L’Italie signe des accords économiques avec la Libye pour lutter contre la migration irrégulière

A Tripoli, la cheffe du gouvernement italien, Giorgia Meloni, a rencontré le premier ministre libyen, Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, mardi 29 octobre.

La Libye et l’Italie ont signé mardi 29 octobre plusieurs accords dans les domaines des investissements et des infrastructures notamment, avec le but de renforcer la coopération entre les deux pays méditerranéens. Les accords ont été signés par le premier ministre libyen, Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, et la cheffe du gouvernement italien, Giorgia Meloni, dans le cadre du forum d’affaires Italie-Libye, qui s’est tenu à Tripoli après une interruption de dix ans.

Attaque de Boko Haram : le Tchad appelle la communauté internationale à l’aide

Le gouvernement du Tchad a appelé mardi la communauté internationale à intensifier son aide dans la lutte contre le groupe terroriste Boko Haram, au lendemain d’une attaque qui a tué une quarantaine de soldats.

Le gouvernement tchadien a appelé mardi 29 octobre la communauté internationale à intensifier son soutien dans la lutte anti-terroriste au Sahel, au lendemain d’une attaque du groupe Boko Haram qui a tué une quarantaine de soldats dans la région du lac Tchad, dans l’ouest du pays.

Iran Update, October 30, 2024

Qassem hinted at a possible shift in Hezbollah policy that would allow a Lebanon ceasefire to be separated from Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. The new secretary general was less absolute regarding a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip than Nasrallah had been before his death. Nasrallah had previously said that a ceasefire in Lebanon would have to be contingent on halting Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Qassem appeared less resolute by saying that Hezbollah would accept “appropriate” ceasefire conditions but insisted that “the basis for any negotiations is a ceasefire first.”[10] Qassem indicated on October 8 that the group may be open to a ceasefire that is not linked to the Gaza Strip.[11] Nasrallah had previously been very explicit that Hezbollah would not stop indirect fire attacks into Israel until the IDF withdrew from the Gaza Strip.[12] Nasrallah held this unambiguous position before Israel began ground operations in southern Lebanon, however. The shift in Hezbollah’s position may be a result of both new Hezbollah leadership and the escalation of a war that has temporarily degraded Hezbollah’s command, control, and logistical networks. Qassem said he believes that Hezbollah, not an international resolution, expelled Israel from Lebanon in 2006 and 2000, suggesting his reluctance to enter into a ceasefire agreement.[13]

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (October 14 – 28 ,2024)

The IDF forces continued maneuvering in south Lebanon, eliminating hundreds of Hezbollah terrorist operatives, locating and destroying facilities hidden in civilian sites, and locating large quantities of weapons. The Israeli Air Force continued airstrikes on Hezbollah targets in Beirut and other locations, killing senior Hezbollah leaders and field operatives in targeted attacks. Twenty-one IDF soldiers were killed in fighting in south Lebanon.

Naim Qassem vows Hezbollah will continue fighting

Naim Qassem, newly appointed as Hezbollah’s secretary-general, has become the centerpiece of the group’s narrative efforts. On October 15, as then-deputy secretary-general, he gave his third speech after Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, amidst rumors he had fled Lebanon to Iran.

Against a dark and nondescript backdrop—perhaps to signify Hezbollah mourning its fallen leaders, particularly Nasrallah—and flanked by a Hezbollah flag and, unusually, a Lebanese flag on his right and a picture of Nasrallah to his left, Qassem delivered his most defiant speech yet. As with Nasrallah’s speeches, the themes and tropes raised by Qassem were then echoed and amplified by the group’s officials and media apparatuses.

Le Grand Jeu dans la Corne de l’Afrique continue. Partie 4 : Le conflit éthiopien-somalien à travers le prisme d’autres acteurs extérieurs

S’agissant du Royaume-Uni, principal allié des États-Unis, il adopte dans ses relations avec l’Éthiopie une approche plus pragmatique.

Le 21 août de cette année, lors de sa visite à Addis-Abeba, la ministre britannique du Développement international, Anneliese Dodds, a déclaré lors de sa rencontre avec le ministre des Affaires étrangères éthiopien, Tayé Atské Sélassié, que Londres soutenait un dialogue inclusif et pacifique en Éthiopie et dans la région en général. Elle a également discuté des perspectives de coopération économique entre les deux pays. Cette visite n’était pas un hasard.

Post-Sinwar: Hamas at a Crossroads

The assassination of Sinwar places Hamas at a crossroads at various organizational, political and military levels, especially in the context of the course of the war in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, and the movement’s role on the day after the war, which may affect its alliances and relations internally and externally.

Political extortion? JNIM’s blockade of Boni, Mali.

In June 2024, fighters from the Katiba Serma sub-group of Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) redoubled their efforts to cut off the town of Boni, in the Mopti region of central Mali.1 This is the latest iteration of a blockade that the jihadist group had intermittently imposed for more than nine months on the Route Nationale (RN) 16.2 Blockades are very much part of JNIM’s toolkit in its areas of influence not just in Mali, but also in neighbouring Burkina Faso.