Key Takeaways:
From consumer to provider. Building on Jakub Grygiel’s five U.S. choices for Europe, the author says Albania and Kosovo can no longer treat NATO and Washington as a fixed shield; allies will be judged by what they add—modern forces, a defense industry, cyber, intelligence, and civil protection.
Ten theses, one horizon. The platform calls for Eastern-Flank partners (Poland, the Baltics, Nordics, Czechia; dialogue with Romania and Slovakia), an Adriatic–Kosovo “southern gateway,” functional Albania–Kosovo integration that could later become a democratic “Albanian Federation,” one security map for Albanians across the region, and a realist stance toward Serbia as the main Balkan power channel for Russian (and some Chinese) influence—balance and deterrence, not reflex hostility.
Power beyond the ministries. Diplomacy should fuse defense, energy, industry, and tech; the diaspora should be treated as national power, not remittances; strategic-intelligence centers should outlast election cycles. End-state named: an indispensable NATO actor on the Adriatic and in the Western Balkans, not a bargaining chip.Introduction: Toward a New Albanian Strategic Doctrine in the Era of Transforming Transatlantic Relations
The profound transformations currently affecting the international system are signaling the gradual end of the strategic model that has dominated transatlantic relations since the end of the Cold War. The war in Ukraine, the systemic rivalry between the United States and China, the return of Russia as a revisionist power, energy crises, technological challenges, and pressure on the public finances of Western democracies are pushing Washington toward a reassessment of its global role and, in particular, of its relations with Europe.
In this context, Dr. Jakub Grygiel’s analysis should not be read merely as a debate about American foreign policy. Rather, it represents a broader reflection on how the Euro-Atlantic security architecture may be reconfigured in the decades ahead.
The five strategic questions he raises — concerning European integration, the U.S. military posture, the choice of key partners, the degree of involvement in European politics, and Europe’s military autonomy — are not relevant only to Washington. They create a new analytical framework within which small and medium-sized states must also reassess the assumptions upon which they have built their national strategies.
For the Albanian space, this constitutes a moment of particular historical significance. For more than three decades, Albanian strategy has rested on the premise that Euro-Atlantic integration and the security guarantees provided by NATO and the United States constituted the virtually unchanging axis of national policy. This orientation was not only justified, but also decisive for the political survival of Kosovo, the consolidation of the Albanian state, and the stability of the region.
Nevertheless, the changing international environment requires a transition from a strategic culture based primarily on reliance upon external guarantees toward a new culture founded on the development of national capabilities and active contribution to collective security.
Alliances are not losing their importance; on the contrary, they are becoming more selective and more demanding toward their members. In the emerging new order, a state’s political weight will increasingly be measured by its ability to generate security, build economic and technological resilience, and provide strategic value to the alliance.
This means that the Albanian factor must also reconsider the paradigm upon which its strategic thinking has been built. Albania and Kosovo can no longer be conceived merely as beneficiaries of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture; they must instead seek to become actors that make a measurable contribution to the stability of NATO’s and Europe’s Southeastern Flank.
The ten theses presented below do not constitute a government program, nor are they a party platform. They represent an attempt to formulate the fundamental elements of a new Albanian strategic doctrine, capable of responding to the transformations of the international order and of guiding political, academic, and institutional thinking toward a long-term vision. At their core, they seek to stimulate debate on how the Albanian nation can move from the position of an actor seeking protection to that of a factor generating security, stability, and strategic weight within the Euro-Atlantic space.
If the twentieth century was the era of survival and the affirmation of the Albanian cause, then the challenge of the twenty-first century is to build the capabilities that will make the Albanian factor an indispensable component of the emerging European security architecture.
It is precisely on this premise that the following ten theses are built.
From the Transformation of Transatlantic Relations toward a New Albanian Strategic Doctrine
Building on the analysis of Dr. Jakub Grygiel,[1] but reading it from the perspective of the Albanian national interest (Albania–Kosovo), the time has come to formulate a new Albanian strategic platform. Its essence should not be passive adaptation to transatlantic changes, but the active positioning of the Albanian factor as part of the emerging security architecture in Southeastern Europe.
Within this framework, the new Albanian strategic doctrine should include, as a long-term objective, the gradual transformation of relations between the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Kosovo toward an integrated political, economic, security, and foreign-policy community which, in perspective, could take the form of an Albanian Federation, built upon the democratic will of the citizens of both states, in accordance with international law and the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. In this sense, the Albanian Federation is not presented as a revisionist territorial project, but as the most advanced stage of the functional integration of the Albanian space within the framework of the emerging European order.
Below are the fundamental theses that, in my view, could constitute the basis of a new Albanian strategic doctrine.
