On regarde le Yémen sur une carte et l’on voit un pays pauvre, fragmenté, ravagé par plus d’une décennie de guerre.
On regarde son PIB et l’on voit presque rien.
Mais on regarde sa population, ses montagnes, son histoire et surtout sa position devant Bab el-Mandeb : soudain, le Yémen change de dimension.
When I think about the journey of heroin from its source to a European market, I don’t picture a criminal mastermind directing a supply chain from beginning to end.
What I see instead is a farmer, then a transporter, a courier and perhaps a broker who moves the drugs only as far as the next village. Another broker might get them across a border, after which a gang takes over one stretch of the journey before handing it to another. By the time the heroin arrives in Europe, still more people may be responsible for moving it to wherever it eventually ends up.
The Transition from Young Marx to Mature Marx
Louis Althusser’s interpretation of Karl Marx is marked by a fundamental distinction between the early writings of Marx and the theoretical work that emerged from the mid-1840s onward. In For Marx and Reading Capital, Althusser develops the argument that Marx’s intellectual development cannot be understood simply as a gradual accumulation of ideas. Instead, he identifies a decisive theoretical transformation, which he describes through the concept of an epistemological break.
Key Takeaways:
From consumer to provider. Building on Jakub Grygiel’s five U.S. choices for Europe, the author says Albania and Kosovo can no longer treat NATO and Washington as a fixed shield; allies will be judged by what they add—modern forces, a defense industry, cyber, intelligence, and civil protection.
Ten theses, one horizon. The platform calls for Eastern-Flank partners (Poland, the Baltics, Nordics, Czechia; dialogue with Romania and Slovakia), an Adriatic–Kosovo “southern gateway,” functional Albania–Kosovo integration that could later become a democratic “Albanian Federation,” one security map for Albanians across the region, and a realist stance toward Serbia as the main Balkan power channel for Russian (and some Chinese) influence—balance and deterrence, not reflex hostility.
Power beyond the ministries. Diplomacy should fuse defense, energy, industry, and tech; the diaspora should be treated as national power, not remittances; strategic-intelligence centers should outlast election cycles. End-state named: an indispensable NATO actor on the Adriatic and in the Western Balkans, not a bargaining chip.
Key Takeaways:
Saudi Arabia built the East-West Pipeline in the Iran–Iraq War as redundancy past Hormuz, moving crude from the Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea. A 10 September drone strike—Riyadh blames Iranian-backed militias in Iraq—forced a temporary shutdown. The piece says that hits about 4% of world oil supply. Rystad: as of late August, up to 4 million b/d on the line. Prior hits: Houthis at Afif (2019) and Iranian drones in the 2026 Iran war.
Bypassing Hormuz shifts risk to Bab el-Mandeb. The author says Houthis now hold more ground around Perim, Hanish, Mocha, and Dhubab. Hormuz flows: 21.6 million b/d in Q4 2025 to 4.9 million in Q2 2026; Bab el-Mandeb 5.4 million to 8.1 million; Suez/SUMED ~5.8 million. Aramco’s 15% SUMED stake is a backup, but much of that still needs the pipeline and Yanbu; ship size and pipe capacity cannot swap every barrel.
2019: pipeline hit, Hormuz open. April 2026: Hormuz squeezed, Bab el-Mandeb less constrained. September 2026: pipeline, Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb under pressure at once. Author: alternatives that share the same nodes are not independent risk. Count independent capacity under simultaneous hits, not the number of maps on the wall.
La «clause des États ennemis» place l’Allemagne sous la tutelle des vainqueurs de la Seconde Guerre mondiale depuis 1945. Jamais abrogée, cette disposition souligne les limites actuelles de la souveraineté allemande.
Remarques préliminaires
Récemment, la «clause des États ennemis» de la Charte des Nations unies — tombée depuis longtemps dans l’oubli — est revenue sur le devant de la scène. Comme j’étudie cette question depuis plusieurs années déjà, je souhaiterais l’aborder une nouvelle fois dans l’article qui suit. La première partie de mon analyse a déjà été publiée en janvier 2024, notamment dans Overton Magazine le 18 janvier 2023, ainsi que dans mon ouvrage Niemand soll hungern, ohne zu frieren (Personne ne devrait souffrir de la faim ni du froid), paru en 2024. La deuxième partie est un extrait de mon ouvrage Geopolitik im Überblick. Deutschland-USA-EU-Russland (La géopolitique en bref : Allemagne-États-Unis-UE-Russie), publié en juillet 2025, dans lequel j’aborde, entre autres, l’importance de la «clause des États ennemis» pour la situation politique actuelle, qui devient de plus en plus tendue.
Key Takeaways:
Shoe, then collapse. The author starts with Khrushchev’s 1960 “we will bury you” and says CMEA (Comecon) after 1945 locked Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—later Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam—into state ownership, banned private initiative, and replaced prices with planners’ guesses.
Political specialization, shoddy goods. Examples: Hungary’s Ikarus buses; East Germany’s Trabant/Wartburg vs. the Beetle; Poland’s coal peak of 200 million tons in 1979, then 1980 strikes, an 80% drop in CMEA coal exports in two years, and recession; Czechoslovakia’s uncompetitive machines; Bulgaria’s Balkancar forklifts sold in the West at a loss; Ceaușescu’s debt payoff via rationing; Soviet cars costing years of wages.
Cuba as the hangover. After joining CMEA in 1972, ~80% of Cuban exports went there; when the USSR fell, GDP dropped about a third. Author’s line: output without market prices and competition looks strong in GDP tables and fails when buyers can choose.
September 27, 2024 – The deadly pager attack in Lebanon has sparked global concerns over supply chain security. Chinese international relations scholar Shen Yi stated that China should take some measures in response to the U.S.’s increasingly aggressive stance in the strategic competition with China.
At any other time in American history, it would end the career of somebody like Scott Bessent, our limited-intelligence Treasury Secretary. It came out yesterday when Illinois Congressman Sean Casten was questioning him about the “billions of dollars” that Trump keeps claiming America is “getting” from selling Venezuelan oil.
L’approche américaine de la gestion des conflits se résume rarement à un simple soutien à l’une des parties. Même lorsque Washington est officiellement lié par une alliance, il maintient un canal de communication avec la partie adverse et s’efforce de préserver un équilibre afin qu’aucun des belligérants ne remporte une victoire totale ni ne subisse une catastrophe militaire. C’est une machine bien huilée, dont les rouages restent constants : la fourniture mesurée d’armes ; les autorisations et interdictions concernant leur utilisation ; les renseignements parfois partagés, parfois dissimulés ; les sanctions ; et les négociations secrètes avec l’adversaire dans le dos de l’allié, écrit le consultant politique Igor Dimitriev.