Un terroriste ayant mené la fusillade au Crocus City Hall en Russie a avoué avoir tué pour de l’argent et non pour une idéologie extrémiste. L’enquête est en cours pour déterminer les motivations exactes des terroristes et identifier les éventuels complices.
Emmanuel Macron l’offensé s’imagine être en mission pour restaurer la «grandeur de la France», semblant nourrir le fantasme de diriger également le reste de l’Europe sous tutelle parisienne.
Le président russe Vladimir Poutine a vu juste cette semaine lorsqu’il a expliqué pourquoi le Français Emmanuel Macron se pavanait et parlait de la guerre en Ukraine.
Le 24 février 2022, Vladimir Poutine, président de la Fédération de Russie annonce le déclenchement et les objectifs d’une opération spéciale russe en Ukraine. Surprenante pour certains, attendue au point d’être annoncée par d’autres, cette opération conduite avec des effectifs très limités au départ, à un contre trois, obtient d’emblée des résultats spectaculaires sur un front initial très étendu de 2600 kms.
It’s come to light that according to sources from the French Marianne paper, Macron’s entire recent mental manqué resulted from a secret series of ‘assessments’ by the French military that not only provided an absolutely disastrous picture of the actual realities on the ground in Ukraine, but in no uncertain terms even concluded quite frankly that: “Ukraine cannot win this war militarily.”
This project is a much bigger deal than most observers have realized since it’ll play an important role in shaping the EU and NATO’s post-conflict future upon the inevitable end of their proxy war on Russia.
Romanian media recently reported that their country is building the so-called “Moldova Highway” (MH) between the capital of Bucharest and the town of Siret on the Ukrainian border in “emergency” mode. 3,000 workers and hundreds of vehicles are said to be involved in round-the-clock construction on this project. Upon its completion, the MH will have major military-strategic implications, which will be briefly discussed in this piece.
While Moscow opposes the “military Schengen” due to the ease with which it’ll facilitate NATO aggression against Belarus, Kaliningrad, and/or “mainland” Russia and regards Bild’s leak as ridiculous, the Kremlin isn’t troubled by Germany reimposing its hegemony over Poland through these means.
Olaf Scholz’s long dithering before sending tanks is symptomatic of a deep-seated mindset that détente won the Cold War, not Reagan’s belligerence.
In early January of 1984, an aspiring young West German socialist with a shoulder-length curly mane traveled by train to East Berlin with his comrades for an important meeting.
NATO is planning for a possible Russian breakthrough across the Line of Contact later this year but isn’t yet sure how to react if that happens.
French President Macron hosted over 20 fellow European leaders in Paris on Monday to discuss their next moves in Ukraine, including the possibility of a conventional NATO intervention, which he said they hadn’t ruled out for reasons of “strategic ambiguity” despite not reaching a consensus on this. His Polish counterpart Duda also confirmed that this subject was the most heated part of their discussions. The very fact that this scenario is being officially considered shows how desperate NATO has become.
On February 22, 2024, the pro-Syrian Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), Al-‘Askari Media, published on Telegram a set of infographic posters titled “The Kamikaze – The Weapon That Will Change Future Wars.” The images inform the group’s fighters on how to avoid being targeted by “kamikaze” drones, also known as suicide drones.[1]
Early in the War, Moscow Struggled to Shift Gears—but Now It’s Outlearning Kyiv
Throughout the war in Ukraine, Kyiv and Moscow have waged an adaptation battle, trying to learn and improve their military effectiveness. In the early stages of the invasion, Ukraine had the advantage. Empowered by a rapid influx of Western weapons, motivated by the existential threat posed by Russia’s aggression, and well prepared for the attack, Kyiv was able to develop new ways of fighting in remarkably short order. Russia, in contrast, fumbled: a big, arrogant, and lumbering bear, overconfident of a rapid victory. The institutional shock of Russia’s lack of success, in turn, slowed its ability to learn and adapt.