Thesis I: From a “Security Consumer” to a “Security Provider”
For three decades, Albanian policy has been built on the assumption that security is guaranteed primarily by the United States and NATO.
Current transformations suggest that allies will increasingly be judged according to their ability to generate security, rather than merely consume it.
Therefore, the Albanian strategic objective should be:
building modern military capabilities;
strengthening the defense industry;
developing capabilities in the cyber domain;
strategic intelligence;
civil protection.In this way, the Albanian factor can become an exporter of stability.
Thesis II: Revising Strategic Partnerships in Line with the Evolution of NATO’s Eastern Flank
The analysis of Dr. Jakub Grygiel argues that the center of gravity of U.S. strategy in Europe is gradually shifting from the traditional Franco-German axis toward NATO’s Eastern Flank and the states of Central and Northern Europe. This development does not imply the replacement of traditional transatlantic alliances, but rather their adaptation to the new realities of European security.
For Albanian strategic interests, this does not translate into a shift in the axis of foreign policy, but into an expansion and diversification of the network of strategic partnerships.
In this regard, the strategic partnership with the United States remains the cornerstone of Albanian national security, while close cooperation with the United Kingdom, Germany, Croatia, and Türkiye continues to be of paramount importance for defense, diplomacy, economic development, and regional stability.
Nevertheless, the transformation of U.S. strategic priorities requires Albanian policy to develop a new dimension of cooperation with the states of NATO’s Eastern Flank, which are assuming an increasingly important role in the emerging European security architecture.
Within this framework, Albania and Kosovo should build more intensive partnerships with:
Poland;
the Baltic states;
Finland;
Sweden;
Czechia;as well as develop a more structured strategic dialogue with Romania and Slovakia, despite the fact that these two countries have not yet recognized Kosovo’s independence. The interest in closer cooperation stems from the fact that they share a similar perception of the threats arising from Russian revisionist policy and of the need to strengthen NATO’s Eastern Flank.
Therefore, revising Albanian strategy does not consist in replacing existing alliances, but in aligning diplomacy and security policy with the evolution of the priorities of the transatlantic alliance. The more the strategic attention of the United States becomes focused on NATO’s Eastern Flank, the more the Albanian factor should also be present in this space, building new bridges of cooperation without undermining its consolidated relations with its traditional allies.
Thesis III: Albania and Kosovo as the Southern Gateway of the New Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture
If Poland is consolidating its position as the northern gateway of the strategy of deterrence toward Russia in Europe, then Albania and Kosovo have the potential to become the southern gateway of this emerging security architecture in Southeastern Europe.
This role derives not only from their geographical position, but also from the fact that the Albanian space represents the principal link between the Adriatic, the Western Balkans, and NATO’s Southeastern Flank. In an environment characterized by geopolitical competition, growing Russian influence through Serbia, and persistent instability in the region, Albania and Kosovo could become a key factor of stability and of Euro-Atlantic security projection.
In this sense, as two sovereign states and natural allies, Albania and Kosovo should gradually build an integrated strategic space. In the longer term, through a process of institutional and functional integration, followed by the institutionalization of an Albanian Federation, this potential could be consolidated into a more powerful strategic entity, capable of contributing to the defense of Southeastern Europe and to the strengthening of NATO’s Southern Flank.
This objective entails:
modernizing military bases in Albania;
developing strategic Adriatic–Kosovo logistical corridors;
progressively integrating defense planning between the two states;
accelerating the development of the Kosovo Security Force in accordance with NATO standards;
building joint strategic infrastructure in transport, energy, communications, and defense;
coordinating security and crisis-management policies.In this way, the Albanian space would no longer be perceived merely as a consumer of Euro-Atlantic security, but as a strategic hub that contributes directly to the defense of Europe’s southern flank against conventional and hybrid threats.
Thesis IV: Albanian Integration Must Be Functional, Not Bureaucratic
If the United States begins to favor functional states over supranational bureaucratic structures, then Albania–Kosovo cooperation should likewise be oriented toward practical integration.
Priorities:
a common market;
energy;
defense;
education;
technology;
infrastructure.Fewer political declarations. More functional joint institutions.
This integration process should not be viewed as an end in itself, but as a preparatory stage for an increasingly deep institutional union between the two Albanian states. In this sense, the de facto creation of joint institutions in the fields of economy, defense, energy, diplomacy, infrastructure, and education should precede the establishment, at the appropriate time and on democratic foundations, of an Albanian Federation as the highest form of political organization of the Albanian nation in the twenty-first century. The transition from functional integration to the de jure institutionalization of this union should constitute one of the long-term objectives of the new Albanian strategic doctrine.
Thesis V: National Security Must Be Conceptualized within the Albanian Space
Threats do not stop at administrative borders.
Therefore, Albanian strategy should treat the Albanian space as a single security system.
