After the death of Josip Broz Tito on May 4, 1980, the Yugoslav Empire lost the main link uniting the empire. In the further history of Yugoslavia, there were no longer any high statesmen who would pursue the line of so-called Tithonism.
Over the course of the last two years, the Islamic State in Libya has gradually re-emerged as a formidable insurgent force. Following its territorial loss of Sirte in late 2016 to a U.S.-backed, anti-Islamic State coalition, the group has adopted new approaches to recruitment and financing. These reveal that the group has become more reliant on sub-Saharan African personnel in its post-territorial phase and has simultaneously deepened its connections with Libya’s desert smuggling networks, which connect North Africa to the Sahel. Moreover, as will be outlined in this article, its organizational structure appears to have shifted from ‘state-like’ to ‘guerrilla insurgency-like.’
On the evening of 16 September, Government of National Accord (GNA)/ and Presidential Council (PC) head Fayez al-Serraj announced on live television that he would ‘hand over’ his duties ‘to the next executive authority no later than the end of October.’ Serraj reportedly arrived in Tripoli from Turkey the day of his announcement and urged negotiators to quickly name ‘a new administration’ to ‘secure a peaceful and smooth transition’
No relevant developments.
On 17 September, details emerged of a Russian-brokered deal negotiated in Sochi between the Presidential Council (PC)/Government of National Accord (GNA) Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteeq (representing himself) and Khalid Haftar, the son of the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar. Neither the GNA/PC nor the National Oil Corporation (NOC) participated in or were signatories to the deal, and as such the deal could not be said to be binding on them. The following day, LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar gave a speech on television in which he announced that Libya’s oil ports would reopen, based on the agreement reached with Maiteeq. At this point, the NOC had the legal right to not restart production, but did not want to be seen to be blocking progress. On 19 September, the NOC announced the lifting of force majeure on ‘safe’ oil fields and ports. In its statement, the NOC added that it had instructed relevant companies to restart productions, but that ‘force majeure continues on the oil fields and ports that confirmed the presence of elements of Wagner and other armed groups that impede the activities and operations’ of the NOC.
On 21 September, the LNA claimed that its 128 Brigade and 116 Battalion had arrested an ISIS member in the town of Ghadduwah in southern Libya. The LNA reported that the individual was connected to a cell that had been recently raided by the LNA in the Abd al-Kafi neighbourhood of Sebha.
The decision of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to normalize relations with Israel has not disadvantaged Qatar’s relationship with the Trump administration.
On 3 September, the Presidential Council (PC) of the Government of National Accord (GNA) announced that the GNA’s Minister of Interior (MoI), Fathi Bashaagha, had been re-instated in his role after being suspended the previous week. The announcement came after a five-hour hearing concerning the recent protests in the western region and the response and role of the security forces. On 7 September, the GNA’s Operation Volcano of Rage (VoR) announced through its spokesperson, Mohammed Gununu, that it had taken down a helicopter belonging to the Libyan National Army (LNA) near the Sirte-Jufra frontlines. However, other reports suggest that the helicopter undertook an emergency landing south of Abu Grein. On 2 September, Gununu accused LNA forces of violating a declared ceasefire for the second time in 3 days. Gununu said the LNA fired six grad rockets at the positions of the GNA armed forces west of Sirte. He added that the GNA armed forces were waiting for instructions from the supreme commander on how to respond. On 4 September, the spokesperson for the Government of National Accord (GNA) Sirte-Jufra Operations Room, Abdelhadi Drah, denied reports that mercenaries from the Russian Private Military Contractor (PMC) Wagner Group had pulled out of Sirte and Jufra to Ras Lanuf that day. Drah added that the pro-Haftar Central Backup Force, positioned west of Sirte, had left to an unknown destination.
