It’s premature to speculate about the details of their discussions, but the news items shared in this analysis indicate that they could concern the resumption of peace talks and possible pathways for getting there, including those that go around Zelensky or even get rid of him if he remains an obstacle.
The war in Ukraine heralded a new era of public engagement for Defence Intelligence. However, the Israel–Hamas war has demonstrated that it is not a silver bullet for countering disinformation.
In the days and weeks following Hamas’s attack on Israel, and as the Israeli counteroffensive began, no daily intelligence updates were made public by Defence Intelligence in the UK’s Ministry of Defence. This sort of disclosure would not have been expected at all a few years ago. But during the build-up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, then-Chief of Defence Intelligence Lt Gen (now Gen) James Hockenhull began briefing publicly that Russia was not drawing down its troops as the Kremlin had claimed. Public commentary on ongoing crises from within the UK’s intelligence establishment was unprecedented at the time. It placed the UK in clear defiance of Russian disinformation, and strongly signalled the UK’s resolve to counter Russian narratives surrounding the war.
Mali’s military junta succeeded in kicking out the U.N. peacekeeping force, and on Wednesday its Russian allies scored yet another victory against the U.N.: They were able to terminate all U.N. sanctions on Malians and abolish a panel of experts which has been critical of activities of Russia’s Wagner Group in the West African nation.
Niger’s new military junta has asked for help from the Russian mercenary group Wagner as the deadline nears for it to release the country’s ousted president or face possible military intervention by the West African regional bloc, according to an analyst.
The Wagner Group’s presence extends from the ancient battlegrounds of Syria to the deserts of sub-Saharan Africa, projecting the Kremlin’s global influence with mercenaries accused of using brutal force and profiting from seized mineral riches.
After the dramatic death of Russian warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin and several of his closest lieutenants in August, much of the discussion among international observers has centred around which individuals or organizations might take control of Prigozhin’s economic, military and criminal activities in Africa.
As we reach the end of 2023, while the Russian government celebrates “healthy” economic growth of around 3%,[1] ordinary Russians seem to be disturbed by the rapid increase in retail prices. By late November, the cost of many foodstuffs (including “benchmark” bananas and eggs), staple goods and services recorded a solid jump: eggs are now 23%, more expensive than they were a year ago, poultry 26%, bananas 47%, oranges 80%, and tomatoes 121%.[2] In its attempt to fight accelerating inflation, the Roskomnadzor, the Russian federal executive agency responsible for monitoring, controlling and censoring Russian mass media, blocked a popular website “Prices today” where different prices were compared from across the country.[3] Meanwhile, as the Bank of Russia gradually revises its 2023 inflation forecast to 7.5% from 5%, as was released in July,[4] the Kremlin is addressing the issue extremely often as it has become a matter of concern among the Russian population.
Last month, Ukrainian researchers and Politico correspondents revealed that they had identified nearly 200 Cubans who had joined the Russian military in recent weeks, with enlistees ranging in age between 19 and 69. In interviews, Cuban recruits reported a range of Russian tactics to secure new personnel. Many in particular cited monetary incentives and the prospect of Russian citizenship — an attractive draw for young men in a country beset by food insecurity and joblessness.
The 10th anniversary of the start of Ukraine’s Euromaidan, when thousands of demonstrators set up a protest camp in Kyiv’s central square, was last week.
Ukraine’s economy had been struggling and the Kremlin-backed President Viktor Yanukovych knew something had to be done to create new opportunities. Meanwhile the EU’s Eastern Partnership, the platform used by Brussels to engage with Eastern Europe, was keen to deepen relations with the countries of east, especially Ukraine. This led to a proposed political association and free trade agreement between the EU and Kyiv.
Putin and Medvedev recently made statements that took an expansive view of what “Russian lands” in Ukraine amounted to. At least as far as Putin is concerned, what he said at the November 3 meeting with members of the Civic Chamber is, philosophically, not all that different than the sort of historical observations Putin had made before.