Rusia

During the first three months of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukraine’s ability to defeat Russia on the battlefield has astonished the watching world and led to mounting speculation that Vladimir Putin’s invasion will end in defeat.

At the same time, the situation at sea remains significantly more favorable for the Kremlin and demands urgent international attention. Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports is strangling the country’s economy and also threatening to spark a global food security crisis by preventing Ukrainian agricultural exports from reaching international markets. Unless this issue is addressed, it will cause famine around the world in the coming months.

Less than two months after synchronizing with the European electricity grid, Ukraine has begun landmark commercial energy exports to neighboring Moldova in a move that is likely to further dent Russia’s grip over the region. Ukraine’s state-owned hydro producer Ukrhydroenergo has booked between 80-150MW per hour of transmission capacity to Moldova and the first imports by the Moldovan state-owned wholesaler Energocom started on May 12.

The attack launched by ISIS on 20 January 2022 against the Al-Sina’a Prison in Al-Hasakah, an area situated in North-Eastern Syria and currently under the authority of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, with the intention of freeing ISIS fighters held there, once again demonstrated the importance of adequately addressing the situation of the foreign fighters still being held in camps in Syria (and Iraq).

(Paris) Les Occidentaux défendent la volonté de mettre fin à la guerre en Ukraine sans la faire, mais l’ampleur de l’aide à Kyiv et des sanctions contre Moscou soulèvent une question plus crue : s’agit-il d’une guerre par procuration entre l’Ouest et la Russie ?

Russia’s failures are a result of outdated Soviet attitudes and ideas that cannot keep up with the evolving intelligence environment.

The Russian offensive against Ukraine has been dogged by a cascade of intelligence failures at every level of command. This has ranged from completely failing to assess the likelihood and shape of a unified Western response and Ukraine’s determined resistance, to inadequate preparations for Ukraine’s ‘mud season’ and a bewildering lack of any effective operational security (OPSEC) measures. The irony of this, of course, is that Vladimir Putin’s ruling coterie is numerically and functionally dominated by former intelligence officers. Attempts to explain this paradox have tended to rely on conventional wisdoms of why authoritarian regimes are often bad at strategic intelligence. Such governments, the orthodoxy runs, may invest heavily in covert information collection, but they are typically poor at analysis and assessment. In part this is because of an institutional bias towards espionage that neglects analysis, partly because of a pressure to tell autocrats what they want to hear because of the personal and professional risks of doing otherwise, and partly because autocrats tend to act as their own intelligence officers and ignore the truth even when someone dares speak it, acting instead on their own judgement.

As Russia’s offensive in Ukraine stalls, there is a real risk that it could escalate its nuclear threats if faced with the potential loss of Crimea.

Explaining Nuclear Peace

The Cold War saw many armed interventions by the two superpowers – by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, Africa and Afghanistan, and by the US in Korea and Indochina. The frequency of such interventions increased after 1990, with wars fought by the US in Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, and by Russia in Georgia, Ukraine and (other parts of) Syria. In several cases, one of these powers sought to undermine the other through arming its military opponents, often on a considerable scale. But none of these wars saw direct conflict between their armed forces. This is one of the main reasons why no nuclear weapon has been used since August 1945.

Key points

The Biden administration is confronting Russia’s naked aggression against Ukraine without direct military engagement, but a triple threat of inflation, starvation, and a coalition that is not sufficiently global promises trouble ahead for the United States and its position in a global order that is suddenly on an accelerated path to change.