On 6 September, delegations representing the eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR), the High Council of State (HCS), and three advisors from the eastern region began discussions under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and Moroccan Foreign Minister, Nasser Bourita, in the town of Bouznika in Morocco. Dialogue participants will explore ways toward a political solution to the Libyan crisis and the connected mechanisms to replace the heads of several of the current Libyan semi-sovereign institutions. On 7 September, head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Serraj was received by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul for a closed-door meeting. Serraj’s visit followed meetings between other senior Libyan officials and Turkish authorities regarding the GNA’s ceasefire announcement of 21 August. On 2 September, the acting head of the UNSMIL, Stephanie Williams, said to the UN Security Council (UNSC) that foreign supporters in Libya were helping stockpile weapons in breach of an arms embargo as coronavirus ‘spirals out control’ in the country. Williams, citing a confidential report, told the Security Council that 70 resupply flights had landed in eastern Libya since 8 July, and 30 flights and nine cargo ships had carried material to western Libya to assist the GNA in Tripoli. The report attributed these and other violations of the embargo to the Russian Private Military Contractor (PMC) Wagner Group along with Turkey, the UAE, Jordan and Qatar, as well as Russia itself. On 1 September, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Union (EU), Joseph Borrel, met with head of the GNA, Serraj and head of the Turbruq-based House of Representatives (HoR) Saleh to help advance the dialogue process in the country. During the meeting, Borrel reiterated the EU’s support for an inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-owned dialogue, and conveyed the EU’s ‘strong and unwavering commitment to preserving Libya’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and national unity.’ On 1 September, Italian Foreign Minister Luigi di Maio made an unannounced visit to Libya, where he met separately with Serraj and Saleh to discuss recent ceasefire initiatives. Serraj’s office issued a statement following the meeting that he and Di Maio had discussed ‘points of agreement’ with Saleh on implementing a permanent ceasefire and demilitarisation of Sirte and Jufra.
No relevant developments.
No relevant developments.
A peaceful uprising against the president of Syria almost eight years ago turned into a full-scale civil war. The conflict has left more than 360,000 people dead, devastated cities and drawn in other countries. Even before the conflict began, many Syrians were complaining about high unemployment, corruption and a lack of political freedom under President Bashar al-Assad, who succeeded his father, Hafez, after he died in 2001. In March 2012, pro-democracy demonstrations erupted in the southern city of Deraa, inspired by the “Arab Spring” in neighbouring countries. When the government used deadly force to crush the dissent, protests demanding the president’s resignation erupted nationwide. The unrest spread and the crackdown intensified. Opposition supporters took up arms, first to defend themselves and later to rid their areas of security forces. Mr Assad vowed to crush what he called “foreign-backed terrorism”. The violence rapidly escalated and the country descended into civil war.
Read MoreOn 27 August, the United States and United Nations co-chaired a meeting regarding the Berlin Process on Libya. During the meeting, the US welcomed calls by House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aqeela Saleh and Government of National Accord (GNA) head Fayez al-Serraj on 21 August for a ceasefire and the resumption of oil production. The US also reiterated its support for Libyan efforts to build on this momentum and ‘to achieve a peaceful political solution that preserves Libyan sovereignty.’ On 30 August, the head of the Arab League, Ahmed Aboul-Gheit, met with Acting Head of the UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) Stephanie Williams in Cairo to discuss the latest developments in Libya. At the meeting, the two parties agreed on the importance of building on the joint calls for a ceasefire and vowed to end all hostilities in Libya. They also called for presidential and parliamentary elections and the resumption of oil exports. On 29 August, Acting Head of UNSMIL, Williams, arrived in Cairo for a three-day visit to engage with various officials on the Libya crisis. On 30 August, Williams met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry to discuss efforts to advance political discussions centred on the ceasefire statements of 21 August. According to an official statement by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, the two ‘shared a vision’ on the way to reach a political settlement. On 28 August, Turkey announced that it would undertake military exercises, known as ‘gunnery exercises’, off the northwest coast of Cyprus from 29 August through to 11 September. This coincided with the extending of activities of a seismic vessel in the Mediterranean until 1 September. Within hours of Turkey’s announcement, Greece’s Parliament ratified a maritime accord with Egypt on maritime boundaries. On 26 August, Greece and Italy also finalised a similar agreement.
On the morning of 1 September, a suspected failed suicide bombing occurred close to a Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned checkpoint at the Doran al-Ghariyan roundabout, near Janzour in western Tripoli. Initial reports claim the bomber was traveling on a motorcycle at the time the explosion was set off. The target of the attack is believed to have been the checkpoint belonging to the Janzour Knights.
On 28 August, Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister and head of the Presidency Council (PC) Fayez al-Serraj announced that he was suspending Interior Minister Fathi Bashaagha and called for an investigation of Bashaagha’s handling of street protests. Serraj said the investigation of Bashaagha would occur within 72 hours; meanwhile, his duties would be assumed by a deputy minister, Khalid Mazen. Bashaagha responded in a statement by expressing readiness for an investigation but said it should be televised to ensure transparency. Serraj’s announcement coincided with a series of other decrees, including one granting the Zintani-dominated Joint Security Force the responsibility to secure Tripoli; one promoting Deputy Minister of Defence Saleh al-Din Namroush to Minister of Defence and one appointing Central Military Region Commander Mohammed Haddad as the new Chief of Staff (CoS).