Can The Inflation Increase In Russia Affect Its Social ‘Stability’?

As we reach the end of 2023, while the Russian government celebrates “healthy” econo­mic growth of around 3%,[1] ordinary Russians seem to be disturbed by the rapid increase in retail prices. By late November, the cost of many foodstuffs (including “benchmark” bananas and eggs), staple goods and services recorded a solid jump: eggs are now 23%, more expensive than they were a year ago, poultry 26%, bananas 47%, oranges 80%, and tomatoes 121%.[2] In its attempt to fight accelerating inflation, the Roskomnadzor, the Russian federal executive agency responsible for monitoring, controlling and censoring Russian mass media, blocked a popular website “Prices today” where different prices were compared from across the country.[3] Meanwhile, as the Bank of Russia gradually revises its 2023 inflation forecast to 7.5% from 5%, as was released in July,[4] the Kremlin is addressing the issue extremely often as it has become a matter of concern among the Russian population.

From The MEMRI Archives – October 4, 2021: Hamas-Sponsored ‘Promise Of The Hereafter’ Conference For The Phase Following The Liberation Of Palestine And Israel’s ‘Disappearance’

Below is a report published by MEMRI on October 4, 2021:

The September 30, 2021 “Promise of the Hereafter[1] – Post-Liberation Palestine” conference, sponsored by Hamas leader in Gaza Yahyah Al-Sinwar and attended by senior officials from Hamas and other Palestinian factions, discussed preparations for the future administration of the state of Palestine following its “liberation” from Israel after the latter “disappears.”

Hamas Policy Document: Palestinian State In 1967 Borders Is ‘National, Agreed-upon and Joint Formula’ By Hamas, PLO – Yet Armed Struggle Will Continue, And Palestine Extends From River To Sea

On May 1, 2017, Hamas published a policy document approved by all the movement leaders. The leaders clarified that the document was not replacing the Hamas Charter[1] but was aimed at adapting the movement’s position to the current time. The document was presented by Hamas spokesmen as a development that did not compromise their principles.[2]

Senior Iranian, Hamas, And Palestinian Islamic Jihad Officials Link Hamas Attack On Israel To Thwarting U.S.-Saudi-Israel Normalization Initiative

On October 10, 2023, three days after the Hamas attack on southern Israel, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set out Iran’s official position – i.e. that Iran had no hand in the attack.

However, statements by some senior Iranian officials and leaders of the Palestinian resistance groups indicate that one of the aims of the attack was to thwart the U.S.-Saudi-Israel initiative to expand Saudi-Israeli normalization, implement the Saudi solution to the Palestinian issue, and grant legitimacy to a Saudi nuclear program. This is because this joint initiative would cause strategic damage to Iran and to the resistance axis that it leads.

Moscow’s Search for Foreign Recruits Reveals Its Growing Desperation

Last month, Ukrainian researchers and Politico correspondents revealed that they had identified nearly 200 Cubans who had joined the Russian military in recent weeks, with enlistees ranging in age between 19 and 69. In interviews, Cuban recruits reported a range of Russian tactics to secure new personnel. Many in particular cited monetary incentives and the prospect of Russian citizenship — an attractive draw for young men in a country beset by food insecurity and joblessness.

Houthis target U.S. warship, commercial vessels in the Red Sea

The Iranian-backed Houthis fired missiles and drones at three commercial vessels and a U.S. warship in the Red Sea. The Houthis claimed credit for targeting the commercial vessels Unity Explorer and Number Nine, while the Pentagon confirmed that it downed missiles and drones that were fired from Yemen. Today’s attack is the latest by the Houthis against international shipping, which the terror group claims is designed to support Hamas as Israel targets it in Gaza.

Deir Azzour Tribal Mapping Project

About Deir Azzour
Syria’s Deir Azzour governorate encompasses the two most important remaining wilayat (provinces) of ISIS’ would-be caliphate, Wilayat al-Furat/Wilayat al-Badiya and Wilayat al-Khayr, in an area that runs south into Iraq on the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) in eastern Syria. These two provinces, Wilayat al-Khayr/Wilayat al-Badiya (from the areas west of the city of Deir Azzour down the MERV to the area of Albu Kamal) and Wilayat al-Furat (the area of Albu Kamal in Syria to the area of Qa’im in Iraq), will be the next target of the U.S.-led coalition’s campaign. This area of the MERV is also the current target of forces loyal to the Bashar al-Assad government, which maintains a significant presence in the governorate via control over the Deir Azzour Airport and a large part of the city of Deir Azzour. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition, mainly through its constituent organization the Deir Azzour Military Council, is also advancing toward the city of Deir Azzour.

The Salafi-Jihadi Base in the Sahel: December 2018

Common purposes, shared histories, and ethnic and tribal affiliations unify the highly complex and fractious Salafi-jihadi base[1] in West Africa’s Sahel region. Organizational splinters have not stopped Salafi-jihadi groups in the Sahel from cooperating to achieve the same objectives.[2] Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) serves as an umbrella group for four factions. A breakaway faction of al Murabitoun under Abu Walid al Sahrawi, which became the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), continues to cooperate with the al Qaeda-linked groups. The relationships between Sahrawi and members of JNIM have enabled operational deconfliction and even cooperation between the groups.[3] Ethnic and tribal affiliations cut across the organizational divides and further enrich the network. Militant commanders who are dual-hatted as ethnic or tribal notables lead factions that draw on their local identities, like Iyad Ag Ghali’s Tuareg-majority Ansar al Din and Amadou Koufa’s Fulani-majority Macina Liberation Front. These cross-cutting identities have allowed the Salafi-jihadi base in the Sahel to mobilize local ethnic identity groups to gain access to communities and expand their operational reach.[4]

The Syrian Democratic Forces’ Arab Coalition is Crumbling, Creating Opportunities for ISIS, Iran, and Turkey

The coalition between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Arab tribes in Deir ez Zor is fracturing amid clashes over long-standing grievances. The SDF’s response to the clashes very likely will undermine its ability to maintain control in the province for at least the next several months. The SDF and the Deir ez Zor Military Council (DMC) began fighting after the SDF arrested the DMC commander on August 27. The conflict rapidly expanded after August 30, as other tribes joined the fighting driven by long-running grievances against the SDF.[1] These grievances included limited reconstruction in the Arab areas, repeated SDF abuses of the local populations, and a lack of representative Arab leadership.[2] The tribes captured the southern areas of SDF-administered Deir ez Zor province by September 2.[3] The SDF recaptured the territory on September 10 by force and through actions that local media portrayed as abuses. Anti-SDF tribal fighters began conducting hit-and-run insurgent attacks on September 6, meaning anti-SDF forces are contesting the SDF’s control of the population in Deir ez Zor. CTP defines control as “uncontested physical or psychological pressure to ensure that individuals or groups respond as directed.”[4] The SDF has not taken steps to address the tribes’ grievances as of September 14.[5]