Rusia

Introduction

The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad.

The Ukrainian military urgently needs long-range air defenses and longer-range artillery. It does not have them.

[Zelensky] said he wanted the war over before Russia could rebuild its forces, and that each additional day of war meant more death and destruction. Above all, he said, not only Ukraine is at stake, but the security and values ​​of the West.

In what may be the most provocative escalation of the US-NATO war against Russia to date, the White House has confirmed that the US is planning to send NATO-made fighter jets to Ukraine.

John Kirby, the National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, confirmed that the Pentagon is discussing “providing fighter aircraft to the Ukrainians.”

In many circles it has become de rigueur to assert that Ukraine cannot hope to prevail against the Russian military in the current war. If this assessment is correct, the obvious outcome of the conflict would be a negotiated settlement leaving Russia in possession of presently occupied territories in exchange for “peace.” With much of its eastern agricultural and industrial areas lost along with most of its Black Sea coastline, Ukraine would then become a vassal state, unviable economically and dependent on outside support for its existence.

MIDDLE ISRAEL: Moscow’s strategic setbacks in Ukraine have yet to spell victory for anyone else.

Having listened to Nikolai Gogol read to him from his Dead Souls, which mocked feudal Russia through a plan to buy dead serfs’ souls, Alexander Pushkin at one point burst into laughter only to suddenly turn pensive and say in despair: “God, how sad our Russia is.”

Asta susține Secretarul General NATO, norvegianul Jens Stoltenberg. Să-i facem pe ucraineni să se bată cu rușii în locul nostru, cheltuiala cu finanțarea războiului ucrainean, care apasă asupra economiei UE și a nivelului de viață al cetățenilor europeni, fiind mai mică decât cea pe care ar presupune-o un război direct al NATO cu Rusia.

Fereşte‐mă, Doamne, de prieteni…

LARRY L. WATTS a absolvit cu master Universitătile din Washington, Seattle şi UCLA, având şi un doctorat la Umea University din Suedia. Între 1990 şi 1991, a condus Biroul IREX din Bucureşti, iar pînă în 1997, a fost Senior Consultant al Project on Ethnic Relation şi director al Biroului PER din România. Din 1990, a fost consilier în probleme de reformă democrată şi control asupra institutiilor statului şi s-a ocupat de înfiintarea Colegiului National de Apărare şi a Consiliului pentru Minorităti Nationale.

Întrebarea Zilei: Este Rusia de astăzi aceeași ca și Rusia din 1945?

Sterie Ciumetti: Multă lume cu care suntem noi în contact se referă la Rusia ca fiind aceeași țară ca cea din trecut, cu aceleași apucături și aceeași agresivitate cu cea din perioada sovietică. Este Rusia de astăzi aceeași ca și Rusia din 1945?