Rafael Grossi says project ‘has grown enormously, far beyond what it was in 2015,’ as Tehran creates new difficulties and negotiations remains stalled
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency warned Friday that Iran’s nuclear program “is advancing at a gallop and we have very little visibility.”
Pendant que les Européens prônent des valeurs, la Chine convainc le continent par sa puissance de frappe financière et l’efficacité de ses grands chantiers.
Une voie rapide qui s’étend sur 27 kilomètres au cœur de Nairobi et relie le principal aéroport du Kenya au quartier central des affaires de la capitale, au musée national et au palais présidentiel. Sa construction n’a duré que deux ans sous l’égide de la Chine.
Bamako a ordonné l’expulsion du porte-parole de la Minusma. Cette attitude est perçue comme une stratégie pour pousser les Casques bleux à quitter le pays.
Le commandant de la force française Barkhane, le général Laurent Michon, a accusé jeudi à Ouagadougou le groupe paramilitaire russe Wagner de “prédation”, le comparant à un “dealer” de drogue dans sa façon d’agir au Mali.
While speculation around the potential demise of Putin’s regime is understandable, it is more helpful to consider the ‘so what’ of who comes next.
Since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February, speculation has swirled about the Russian leadership. One common theme is the supposedly shrinking circle of people around Vladimir Putin, his political isolation and elite discontent – or even that there might there be a coup against him. Another is that senior officials are said to be seriously ill – or even dead. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu was thought to have had a heart attack, for instance, and Putin has been repeatedly ‘diagnosed’ not just with a bad back, but with a whole range of serious mental and physical illnesses. A third theme is that frustration with failures in the campaign has driven Putin to fire (or ‘purge’) senior officials, first in the security services responsible for laying the ground for the invasion, and then in the military conducting it, including Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov. For some, these are all signs that the Russian ‘ship is beginning to sink’.
With missile stockpiles edging up across the Middle East, there is a clear need to develop a regional code for their acceptable use.
The Middle East is entering a new missile age. More regional states are either developing indigenous production capabilities or importing missiles than ever before. Currently, 11 states in the Middle East have ballistic or cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 250 km in their arsenals. But it is not just about the number of regional actors acquiring longer-range missiles. Missiles have also become a frequent feature of several regional conflicts, where they are used to meet new and evolving objectives beyond just deterrence or signalling military strength. This was on display during the Syrian civil war, and continues to feature prominently in the war in Yemen. Iran currently actively employs missiles to project power regionally. These examples reflect new patterns of use and a greater access to missiles perhaps unprecedented on a regional scale. As these dynamics take hold, traditional options and views about missile control start to appear both inadequate and out of sync with new regional realities.
Despite speculation around Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent trip to Tehran, Russia–Iran relations remain firmly transactional.
President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Tehran, coupled with intelligence released by the US about Iran’s provision of armed drones to Russia, has renewed speculation that the relationship between the two might finally be moving towards a deeper, more strategic one. While these developments deserve careful monitoring, nothing much has changed in their ties yet. They continue to opt for ad hoc cooperation on specific issues and crises, which is balanced by mutual mistrust and competition, even in the context of the Ukraine war and its global implications.
As evidence mounts that the Global South is leaning closer to the Russia–China position over Ukraine, the West needs to think hard about how to regain the initiative in the narrative battle.
The Ukraine war has further entrenched and exacerbated the geopolitical rivalry between the West and the Russia–China camp. This new ‘Superpower Plus’ clash leaves the so-called ‘Rest’ in a difficult position, with some countries feeling pressure to choose sides, and others trying to remain neutral. Worryingly, many are leaning closer to the Russia–China position than the West.
Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2016 turned out to have much broader objectives. The development of air and naval bases provided Moscow with platforms for operations in the Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The delivery of S-400 missile systems to Turkey added another major strategic gain.
The European Union is faced by broad challenges on its South, with a sharp decline in rule of law, political instability, and a surge in authoritarianism. Wider phenomena such as climate change, demographic trends, and criminal activities of human trafficking networks add to the challenges. ISIL is still a threat too.
Turkey’s choice of disruptive policies has perplexed EU and NATO leaders in the recent past. Tensions with the EU have risen due to challenges to maritime boundaries and sovereignty of Cyprus and Greece.
Although largely a consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union’s major foreign policy initiatives in 2022 have marked a watershed moment and constitute a useful precedent for the Union’s policies with third countries.
In the near future, the EU will have to invent a new format, distinct from accession, for its relationship with the countries of ‘Wider Europe’ and to use its now diversified ‘foreign policy toolbox’ in a coherent and effective fashion.
Erdogan fails to enlist Russian and Iranian support for a fresh Turkish military operation in Syria, but he remains bent on maintaining the pressure.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan returned without any concrete results from talks with his Russian and Iranian counterparts in Tehran, to which he went with a thick dossier of bilateral problems. The many strains in Turkey’s ties with Russia and Iran remain unrelieved, and Erdogan’s quest for a green light for a new military intervention in Syria remains unanswered.