Rusia

Olaf Scholz’s long dithering before sending tanks is symptomatic of a deep-seated mindset that détente won the Cold War, not Reagan’s belligerence.

In early January of 1984, an aspiring young West German socialist with a shoulder-length curly mane traveled by train to East Berlin with his comrades for an important meeting.

NATO is planning for a possible Russian breakthrough across the Line of Contact later this year but isn’t yet sure how to react if that happens.

French President Macron hosted over 20 fellow European leaders in Paris on Monday to discuss their next moves in Ukraine, including the possibility of a conventional NATO intervention, which he said they hadn’t ruled out for reasons of “strategic ambiguity” despite not reaching a consensus on this. His Polish counterpart Duda also confirmed that this subject was the most heated part of their discussions. The very fact that this scenario is being officially considered shows how desperate NATO has become.

Early in the War, Moscow Struggled to Shift Gears—but Now It’s Outlearning Kyiv

Throughout the war in Ukraine, Kyiv and Moscow have waged an adaptation battle, trying to learn and improve their military effectiveness. In the early stages of the invasion, Ukraine had the advantage. Empowered by a rapid influx of Western weapons, motivated by the existential threat posed by Russia’s aggression, and well prepared for the attack, Kyiv was able to develop new ways of fighting in remarkably short order. Russia, in contrast, fumbled: a big, arrogant, and lumbering bear, overconfident of a rapid victory. The institutional shock of Russia’s lack of success, in turn, slowed its ability to learn and adapt.

Dans un contexte où la liberté d’expression est devenue la cible préférée de nos gouvernants et où les instances européennes se sont donné pour mission de faire taire toute information alternative, Réseau International doit également mener une lutte permanente contre diverses malveillances ayant pour but la dégradation de la qualité su site. Aidez-nous à relever le défi, soutenez-nous grâce à vos dons.

Gloomy speeches at the Munich Security Conference reflect the general mood two years into Russia’s war on Ukraine. Rather than drawing conclusions and analogies that benefit the Kremlin, the West should bolster support for Kyiv.

Dans le dernier sitrep Ukraine, j’évoquais le choix du général Oleksandr Syrsky comme nouveau commandant en chef des forces armées ukrainiennes. Il est probable qu’il soutiendra les choix agressifs du président ukrainien Zelensky.

Extending the transport of Russian gas via Ukraine after 2024 would likely benefit both Russia and Ukraine. Stopping the flow of gas, on the other hand, would be painful for whichever side initiates it.

At the end of 2024, a five-year agreement expires governing one of the oldest and biggest economic links between Russia and Europe: the transit of Russian gas through the territory of Ukraine. Kyiv has already said it will not extend the agreement, and Russian officials have confirmed no negotiations to that end are under way with either Ukraine or the EU. Still, that’s not to say that no more Russian gas will ever be shipped via Ukraine.

There are no grounds for the doom-filled prophecies that without Zaluzhny, Ukraine faces disaster. But the circumstances of the general’s departure do leave the impression of a president who is overreaching his hand by more or less openly putting narrow and selfish interests before considerations of state.

Russian spy-saboteurs from military unit 29155 of the GRU travel around the world under false names, organizing murders, explosions and chemical weapons poisonings, but before going abroad they need to create a reliable legend. Sometimes, for this purpose, they spend years infiltrating the circles of human rights activists, journalists or filmmakers. Having gained trust in these circles, the GRU killers were able to infiltrate Kasparov’s forum, join the Documentary Film League and get a job at the newspaper.