In this regard:
Albania;
Kosovo;
Albanians in North Macedonia;
the Preševo Valley;
Ulcinj / Tuzi [Albanian-inhabited areas in Montenegro];
Sandžak [Novi Pazar]should be analyzed as elements of the same strategic architecture.
Thesis VI: Serbia as a Strategic Factor and the Balance of Power in the Western Balkans
Within the new Albanian strategic doctrine, Serbia cannot be treated merely as a neighboring state with which historical or political disputes exist. It must be analyzed as the principal strategic actor directly affecting the security environment of Albania, Kosovo, and the entire Albanian space.
This does not stem from an ideological or emotional approach, but from a realistic assessment of geopolitical developments in the Balkans. Serbia’s foreign and security policy continues to be characterized by efforts to maintain a dominant position in the region while simultaneously cultivating strategic partnerships with powers that challenge the Euro-Atlantic order. In this sense, Serbia remains the principal channel through which Russian influence, and in some areas Chinese influence as well, is projected into the Western Balkans.
At the same time, the development of a strategic dialogue between the United States and Serbia should be interpreted as part of American efforts to influence Belgrade’s strategic orientation, rather than as a replacement for the privileged partnership with Albania and Kosovo. Precisely for this reason, Albanian policy should avoid emotional reactions and instead rely on a sober analysis of interests and balances of power.
This requires abandoning the illusion that international relations are built on political sympathies or rhetorical affinities. In international politics, states are guided by long-term interests and by the balance of power. Consequently, Albanian strategy should also be built upon this logic.
Within this framework, the new Albanian strategic doctrine should rest on four fundamental pillars:
strategic balancing of power, through the strengthening of national capabilities and Euro-Atlantic alliances;
deterrence, by increasing military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities to prevent any destabilization of the Albanian space;
national resilience, in the face of hybrid threats and political, economic, informational, and cyber influence;
strategic intelligence, as an instrument for anticipating developments, identifying risks, and supporting state decision-making.In this way, Serbia is not conceptualized as a permanent adversary, but as a structural factor in the strategic environment of the Balkans, toward which Albanian policy should develop a consistent, realistic approach based on the national interest. The objective is not confrontation, but the preservation of strategic balance, the protection of Albanian interests, and the strengthening of the Albanian space as a factor of stability within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.
Thesis VII: From Traditional Diplomacy to Strategic and Geopolitical Diplomacy
The transformations of the international order are making traditional diplomacy increasingly inadequate, as it focuses primarily on managing bilateral relations and on the formal representation of the state. In an environment characterized by competition among great powers, diplomacy must become an instrument for projecting the national interest and state power.
For Albania and Kosovo, this means building a strategic diplomacy capable of integrating foreign policy with defense, the economy, technology, energy, and national security. The objective is not merely to maintain good relations with allies, but to increase the weight of the Albanian factor in Euro-Atlantic decision-making processes.
Within this framework, Albanian diplomacy should develop five new dimensions:
Security and defense diplomacy, by making Albania and Kosovo active participants in NATO initiatives, regional defense planning, and military cooperation with allies.
Economic and industrial diplomacy, with the aim of attracting strategic investment into sectors related to national security, critical infrastructure, the defense industry, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy.
Energy diplomacy, positioning the Albanian space as an important hub within the energy corridors of the Adriatic and Mediterranean, with a role in diversifying European energy supplies and strengthening regional energy security.
Technology diplomacy, aimed at building partnerships in innovation, artificial intelligence, cyber defense, dual-use technologies (civilian and military), and the digital transformation of state administration.
Strategic influence diplomacy, through research institutes, universities, the diaspora, international media, and public diplomacy, with the aim of strengthening the position of the Albanian factor in European and transatlantic strategic debates.This transformation also requires a change in the institutional culture of foreign policy. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Albania and Kosovo should no longer function merely as diplomatic administrations, but as centers of strategic planning, closely coordinated with institutions responsible for defense, intelligence, the economy, and technological development.
In this way, Albanian diplomacy would no longer be limited to managing international relations, but would become a direct instrument for strengthening the state and advancing the strategic interests of the Albanian nation within the emerging multipolar order.
Thesis VIII: The Albanian Diaspora as a Strategic Component of National Power
In the twenty-first century, the power of a state is no longer measured solely by territory, population, or military capabilities. Equally decisive are human capital, global networks of influence, and the ability to mobilize intellectual, economic, and technological resources that extend beyond state borders.
In this sense, the Albanian diaspora should be regarded as an organic component of national power, rather than merely as a migrant community or a source of remittances. Spread across the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, the Nordic countries, and other major economic and scientific centers, it represents a unique potential for increasing the international weight of the Albanian factor.
