Rusia

At the June summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, maintenance of support to Ukraine, the applications for NATO membership by Finland and Sweden, and the rollout of the new Strategic Concept will appropriately be front and center. But, if NATO is to maintain its long-term capacity for deterrence and defense, it will be equally important to take actions to implement four key operational priorities, each derived from initial lessons underscored by the Russia-Ukraine war. Specifically, effective deterrence and defense requires: upgraded force capabilities immediately focused on readiness and sustainability, and supported by the requisite funding; additional forward force deployments, including a substantial European component; enhanced cybersecurity resilience based on zero-trust architectures for critical infrastructures necessary for defense mission assurance; and long-term limitations on trade with Russia to limit its capacity to modernize its armed forces.

Protests have erupted around the world against Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons. But any country in possession of nuclear weapons also puts us all in perpetual danger. (Photo: Kwh1050/Creative Commons)

At the outset of his invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin  declared  that other countries “will face consequences greater than any you have faced in history” if they intervened.

President Biden is confronted with two decisions: The first is whether to go to Saudi Arabia this summer to meet with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to try to persuade him to increase his country’s oil output. The second is whether to speak directly with Vladimir Putin to try to end the war in Ukraine. Neither outreach is a form of recognition; it is a necessity for much larger considerations.

In the broadest sense, Russia has thus far failed to secure its strategic objectives in Ukraine, said the undersecretary of defense for policy.

Colin Kahl spoke about the war in Ukraine and the pacing challenge of China at the Center for a New American Security’s National Security Conference Tuesday.

Starting on May 31, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov embarked on a tour to Gulf Cooperation Council countries, where he visited Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, among others. Lavrov’s main objective of these visits is to strengthen ties between Russia and GCC nations amid a global race for geopolitical dominance.

The 2004 Orange Revolution, a wave of street protests that fueled the rise of a pro-Western government in Kiev, will likely be remembered by future historians as the very first modern episode in the drama that would eventually lead to the current Ukraine War. This turning point was enthusiastically supported by the West as a meaningful ideological victory for liberal democracy and ‒ above all ‒ as a geopolitical milestone in the Eastward march of both NATO and the EU. Needless to say, the shockwaves were powerfully felt in the Kremlin. Until then, Boris Yeltsin and his successor, Vladimir Putin, had been seeking some sort of accommodation with the West. Moscow offered flirtatious overtures to NATO, unilateral diplomatic concessions, and even support for the American military intervention in Afghanistan. Such gestures were seen in Washington and Brussels as a sign of weakness. After all, conventional wisdom dictated that, in the post-Cold War era, Russia was rapidly fading into irrelevance so disregarding what it had to say or what it wanted was an affordable luxury. Considering that Russia was a mere shadow of the impressive power once held by the Soviet Union, Moscow was not being taken seriously anymore.

The May report is mostly bad news. The jump in energy and food prices were expected, nonetheless it will hit consumers hard. It seems likely that the rise in interest rates and slower growth will reverse price increases in more areas soon, notably cars, but it has not happened yet. Soaring energy and food prices, largely due to the Ukraine war, will continue to be huge problems. A cease fire could make a big difference.

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth month, Ukrainian officials are increasingly worried the West could soon suffer “war fatigue.”

They fear Russia could take advantage of that to pressure Ukraine into compromise, something Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has resisted, saying Ukraine would pursue its own terms for peace.

Moscow grossly underestimated the economic costs of launching its war in Ukraine. Lulled by the limited sanctions that greeted its invasions of Crimea and Donbas in 2014, and a false sense of security provided by its hundreds of billions of dollars in reserves, President Vladimir Putin appears to have believed that he could ride out any sanctions that a divided West could muster. He seems not to have understood the shock wave that a full invasion of a European state would produce in the West and the massive unity of the European Union’s economic response. He did not anticipate Germany’s about-face in its relations with Russia or the sudden attractiveness of NATO membership to Finland and Sweden. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appears to be a catastrophic blunder by Putin, one that puts Russia and his regime in great peril.

Much has been said about Ukraine’s lethal set of western-donated anti-armor and anti-tank weapons that have been helping them take out Russian tanks left and right since the start of the war. However, there is another anti-tank weapon that the Ukrainian forces have used to bust Russian tanks up to smithereens, the German DM22 PARM2 mine.