The Hollow Order

Rebuilding an International System That Works

There they were, meeting in Beijing on February 4: Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Shortly before the start of the 2022 Winter Olympics, the two leaders released a remarkable 5,300-word joint statement about how the partnership between China and Russia would have “no limits.” The document went on at length about the two nations’ commitment to democracy. It called for a universalist and open world order, with the United Nations at the center. It stressed a commitment to international law, inclusiveness, and common values. It did all this even though Russia, as Xi and Putin both knew, was sending tanks and missile launchers to the Ukrainian border.

Paradigm for peace applied to Russia, Ukraine, and the US: Proposal for a peaceful pathway forward – Part 4B

Part 4. Mental escalators of violence in US policy and media makers. Part 4B. A competitive, threat-orientation towards international relations: Psychological patterns described by Lakoff, Spranger, and Allport

False Bias #2. Life Is Competition; the Goal Is to Beat Adversaries and Stay on Top. Let’s take a look at actual, representative lines from Damon Wilson’s 2019 testimony, two years before he became president of the National Endowment for “Democracy,” and three years before Russia’s military action in Donetsk, Lugansk, and Ukraine. As we do so in this and the next several essays, I’ll point out several biases that I find in Wilson’s way of thinking, a pattern of thinking common to many of the minds that are forever leading our foreign policy. These biases of thought—cognitive biases—skew the mind and allow only certain perceptions of life, international relations, and human dynamics. I write about them at greater length and with more examples in my unpublished works, but I’ll provide some condensed ideas here.

Sanctioning Russia is a long game. Here’s how to win.

Sticking to US President Joe Biden’s public pledge to “stay the course,” the White House has made clear both publicly and privately that it intends to sustain and even intensify its support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia. While military support remains the critical pillar of Western policy, especially in the short term, economic pressure is key to the longer-term goal of isolating Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The triumphs and question marks from this week’s NATO summit

This summer blockbuster lived up to the hype. In Madrid this week, NATO allies substantially boosted their forces in Eastern Europe, struck a deal to invite Sweden and Finland into the club, and dropped a once-in-a-decade strategic concept that strove to break new ground on China and climate change. What do these developments mean—and which ones flew under the radar? How will history judge this consequential gathering? From Madrid to Washington, our experts are here with answers.

Our experts decipher NATO’s new Strategic Concept

This one was a decade in the making. On Wednesday, NATO released its new Strategic Concept—a sixteen-page document of dry diplomat-speak sketching out the Alliance’s future path as it takes on threats posed by Russia, China, climate change, and more. But what were the allies really saying amid all the jargon? And what did they leave out? Experts from the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative carefully combed through the document and dropped their insights in the margins.

What Turkey won with its NATO leverage

JUST IN
The door is back open. After weeks of tension, Turkey finally dropped its objection to Finland and Sweden’s bids to join NATO as the Alliance kicked off its summit in Madrid on Tuesday. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan scored a face-to-face meeting with US President Joe Biden and spurred Stockholm and Helsinki to address his concerns about the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian affiliate, the People’s Defense Units (YPG), while NATO moved toward securing two new members. Our experts, weighing in from the summit in Spain and around the globe, dissect the deal.