The Russian Military Campaign Against Europe: Defining the Threat

Introduction

The Kremlin is conducting a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns targeting Europe, and NATO states must understand and forthrightly discuss both these ongoing Russian campaigns against Europe and the evolving character of the near-term Russian conventional threat in order to design and execute holistic responses. European governments increased their willingness to publicly attribute and discuss ongoing Russian kinetic attacks against Europe after the German government officially attributed the August 5 Leipzig airport drone attack to Russia.[1] European states and leaders still too often refer to Russian actions with language that impedes effective responses, however, and have not taken sufficient action of their own to deter the escalating Russian campaign against them. European governments must develop a shared conceptual framework to understand ongoing Russian campaigns, an essential step toward creating a coordinated policy plan to respond to and deter Russian actions. NATO has recognized the changing near-term Russian conventional threat and has identified the need for rapid European rearmament and adaptation drawing on lessons from Ukraine to meet this threat, although action is lagging behind words. European states must accelerate and improve these rearmament and adaptation efforts and must prepare for the risk of a limited Russian conventional attack on a shorter timeline than the 2028-2030 window that many NATO states currently discuss. NATO and European states can defeat the ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns and deter the growing Russian conventional threat, but only on the basis of a shared understanding of the problem that will enable them to design and execute coordinated policy plans with the necessary sense of urgency and without panic. This paper presents an initial assessment of the current and near-term Russian threats, priority lines of effort for NATO states, and necessary future analytical work by ISW and other organizations.

La nouvelle frontière de la Russie en Afrique

Alors que la stratégie russe visant à étendre son influence au Sahel s’effondre, Moscou change de cap pour employer les mêmes tactiques consistant à attiser la contestation envers la démocratie et à promouvoir la cause du régime militaire dans les démocraties des pays côtiers d’Afrique de l’Ouest.

Al-Sharaa, Bin Zayed Seek Stronger Syria-UAE Ties

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his UAE counterpart, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, affirmed their commitment to continue advancing Syria-UAE relations in a way that helps fulfill both countries’ aspirations for development and for building a more “advanced and prosperous” future.

Building an Effective Train-and-Equip Mission for Lebanon Post-UNIFIL

Authorities should view the end of UNIFIL not as a prelude to a security vacuum, but as a chance to establish a workable U.S.-led transition mechanism that brings in Arab, European, and international partners, with the ultimate goal of helping Lebanon exercise full sovereignty over its territory without the support of foreign forces.

How Rama built his power in Albania

From elections and party politics to local government, media and construction, Prime Minister Edi Rama’s hold on power now faces a new test.

In June of this year, a book setting out an ambitious vision for Albania’s physical transformation was published: The Albanian Files. Featuring a foreword by Prime Minister Edi Rama, the book brings together around 520 projects by 60 international architectural studios — from skyscrapers and luxury apartment buildings to hotels, resorts and developments proposed in coastal and environmentally sensitive areas. One of its contributors is Dutch architect Reinier de Graaf, a partner at the internationally renowned architecture firm OMA. In a deliberately provocative letter in the book, de Graaf suggests dispensing with elections altogether and having Rama continue as “president for life — maybe even King.”

Guerre contre l’Iran : Ansarullah passe à l’offensive

À la mi-juillet, l’Arabie saoudite a relancé sa guerre contre le gouvernement yéménite d’Ansarullah et le mouvement houthi :

«Les forces dirigées par l’Arabie saoudite ont bombardé lundi l’aéroport international de Sanaa, au Yémen, relançant ainsi la guerre contre les Houthis yéménites, officiellement connus sous le nom d’Ansarullah, alors qu’un cessez-le-feu tenait relativement bien depuis 2022.

Kazakhstan: A Responsible Middle Power And Strategic Connector Of Eurasia – Analysis

Key Takeaways:

  • IFIMES reads Tokayev’s Bishkek SCO speech as “responsible middle-power” policy: use the SCO’s “Shanghai spirit” and even a UNGA resolution on its principles, but treat the UN as irreplaceable. Kazakhstan would link China, Russia, the EU, the U.S., Turkey, and the Gulf rather than pick a bloc.
  • Tools cited include the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor (more than raw transit: logistics, industry, digital customs), deep China ties moving from energy to AI and manufacturing, 2026 as a digitalization year, a proposed UN water body and SCO water centre, and a new constitution plus unicameral Kurultai from 1 July 2026.
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La démonstration de force des Houthis a révélé le caractère illusoire de l’OTAN islamique

Les nouveaux alliés musulmans de l’Arabie saoudite ne volent pas à son secours et même les États-Unis auraient rejeté sa demande d’intervention directe dans la dernière phase de ce conflit qui dure depuis plus d’une décennie.

L’expert russe Farhad Ibragimov a évalué avec justesse que «l’OTAN musulmane saoudienne est confrontée à sa première épreuve du feu» face à la multiplication des attaques houthies contre des cibles à l’intérieur du royaume. Le Pakistan aurait transmis à l’Iran un avertissement de son allié saoudien l’exhortant à contenir les Houthis, tandis que son ministre de la Défense laissait entendre que la poursuite des attaques contre l’Arabie saoudite permettrait de concrétiser leur alliance de défense mutuelle. Peu après, cependant, le ministère pakistanais des Affaires étrangères a minimisé cette possibilité.

Where the East-West Pipeline Actually Burned

Baghdad Says the Drones Flew From Maysan. Thermal Data and a Post-Attack Optical Frame Put the Damage on a 110-Kilometer Stretch Southeast of Medina, 1,100 Kilometers Away.

On the morning of Thursday, September 10, drones struck Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, the 1,200-kilometer line from Abqaiq to Yanbu that has carried most of the kingdom’s exports since Iran shut the Strait of Hormuz. The Ministry of Energy shut the line “as a precautionary measure” and reported injuries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs then said the drones came from Iraq and that Riyadh, at the request of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi, had “chosen not to respond at this stage.” Early on Saturday, Baghdad said its investigation had traced the launches to Maysan province on the Iranian border and dismissed the commander of Maysan Operations Command. That is the whole public record.

L’intégration des forces ukrainiennes dans les structures de l’OTAN

L’intégration des forces armées ukrainiennes (FAU) dans les structures militaires de l’OTAN : mécanismes, portée, limites.

Le problème soulevé dans le titre n’est pas purement théorique ou secondaire. Nous constatons comment l’Ukraine s’intègre progressivement avec l’OTAN sur de nombreux points, allant de la création d’une industrie de défense unifiée à la formation des armées occidentales aux compétences et aux techniques de combat conventionnel modernes, y compris lors d’exercices. L’objectif de cette analyse est de déterminer comment le refus de l’Ukraine de rejoindre formellement l’OTAN affecte la sécurité nationale de la Russie à long terme.