In the days since Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump’s Alaska summit, the world’s attention has turned to the portion of the Donetsk region that Kyiv still controls — and that Putin wants it to give up. This territory contains Ukraine’s “fortress belt,” a 31-mile stretch of defensive structures and fortified settlements that’s been built up over more than a decade. Western media outlets have argued that this belt is both the motivation for Putin’s demands and the reason his proposal is a non-starter for Ukraine. Meduza assesses these claims and explains the military and political significance of the “fortress belt.”
Abstract: China has recently been pursuing a much more aggressive stance in African security affairs, including playing a more engaged role in counterterrorism (CT). Where is China engaged in CT in Africa, and by what means? What challenges would China face in engaging more robustly in African CT? Most importantly, why is China newly expressing interest in engaging in the African CT landscape at this particular moment? In the main, this piece argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing’s primary motivations for entering the African CT space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical “economics-first” approach. Recognizing that engaging in African CT is a high-risk but potentially high-reward activity (which other global powers have recently engaged in with mixed results), Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of CT assistance—less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships—that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa. Yet, China faces challenges in its African CT pursuits, including reconciling whether its cautious ethos can stomach the turbulent landscape of African terrorism; how to deal with a saturated African CT space; and how not to fall victim to the same pitfalls as other global powers that have recently engaged in African CT. Nevertheless, if China can prove that its cautious non-military-first approach is fundamentally different from existing CT value propositions from external states, Beijing could deeply rival, and potentially replace, Washington as the partner of choice for security cooperation in Africa.
Abstract: The 12-day Iran war may be over, but the threat of Iranian reprisal attacks now looms large, and will for the foreseeable future. European authorities exposed plots in Sweden and Germany even as the war was being waged, and Israeli authorities issued a warning over potential attacks in the United Arab Emirates a couple of weeks later, specifically citing heightened concerns in the wake of the war with Iran. Iranian operatives or their agents could also attempt to carry out attacks inside the United States, leveraging what U.S. counterterrorism officials have describe as a “homeland option” developed over years. Given the U.S. role in bombing the Fordow nuclear complex, it should not be a surprise that U.S. authorities quickly issued a terrorism advisory warning of potential Iranian plots in the homeland. Drawing on past cases of Iranian plots in the United States and elsewhere, this article explores the primary pathways available to Iran conduct or enable a terrorism act in the United States. These include deploying Iranian agents, criminal surrogates, terrorist proxies, or actively seeking to inspire lone offenders to carry out attacks within the homeland.
Artificial intelligence is rapidly changing modern warfare, as seen in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Drones now cause 70–80% of battlefield casualties, with both sides developing AI-powered targeting systems. AI has boosted first-person view drone strike accuracy from 30–50% to around 80%. David Kirichenko points to the rising ethical concerns about machines making life-or-death decisions. While AI increases lethality, human involvement in logistics and final judgment remains crucial for battlefield operations. The conflict is also providing extensive battlefield data to train these systems and shape the future of warfare.
epa12088954 (L-R) Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz, France’s President Emmanuel Macron, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk attend a joint press conference following a meeting of the ‘Coalition of the willing’ at the Mariinskyi Palace, the official residence of the president of Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine, 10 May 2025, amid the ongoing Russian invasion. EPA/DAREK DELMANOWICZ POLAND OUT
Friday’s “peace summit” in Anchorage was not about peace. It was about war, specifically how Russia can continue to fight a war Vladimir Putin believes he is now winning, while pretending he wants “peace”. It was about the rehabilitation of a disgraced leader wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. It was about an opportunistic rapprochement between two great powers whose heads of state are eager “to do business” with one another. None of this has anything to do with bringing lasting peace to Ukraine.
epa11786445 (L-R) Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, European Council President Antonio Costa, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attend a press conference at the end of the EU Summit in Brussels, Belgium, 19 December 2024. EU leaders met in Brussels to discuss Ukraine, the EU in the world, the Middle East, resilience and preparedness, migration and foreign policy issues. EPA/OLIVIER HOSLET
Même si officiellement aucun traité de paix n’a été signé à Anchorage, il semble que la situation du conflit ukrainien soit tout de même en voie d’amélioration. Je critique souvent Trump sur ce blog notamment sur les questions économiques, mais il est indéniable que son élection a calmé en partie la montée en tension que les néoconservateurs américains et les démocrates provoquaient. Le fait que les deux puissances nucléaires que sont la Russie et les USA se soient mis autour d’une table aurait dû être accueilli avec beaucoup plus d’enthousiasme du côté européen. Mais on voit bien que l’UE et ses petits serviteurs à commencer par notre pathétique président n’ont eu de cesse de vouloir faire capoter cette rencontre. Mais nous reviendrons sur cette question européenne par la suite.
There are approximately 50,000 veteran Islamic State members and their families currently being held at 27 prisons and detention centers across northeast Syria. They have been a frequent target of prison break attempts over the years, some of which have succeeded in freeing jihadists who have gone on to reinforce the group’s ranks.
After the fall of the Assad regime, two main military forces now remain in Syria with two opposing ideologies and irreconcilable visions: the so-called Syrian government, which is made up of Turkish-backed jihadi factions, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is comprised of Kurdish, Arab, and Christian forces. While the SDF are pro-West and democratic, the Syrian government is pro-sharia and is ideologically aligned with ISIS. Despite its attempts to project moderation, its extremist ideology and reliance on extremist groups have only fueled sectarian violence and enabled the resurgence of ISIS across Syria.
