De nouvelles données israéliennes montrent que parmi les citoyens qui quittent le pays, les médecins, les ingénieurs, les professionnels du secteur technologique et les contribuables à hauts revenus, dont dépend l’économie de guerre de l’État d’occupation, sont de plus en plus nombreux.
While the flamingos have given the Albanian protest its visual identity, drums and chants have given it a voice. In this report, we have collected some of the most well-known voices from the protests which have been going on uninterruptedly for almost three months now
The clearest example is the recent “Eagles of Civilisation 2026” military exercises with Egypt. The drills demonstrated capabilities that went beyond symbolic military diplomacy. China deployed J-16 fighter aircraft, a YY-20A aerial tanker, a KJ-500 airborne early-warning aircraft, an electronic warfare aircraft, and other support assets to Egypt.
Nablus, occupied West Bank – At Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus, Israeli military vehicles enter the city ahead of groups of Jewish settlers. Roads are closed within minutes. Movement in the surrounding neighbourhoods comes to a halt.
Le Pacte de La Mecque n’est certainement pas l’équivalent de l’OTAN au Moyen-Orient. Mais il traduit néanmoins une nouvelle réalité en matière d’architecture de sécurité en Asie occidentale.
Le 28 février 2026, les États-Unis se sont associés à Israël pour lancer une guerre d’agression illégale contre l’Iran. Au cours des mois suivants, non seulement les États-Unis n’ont atteint aucun de leurs objectifs militaires et politiques affichés, mais ils ont été contraints de faire face à la dure réalité : pour la première fois de leur histoire, ils ont subi une défaite militaire stratégique face à un ennemi armé. Cette défaite a eu un retentissement mondial : la vulnérabilité militaire conventionnelle dont ont fait preuve les forces américaines — illustrée par leur incapacité à atteindre leurs objectifs militaires en Iran et à défendre de manière efficace les pays arabes du Golfe, la Jordanie et Israël contre les représailles iraniennes — a contraint les nations ayant autrefois fondé leur sécurité — tant individuelle que collective — des garanties de sécurité américaines viables à chercher désespérément une solution alternative.
The administration of President Donald Trump has removed the names of some of the world’s most notorious commanders, recruiters and financiers for the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda from its list of specially designated terrorists. Among those relieved of US sanctions this August was Abdullah Muhaysini, a Salafi-jihadi cleric from Saudi Arabia who participated in videotaped massacres of captive soldiers and recruited droves of foreign youth to carry out suicide bombings throughout Syria over the past decade.
Qualifiant les accusations de Berlin de «conjecture», la diplomatie russe a averti que toute attaque contre ses intérêts entraînerait une réponse adéquate. Dans ce contexte, le conseiller de Poutine affirme que la «junte eurofasciste» devra rendre des comptes, et Sergueï Lavrov dénonce un délire occidental destiné à sauver des élites européennes.
The real question, however, is: Unity with whom, and against whom?
Why is Hamas being treated as a legitimate political organization rather than a terrorist group that needs to be disarmed, dismantled, and removed from power?
Egypt, a key ally of the United States, should be asking these questions. Instead, Cairo appears to be doing exactly the opposite.
Key Takeaways:
Four sources told the BBC the Pentagon has told Iraqi Kurdish leaders it does not plan to renew Peshmerga aid when the security MoU expires Sept. 30—the same day coalition forces are due to leave Iraq.
In FY2026 the Peshmerga (~180,000 troops) received $61 million to counter Daesh; a Pentagon source said some residual support is still under review, and Irbil’s last U.S. base is slated to close with the pullout.
Hegseth’s July line with PM Al-Zaidi is that Iraqi and Kurdish forces will now lead the fight; Washington also cites disarming Iran-aligned militias, while analysts note fewer U.S. troops would be in range of Iranian strikes on Kurdistan.
The US is planning to cut off military aid to Iraqi Kurds, four sources with knowledge of the situation have told the BBC.
Key Takeaways:
The essay reads West Asia through neorealism and burden-sharing: Washington still wants influence but prefers partners (Turkey, Gulf states, Pakistan) to carry more of the security load after Assad’s fall.
Turkey’s Syria role, plus the Aug. 7, 2026 Mecca/Makkah pact among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, is framed as flexible balancing and autonomy—not a finished anti-Iran alliance; success depends on exercises, industry, and crisis aid.
Iran’s “strategic depth” via Syria and Hezbollah is described as under pressure if a Turkey-friendly Syrian order takes hold; the author sees a fluid multipolar balance, not a single bloc.
Strategic Reconfiguration of the Middle East: An Assessment Through International Relations Theory
A phase of structural adjustment is about to begin in the West Asian geopolitical order. Neither the United States nor regional powers are merely stepping in to fill the void left by the United States’ withdrawal from the Middle East. Rather, Washington seems more open to encouraging skilled allies to take on more responsibility for regional security while maintaining American strategic sway.