The war in Ukraine seems to be entering a transitional phase. Early on, Russia failed in its effort to take Kyiv—so Russian President Vladimir Putin scaled back his ambitions and shifted his military’s efforts to the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. As both sides battle it out there, exhaustion and the ability to replenish supplies, weapons, and manpower are becoming more and more critical.
While speculation around the potential demise of Putin’s regime is understandable, it is more helpful to consider the ‘so what’ of who comes next.
Since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February, speculation has swirled about the Russian leadership. One common theme is the supposedly shrinking circle of people around Vladimir Putin, his political isolation and elite discontent – or even that there might there be a coup against him. Another is that senior officials are said to be seriously ill – or even dead. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu was thought to have had a heart attack, for instance, and Putin has been repeatedly ‘diagnosed’ not just with a bad back, but with a whole range of serious mental and physical illnesses. A third theme is that frustration with failures in the campaign has driven Putin to fire (or ‘purge’) senior officials, first in the security services responsible for laying the ground for the invasion, and then in the military conducting it, including Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov. For some, these are all signs that the Russian ‘ship is beginning to sink’.
As evidence mounts that the Global South is leaning closer to the Russia–China position over Ukraine, the West needs to think hard about how to regain the initiative in the narrative battle.
The Ukraine war has further entrenched and exacerbated the geopolitical rivalry between the West and the Russia–China camp. This new ‘Superpower Plus’ clash leaves the so-called ‘Rest’ in a difficult position, with some countries feeling pressure to choose sides, and others trying to remain neutral. Worryingly, many are leaning closer to the Russia–China position than the West.
Erdogan fails to enlist Russian and Iranian support for a fresh Turkish military operation in Syria, but he remains bent on maintaining the pressure.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan returned without any concrete results from talks with his Russian and Iranian counterparts in Tehran, to which he went with a thick dossier of bilateral problems. The many strains in Turkey’s ties with Russia and Iran remain unrelieved, and Erdogan’s quest for a green light for a new military intervention in Syria remains unanswered.
«Холодная зима в Европе», или О том, как путинский режим торгует страхом
За свою почти четвертьвековую историю путинский режим не научился делать ничего — ни в политике, ни в общественных отношениях, ни в экономике. Впрочем, одному в отношениях с Западом он все-таки научился — торговаться. При этом торговлю режим понимает очень своеобразно, поскольку это торговля краденным.
The global headwinds in recent times—started by the new great power rivalry, exacerbated by the pandemic, and rapidly accentuated by the Russia-Ukraine war—have begun to take their toll in different parts of the world. Despite major economic, social, and environmental stresses, there is an increased level of domination of geopolitics over other challenges. Looking ahead, there are some major uncertainties, including those related to the duration of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, continuation of the economic sanctions’ regime, re-emergence of bloc politics, macroeconomic stability, and changing trade-patterns and supply chains.
Introduction
The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad.
The Ukrainian military urgently needs long-range air defenses and longer-range artillery. It does not have them.
[Zelensky] said he wanted the war over before Russia could rebuild its forces, and that each additional day of war meant more death and destruction. Above all, he said, not only Ukraine is at stake, but the security and values of the West.
In what may be the most provocative escalation of the US-NATO war against Russia to date, the White House has confirmed that the US is planning to send NATO-made fighter jets to Ukraine.
John Kirby, the National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, confirmed that the Pentagon is discussing “providing fighter aircraft to the Ukrainians.”
In many circles it has become de rigueur to assert that Ukraine cannot hope to prevail against the Russian military in the current war. If this assessment is correct, the obvious outcome of the conflict would be a negotiated settlement leaving Russia in possession of presently occupied territories in exchange for “peace.” With much of its eastern agricultural and industrial areas lost along with most of its Black Sea coastline, Ukraine would then become a vassal state, unviable economically and dependent on outside support for its existence.