The new Albanian strategic doctrine should seek to institutionalize this potential through a sustained partnership between the state and the diaspora.
Within this framework, the diaspora should be systematically integrated into:
public and strategic diplomacy, by strengthening Albanian influence in international centers of decision-making;
knowledge and innovation networks, through the transfer of technology, expertise, and scientific research;
economic and industrial development, particularly in high-value-added sectors, the defense industry, and the digital economy;
national security, through the engagement of Albanian experts in strategic intelligence, cyber defense, risk analysis, and security planning;
strategic investment, by directing financial and entrepreneurial capital toward projects that strengthen the competitiveness and economic resilience of the Albanian space.This process requires the creation of permanent institutional mechanisms linking the diaspora with decision-making centers in Albania and Kosovo. It is no longer sufficient to pursue a policy that views the diaspora merely as an electorate or a source of financial capital; it must be treated as part of the state’s strategic architecture.
From the perspective of the gradual construction of an Albanian Federation, the diaspora acquires an even more important role. It can serve as the principal bridge between the Albanian space and global centers of politics, economics, science, and technology, thereby multiplying the capacity of the new political entity to exert influence within the international system.
Therefore, one of the long-term objectives of the new Albanian strategic doctrine should be the transition from a policy toward the diaspora to a strategy for integrating the diaspora into national power, making it one of the principal pillars of the development, security, and international projection of the Albanian nation.
Thesis IX: Strategic Intelligence Must Become a National Capability
In an international order characterized by uncertainty, geopolitical competition, and successive crises, states cannot be governed solely through reactions to day-to-day events.
They require sustained strategic intelligence capabilities — the ability to collect, analyze, and interpret information, identify risks, anticipate possible scenarios, and guide national decision-making.
This requires building a new ecosystem of strategic knowledge through:
national centers for strategic analysis and forecasting;
independent institutes of geopolitics and security studies;
scenario laboratories for long-term developments;
professional mechanisms for assessing national risks.Strategic intelligence should not be viewed solely as a function of security structures, but as a state capacity to think beyond the political cycle, protect the national interest, and act with foresight.
Thesis X: From Fragmented Policies toward an Albanian Strategic Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century
In an era of great-power competition and the return of geopolitics, the Albanian space needs a strategic vision that transcends fragmented policies and short political cycles.
A new Albanian strategic doctrine should define long-term national interests, sources of power, and the means of coordinating them within an increasingly complex international environment.
It should establish an integrated approach encompassing:
foreign policy and geopolitical diplomacy;
national security and defense;
economic development and industrial capabilities;
technology, innovation, and the knowledge economy;
energy security and strategic resources;
education, human capital, and the diaspora;
demographic dynamics and social resilience.This doctrine would not simply be a political document, but a national framework for strategic orientation, aimed at building the capacities of Albanians to act as a consistent factor within the multipolar order of the twenty-first century.
From this perspective, the idea of an Albanian Federation should be treated as a strategic horizon for organizing and coordinating Albanian capabilities, in accordance with European and Euro-Atlantic realities and the principles of democratic development.
Its purpose would be to prepare the Albanian nation for the multipolar order of the twenty-first century.
Conclusion
The analysis of Dr. Grygiel implies that the United States is moving from a strategy of managing Europe toward a strategy of selecting allies that are more capable and more willing to share the burden of security. For the Albanian space, this creates a historic opportunity: rather than remaining on the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic architecture, it can position itself as a strategic hub on NATO’s Southeastern Flank.
In this context, the central thesis of a new Albanian strategy could be formulated as follows:
The strategic objective of the Albanian nation should no longer be merely integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, but becoming an indispensable factor in NATO’s security, stability, and strategic projection in the Adriatic and the Western Balkans.
This means that Albania and Kosovo should establish themselves as a strategic actor vis-à-vis the international community and, above all, vis-à-vis their neighbors, with particular emphasis on Serbia, which continues to pursue policies with destabilizing potential. The objective is for the Albanian space no longer to be treated as a “bargaining chip” or a “currency of exchange” in the calculations of the great powers, but to be consolidated as a national and international factor and actor whose weight cannot be disregarded in any new security architecture or political order in Southeastern Europe.
Such a thesis would represent a transition from a strategic culture based on reliance upon allies to a culture of co-producing security, in line with the transformation that transatlantic relations are expected to undergo over the coming decade.
From this perspective, the gradual transformation of relations between Albania and Kosovo toward the de facto creation and, at a later stage, the de jure establishment of an Albanian Federation should not be treated as a political project of the moment, but as a long-term strategic process aimed at building an entity that is more functional, more competitive, and better equipped to contribute to NATO security and the stability of Southeastern Europe. In the emerging new geopolitical order, the functional integration of Albanian capabilities is not merely a national aspiration, but also a strategic necessity.