A number of flashpoints around the globe could spiral from minor border skirmishes into full-blown conflagrations that could drag their broader regions into conflict.
Given the tectonic shifts in the international system and renewed focus on great power competition, the prospects of inter-state warfare are now receiving more scrutiny.
General Michael Kurilla, head of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), has suggested that at its current trajectory, Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) would be able to conduct external operations within approximately six months.
Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, counterterrorism analysts have warned about the growing threat of ISK, especially in light of the U.S. troop withdrawal and limited human intelligence assets in areas where ISK and other terrorist groups operate.
Africa today consists of 56 different experiences in nation-building with some remarkable successes and many inevitable failures. In many African countries a new player has entered the game: a younger generation that is better educated, more ambitious and, at the same time, less gullible than its ancestors in the 19th century who looked away while imperial powers carved the golden goose.
After besieging and starving 120,000 Armenians of the South Caucasus Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) since December 2022, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale military offensive against Artsakh on September 19, subjecting the capital Stepanakert and other cities and villages to intensive fire using heavy artillery and drones.
Here’s the full text of the written interview that I gave to Dutch journalist Laura Oorschot, who incorporated some of the insight during her appearance on blckbx’s livestream on this subject on 22 September.
How would you describe Pashinyan’s political position at present?
Pashinyan is in a very difficult position after this week’s events since many among the population consider him a traitor to their national cause, which they regard as extending into Azerbaijan’s Karabakh Region. He came to power in what can be described as a Color Revolution that he fueled through a combination of nationalist and liberal rhetoric. The 2020 conflict and the latest one discredited his nationalist credentials, while his orders to break up protests after both discredit his liberal ones.
The Taliban have enabled some terrorist groups and reined in others, elevating longstanding concerns for U.S. policy.
Two years into Taliban rule, the question of whether Afghanistan would once again become a safe haven for international terrorism remains alive. Longstanding fears were affirmed a little over a year ago, when the U.S. government located al-Qaeda leader Aimen al-Zawahiri in Kabul, Afghanistan, before killing him in a drone strike. The fact that the Taliban would bring Zawahiri back to Kabul, despite repeated assurances to U.S. negotiators both before and after the Doha agreement that they had distanced themselves from al-Qaeda, significantly elevated concerns.
Twenty years after the Iraq War began, scholarship on its causes can be usefully divided into the security school and the hegemony school. Security school scholars argue that the main reason the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq was to safeguard the United States against the conjoined threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorist groups. Hegemony school scholars argue instead that the purpose of the Iraq War was to preserve and extend U.S. hegemony, including the spread of liberal democratic ideals. Debates between these camps inform broader disputes about the lessons of the Iraq War for the future of U.S. foreign policy and the analysis of other key questions about the war’s origins. Nonetheless, this binary may not be productive for Iraq War scholarship, and more attention to global and cultural factors would be a useful way to advance this field.
Geopolitics has become marginalized in modern international relations scholarship despite its foundational role. This essay seeks to bring geopolitics back to the mainstream of international relations through conceptual, historical, and theoretical analyses. I make three arguments. First, definitional confusion about geopolitics comes from an overly broad understanding of geography. Notwithstanding various uses, however, geography itself should be re-centered as the analytical core of geopolitics. Second, classical geopolitics sought to inform grand strategy using geography as an explanatory variable and was thus institutionalized in U.S. strategic education. To wit, geography was used as “an aid to statecraft.” Finally, although largely ignored in mainstream international relations, the basic premise of geopolitics still undergirds much of its research. But the asymmetry, relativity, and comprehensiveness of geography have not been well explored. Drawing from classical geopolitical works, I offer some suggestions for future research on how to use geography in international relations scholarship.
On 30 August, elite troops slaughtered over 50 civilians planning to protest perceived foreign interference in the eastern DR Congo, three months ahead of elections. The government has asked the UN for an “accelerated” withdrawal. Crisis Group experts Richard Moncrieff and Onesphore Sematumba explain the stakes.
On August 3, 2023, ISIS’s Al-Furqan Media Foundation released an audiotape with a statement by Abu Hudhaifa al-Ansari, ISIS’s spokesman. In the tape, the organization’s spokesman announces the death of Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi, the organization’s leader, and the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashemi al-Qurashi as his replacement.
ISIS’s spokesman blames the leader’s death on the Al-Qaeda-affiliated HTS, which is considered the dominant organization in the rebel enclave in Idlib. He denies the official version published by Turkey, according to which Al-Qurashi was killed by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT). HTS issued a statement denying its involvement in killing ISIS’s leader. It should be noted that alongside the news of his death, rumors also circulated about the ouster of the leader even before he was killed.
Although the date of his death is not specified on the audiotape, the ITIC estimates that he was killed in April 2023. As ISIS has done in the past, this time too, the information about the leader’s death has not been officially published by ISIS. This is apparently because the organization waited for a new leader to be chosen by the Shura Council and for establishing support and recognition for his appointment by the operatives in the various provinces.
This is the fourth leader of ISIS killed since the establishment of the organization. The last three leaders were killed after a relatively short term of office and it seems that their term of office is getting shorter after the first leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, served for six and a half years while the last leader served only six months. It should be noted that the short terms of office of the organization’s leaders and the high turnover of the organization’s leaders are a severe blow to ISIS’s power, capabilities, and image. It should also be noted that the four leaders were killed on Syrian soil, to which the center of gravity of the organization’s leadership has moved. All four were killed in areas where the Syrian government had limited control (Idlib and Daraa).
If HTS is indeed responsible for the leader’s death, this is the second time that ISIS’s leader has been killed by a rival organization in Syria. This time it is an organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda operating in the Idlib region. It is possible that his death will lead to attempts by ISIS operatives to carry out a series of acts of revenge.