Pour mieux comprendre l’impasse dans laquelle nos troupes semblent se trouver dans la bande sahélo-saharienne, il faut revenir au contexte initial ayant amené à un niveau d’engagement sans précédent des forces armées françaises au Mali et plus généralement dans la bande sahélo-saharienne.
When the caustic Evelyn Waugh visited the majestic sixth century creation of Emperor Justinian, one subsequently enlarged, enriched and encrusted by various rulers, he felt underwhelmed. “‘Agia’ will always win the day for one,” he wrote of Istanbul’s holiest of holies, Hagia Sophia, in 1930. “A more recondite snobbism is to say ‘Aya Sofia’, but except in a very sophisticated circle, who will probably not need guidance in the matter at all, this is liable to suspicion as a mere mispronunciation.”
After having been one of the European countries to provide the greatest diplomatic and logistic support, and remaining silent regarding the thousands of deaths and massacres committed by its troops, France has finally abandoned General Khalifa Haftar. But isn’t it too late? And why now? French President Emmanuel Macron, who has bet on Haftar to defend the interests of his country and its oil companies in Libya, is now on the verge of losing his last cards.
“Would you have enjoyed it so much if a mosque at the center of Europe were converted into a church?” — Ertugrul Özkök, Hurriyet, March 8, 2014.
Bosnia and Herzegovina on Saturday marked the 25th anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide, the worst atrocity on European soil since World War II.
“[W]e are neglecting to properly address the religious and racist aspects of grooming gang crimes…. It’s telling them that it’s OK to hate white people.” — “Ella”, a British woman who was raped more than 100 times in her youth by a Pakistani sex grooming gang, YorkshireLive, April 29, 2020.
On February 27, Erdoğan’s government was on the threshold of executing its threat to flood Europe with millions of (mostly Syrian) migrants … Hundreds of thousands of migrants began flocking to the border. By the next day, Greece was not only operating 52 Navy ships to guard its islands close to Turkey; it had also mobilized additional troops on land. Its security forces were able to block 10,000 migrants from entering Greece by way of the Turkish land border.
After the fall of ISIS in 2019, many relatives of fighters who were detained or killed, including 10,000 families of foreign fighters, were housed in camps in territory controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The biggest camps include Roj and al-Hol. Like any closed society, the foreigners’ annex in al-Hol has its own dynamic. To better understand that dynamic, I conducted around 20 in-depth interviews with females in the camp, including those from Europe, the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, and America. Interviews were conducted in English, Russian, and Serbo-Croatian — languages I speak fluently — and I have been in contact with several of the women for nearly a year now and have developed close relationships.
Today’s landscape is dramatically different from that to which we awoke on Sept. 11, 2001. It’s a complex mix of foreign and domestic forces influenced by economic and social conditions that breed extremism which ebbs and flows across physical and cyber space often defined by great power competition. While terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have innovated and adapted, U.S. counterterrorism strategy has remained unchanged, fighting yesterday’s war while neglecting present day threats as well as those over the near horizon. America is long overdue to update its counterterrorism strategy and, perhaps more importantly, how we measure success.
What’s new? Lake Chad basin countries – Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria – have made welcome efforts to coordinate against Boko Haram militants through a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). But their inconsistent commitment to the force, funding problems and disjointed planning have hindered its effectiveness. Jihadists often regroup when troops withdraw.