Rusia

Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons could trigger a cataclysmic nuclear exchange.

Thousands of demonstrators join Fridays for Future’s global day of action to stand with Ukraine by walking down Willy-Brandt-Strasse, a main thoroughfare in Hamburg, Germany.

What the History of Russia’s Power Struggles Says About Putin’s Future

Russian President Vladimir Putin has lost touch with reality. He has declared a partial mobilization to reverse his defeats in Ukraine and, signaling his desperation, ratcheted up Russia’s nuclear saber rattling. Each day the war drags on, his country grows more isolated from the rest of the world. Increasingly, Russia depends on China to keep its economy from collapsing under the weight of sanctions, even as Chinese leaders express doubts about the invasion. Russia’s failure to take Kyiv, and its recent reversals in the Kharkiv region in eastern Ukraine, have led even pro-Putin commentators to question his decisions. Against this backdrop, it makes sense that many Russians are starting to ask how much longer Putin can stay in power and pursue his barbarous war. The handful of municipal deputies who boldly petitioned Putin to resign publicly expressed what many in the Russian political elite are privately pondering. Surely, it seems, someone in the murky halls of the Kremlin will decide that he must go.

Mobilize, Retreat, or Something in Between?

For the first time in the war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin must contend with the serious prospect of losing it. Early setbacks around Kyiv and Chernigov had been balanced by Russian gains in the south and the east; they could be justified as tactical retreats and thus as Russian choices, regardless of whether they truly were. By contrast, the near rout of Russian soldiers in the Kharkiv region on September 10—and the rapid reconquest by Ukrainian forces of territory spanning some 2,000 square miles in the east and south—clearly showed that Ukraine was on top and that Russian troops may continue to fall to future such offensives. Ukraine’s Kharkiv offensive destroyed the illusion of Russian invincibility. It has also heralded a new stage in the West’s expectations. Suddenly, Western leaders and strategists have been able to contemplate Ukraine gaining the upper hand in this war. This shift in perspective seems certain to unleash a new dynamic of military support for Ukraine. The argument that Ukraine should sue for peace, rather than keep fighting, has been refuted.

More, Please

As we provide Ukraine with increasingly powerful weapons systems, we are mindful of how they will be used. According to the BBC, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) we have sent to Ukraine has a maximum effective range of approximately 50 miles. They have been used to good effect to destroy enemy command and control centers and supply depots. This cuts off the Russians from what they need to move forward with an attack. It’s a good strategy and has worked well so far for the Ukrainians.

Executive summary
The number of cyber operations launched from Russia over the last few years is astounding, ranging from the NotPetya malware attack that cost the global economy billions, to the SolarWinds espionage campaign against dozens of US government agencies and thousands of companies. Broad characterizations of these operations, such as “Russian cyberattack,” obscure the very real and entangled web of cyber actors within Russia that receive varying degrees of support from, approval by, and involvement with the Russian government. This issue brief describes the large, complex, and often opaque network of cyber actors in Russia, from front companies to patriotic hackers to cybercriminals. It analyzes the range and ambiguity of the Russian government’s involvement with the different actors in this cyber web, as well as the risks and benefits the Kremlin perceives or gets from leveraging actors in this group. The issue brief concludes with three takeaways and actions for policymakers in the United States, as well as in allied and partner countries: focus on understanding the incentive structure for the different actors in Russia’s cyber web; specify the relationship any given Russian actor has or does not have with the state, and calibrate their responses accordingly; and examine these actors and activities from Moscow’s perspective when designing policies and predicting the Kremlin’s responses.

For the first time in the war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin must contend with the serious prospect of losing it. Early setbacks around Kyiv and Chernigov had been balanced by Russian gains in the south and the east; they could be justified as tactical retreats and thus as Russian choices, regardless of whether they truly were. By contrast, the near rout of Russian soldiers in the Kharkiv region on September 10—and the rapid reconquest by Ukrainian forces of territory spanning some 2,000 square miles in the east and south—clearly showed that Ukraine was on top and that Russian troops may continue to fall to future such offensives. Ukraine’s Kharkiv offensive destroyed the illusion of Russian invincibility. It has also heralded a new stage in the West’s expectations. Suddenly, Western leaders and strategists have been able to contemplate Ukraine gaining the upper hand in this war. This shift in perspective seems certain to unleash a new dynamic of military support for Ukraine. The argument that Ukraine should sue for peace, rather than keep fighting, has been refuted.

Over the last ten days, Ukrainians have achieved astonishing gains over the Russian army. For six months, the Kharkiv region, in Ukraine’s east, has suffered through battle and Russian occupation. Now, Ukrainians are driving retreating Russian units as far as the pre-war border.

What we’ve been able to provide Ukraine that has been most telling hasn’t been diplomatic or moral support, but a system that can put a rocket on a target 50 miles away.