aqaba (up to 2.5 million), mothballed Kirkuk–Tripoli, and expensive Kuwait routes to Yanbu or Fujairah. Trucks and rail are crisis workarounds, not a fleet replacement.
Scale gap: more than 20 million bpd of crude and products went through Hormuz in 2025. Pipes do little for diesel/refined products or Qatari LNG (~one-fifth of world supply; the Dolphin line is only ~20 bcm vs ~110 bcm exported). UNCTAD: 30 million+ TEU and mixed daily traffic (tankers, boxes, bulk grain and fertilizer). Even a full land net would not empty the waterway.
Key Takeaways
The new issue, Palestine Fights Back, challenges the political and intellectual taboo surrounding serious discussion of Palestinian armed resistance.
Six essays examine resistance through the experiences of Palestine, South Africa and the wider region, addressing strategy, culture, history and political agency.
Contributors include Ronnie Kasrils, Tahrir Hamdi, Ramzy Baroud, Robert Inlakesh and Romana Rubeo.
Thinking Palestine has launched its latest thematic issue, Palestine Fights Back, bringing together a series of essays examining Palestinian resistance as a historical, political and strategic phenomenon.
Key Takeaways:
PAS is no longer just a northern opposition party: largest federal bloc since GE2022, runs Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, and with a BN–PN pact just took Negeri Sembilan (August 2026). The article asks what foreign policy would look like if PAS led Putrajaya—not only hudud at home.
Outlook still starts with 1980s ulama politics (Brotherhood + Iran as models; Darul Islam / Ahdi / Harbi; no Israel; Palestine first). In office (PN 2020–22) that mixed with statecraft: Hadi as Middle East envoy (Qatar, Taliban talks; critics called it ceremonial and Brotherhood-tinged); the Lajnah still slams Abraham Accords but Hadi still met the UAE ambassador. Faith frames the world; practice can split from doctrine.
State governments show “development diplomacy.” Terengganu’s Ahmad Samsuri courts Korea (hydrogen, rare earths), Singapore’s Lee Hsien Loong (ECRL, Kemaman Port); Kedah’s Sanusi pitches China on Kulim airport. The author’s bet: a PAS federal government would sound more Islamist than Anwar’s Malaysia but keep China, ASEAN, Gulf and even non-Muslim neighbours for investment—rhetoric shifts more than the trade map. Risk is delivery and competitiveness, not only ideology.
In Malaysia, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia’s (PAS) electoral performance has gained momentum since the 1990s. Since the 2022 General Election, it has held the largest number of seats in the federal parliament. It now also controls three states: Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu. Rather than viewing PAS as a regional party,[1] policymakers both within and outside Malaysia are beginning to prepare for the possibility of a PAS-led, or at least PAS-dominated, federal government. PAS was part of the federal government in two instances in the past: in Barisan Nasional (BN, 1974-1977) and Perikatan Nasional (PN, 2020-2022), but as a minor party in the coalitions. Currently, there is an electoral pact between BN and PN, which successfully defeated Pakatan Harapan (PH) in the August 2026 Negeri Sembilan state election, thereby forming the new state government. Consequently, it is no longer merely an academic exercise to ask what policy direction Malaysia might take in the eventuality of PAS forming the federal government.[2]
The Russian authorities announced the “wonderful acquisition” of the relics of Dmitry Donskoy and sent them to the front. Modern propaganda paints Dmitry as a holy fighter against the coalition of the “West” and the defender of Orthodoxy. This is already a new iteration of an alternative story around this historical figure, which began to become myths two hundred years after the death of the prince. During his life and in the next few centuries after his death, Dmitry was neither Donskoy nor holy (he was with the church in deep conflict), but the fighter against the West called him and completely ridiculous: no single West then simply did not exist, and everyone fought with everyone.