Cyprus is in a unique position right now. With one action it could accomplish several tasks in one fell swoop that could distance itself from Russia, potentially end the arms embargo imposed by the United States while upgrading their defensive capabilityes and assist Ukraine at the same time.
The war in Ukraine signals a return, with a vengeance, of the hider-finder game of air warfare, both for airspace superiority and to exploit the air for battlespace effects. Against what appeared at the onset to be a resurgent great power seeking to overwhelm a significantly weaker neighbor, Ukraine has relied on airpower, modern system tactics and training, and passion to at least level the playing field against the Russian onslaught to enable them to readily evade (‘hide’) from conventional force attacks and Russian air defense sensors while more efficiently finding conventional military targets. Though the war is far from over, it has already yielded numerous lessons that airpower advocates and joint-minded leaders should apply to other conflicts. Counter-land drone tactics and greater reliance on coordinated fires from multiple domains suggest that significant challenges are ahead for military operations. Long-simmering US doctrinal feuds that the US military has largely sidelined during the war on terrorism need to be directly addressed now in order to anticipate the future battlespace.
What does the US president need to know? Our new “memo to the president” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.
Commander of U.S. Air Force Central Command, Lt. Gen Alex Grynkewich, said on Monday that Russia’s presence in Syria has become “more aggressive” both in the air and on the ground.
“The Russian presence in Syria has become, I would argue, more aggressive since the Ukrainian invasion,” Grynkewich said.
The president successfully preserved the status quo for two decades. Suddenly, he’s turned into a destroyer.
Ukraine’s successful counterattack means that for the first time ever in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 22 years in power, he has to deal with elites who disagree with him—on strategic decisions over Russia’s war in Ukraine and how the war may end. Having launched the war not just without any internal discussions, but without even informing key players, Putin has taken huge risks politically. If the war were going well, that gamble would have paid off, but today, as Ukraine is counterattacking and Russia is retreating, questions about Putin’s decisions are mounting. There are fears that Russia may lose outright. If the president fails to convince the elites that he remains a strong leader with a clear understanding of where he is taking the country, uncertainty may become a significant political risk to Putin’s regime.
The Biden administration will soon release its National Security Strategy, which is being revised in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The document will no doubt trigger a renewed debate about how the United States should gear up for a new Cold War against Russia and China. But before we plunge into a global great-power competition, it’s worth recalling President Biden’s promise to create a “foreign policy for the middle class” and take a look at what most concerns Americans.
Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons could trigger a cataclysmic nuclear exchange.
Thousands of demonstrators join Fridays for Future’s global day of action to stand with Ukraine by walking down Willy-Brandt-Strasse, a main thoroughfare in Hamburg, Germany.
What the History of Russia’s Power Struggles Says About Putin’s Future
Russian President Vladimir Putin has lost touch with reality. He has declared a partial mobilization to reverse his defeats in Ukraine and, signaling his desperation, ratcheted up Russia’s nuclear saber rattling. Each day the war drags on, his country grows more isolated from the rest of the world. Increasingly, Russia depends on China to keep its economy from collapsing under the weight of sanctions, even as Chinese leaders express doubts about the invasion. Russia’s failure to take Kyiv, and its recent reversals in the Kharkiv region in eastern Ukraine, have led even pro-Putin commentators to question his decisions. Against this backdrop, it makes sense that many Russians are starting to ask how much longer Putin can stay in power and pursue his barbarous war. The handful of municipal deputies who boldly petitioned Putin to resign publicly expressed what many in the Russian political elite are privately pondering. Surely, it seems, someone in the murky halls of the Kremlin will decide that he must go.
Mobilize, Retreat, or Something in Between?
For the first time in the war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin must contend with the serious prospect of losing it. Early setbacks around Kyiv and Chernigov had been balanced by Russian gains in the south and the east; they could be justified as tactical retreats and thus as Russian choices, regardless of whether they truly were. By contrast, the near rout of Russian soldiers in the Kharkiv region on September 10—and the rapid reconquest by Ukrainian forces of territory spanning some 2,000 square miles in the east and south—clearly showed that Ukraine was on top and that Russian troops may continue to fall to future such offensives. Ukraine’s Kharkiv offensive destroyed the illusion of Russian invincibility. It has also heralded a new stage in the West’s expectations. Suddenly, Western leaders and strategists have been able to contemplate Ukraine gaining the upper hand in this war. This shift in perspective seems certain to unleash a new dynamic of military support for Ukraine. The argument that Ukraine should sue for peace, rather than keep fighting, has been refuted.
More, Please
As we provide Ukraine with increasingly powerful weapons systems, we are mindful of how they will be used. According to the BBC, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) we have sent to Ukraine has a maximum effective range of approximately 50 miles. They have been used to good effect to destroy enemy command and control centers and supply depots. This cuts off the Russians from what they need to move forward with an attack. It’s a good strategy and has worked well so far for the Ukrainians.