South East Asia

Beijing is Poised to Dominate the Low End of the Arms Market

Shortly after Russia’s annual military expo concluded in August, Alexander Mikheyev, the head of the country’s state arms export agency, predicted that revenues from Russian arms exports in 2022 would be down 26 percent from last year. Russia remains the world’s second-largest arms exporter after the United States, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; it would take a far larger drop in revenues to change that. But it has become clear that since Moscow’s disastrous decision to invade Ukraine in February, the Russian military’s need to replace its own equipment, U.S.-led sanctions, and buyers’ concerns about Russian equipment’s performance on the battlefield have reduced Russia’s ability to export weapons.

The U.S. has the power to stop North Korean missile tests but has chosen not to do so. This is true not only of the Biden administration but also its predecessors. The U.S. has continually decided to adopt feeble options.

Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s foreign minister, says Daesh group has lost its ability to carry out operations in Afghanistan, adding that it; therefore, targets defenseless people in the country.

After their husbands’ killings, these women desperately sought to protect their sons from ongoing violence, even as they are largely shunned by society.

Every time Jameela Begum, 46, wants to talk to her late husband, she digs out a worn photo album from an old wooden almirah.

How Beijing’s Aggression Pushed New Delhi to the West

In June 2020, the Chinese and Indian militaries clashed in the Galwan Valley, a rugged and remote area along the disputed border between the two countries. Twenty Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers were killed, and debate flared about the long-term implications of the skirmishes. Some analysts believed the Sino-Indian relationship would soon return to normal, with regular high-level meetings, increased Chinese investment in India, defense exchanges, and multilateral coordination. Record-high bilateral trade and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s trip to India in March 2022 seemed to support the notion that the two countries could set aside the border dispute and keep strengthening ties. So, too, did Chinese and Indian officials’ agreement in September to pull back from confrontational positions along one of the sections of the border in the Ladakh region where the militaries had been facing off since 2020.

The 73rd National Day of China on 1 October brings a new reflection on its global purpose. Its future orientations remain mired in both inevitable challenges and the greatest potential, dictated by the path and spectre of its intention. Its dream of the great Chinese rejuvenation that will signal its comeback to global primacy by 2049, hinges on two indicators. Firstly, is Beijing fully equipped both in its hard and soft power calculations needed to both dislodge America’s position and to readily and capable execute the subsequent obligations? Secondly, will the responses by the other global players apart from the incumbent powers be accepting or otherwise in Beijing’s intent and purpose to create a Chinese led order?

Taiwan and Ukraine are far apart, geographically different, and have contrasting geopolitical valuations. One is in Asia, an island, and the world’s largest microchip maker. The other is in Europe, a continental country with a maritime frontage, with a bustling pre-war industrial base, and is one of the world’s breadbaskets. But as a devastating war in Ukraine entered its seventh month with no end in sight, growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait make for stark comparisons. Is Ukraine the present and Taiwan the future?