Rusia

On entend de plus en plus de voix occidentales suggérer que des pourparlers de paix dans l’ancienne Ukraine pourraient être une bonne idée, ce qui indique que certaines personnes ont peut-être dépassé le stade du déni (quelques sanctions et la Russie se repliera comme un parapluie) et de la colère (jetez tout votre argent et toutes vos armes sur le régime de Kiev !) et approchent le stade du marchandage (laissons la Russie garder la Crimée, mais rendre le reste). Comme pour les étapes précédentes, cette attitude repose sur une incompréhension très profonde de la situation actuelle. Ce n’est pas si difficile à expliquer – à ceux qui sont prêts à traiter de nouvelles informations – et je vais donc essayer.

Dans la première partie, nous proposions d’envisager le conflit entre la Russie et l’Ukraine, dans la perspective historique élargie d’une guerre de 100 ans opposant, depuis 1917, la Russie et l’occident. Nous suggérions aussi que le conflit idéologique entre propriété privée et collective des moyens de production ne s’était pas éteint, mais transformé en une opposition entre économie libre-échangiste complètement dégagée de toute intervention étatique, et les économies russe ou chinoise, laissant une large part à la planification par l’État.

The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis

There aren’t enough palm trees, the Soviet general thought to himself. It was July 1962, and Igor Statsenko, the 43-year-old Ukrainian-born commander of the Red Army’s missile division, found himself inside a helicopter, flying over central and western Cuba. Below him lay a rugged landscape, with few roads and little forest. Seven weeks earlier, his superior—Sergei Biryuzov, the commander of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces—had traveled to Cuba disguised as an agricultural expert. Biryuzov had met with the country’s prime minister, Fidel Castro, and shared with him an extraordinary proposal from the Soviet Union’s leader, Nikita Khrushchev, to station ballistic nuclear missiles on Cuban soil. Biryuzov, an artilleryman by training who knew little about missiles, returned to the Soviet Union to tell Khrushchev that the missiles could be safely hidden under the foliage of the island’s plentiful palm trees.

Political-geographical imagery, imagination and geopolitics.

The Eurasian Complex

Russian Eurasianism, whose centenary we celebrated in 2021, is a complex phenomenon that can only be fully understood if we carefully consider the context of its birth and development.

Russian Eurasianism as a specific philosophical and political current emerges in the specific Russian philosophical and cultural space of the Silver Age. This space was already characterized by a “turning to the East”, a reflection on the “East” and “pan-Mongolism” by Vladimir Solovyov, and a literary current of “Scythianism”, in which Solovyov’s reflections and fears were reversed into an acceptance of the “Scythian”, “Eastern” dimension of Russian identity. In the 1917 revolution, some Silver Age figures (e.g., A. Blok in “The Scythians”) saw precisely this dimension of Russian origins emerge.

Introduction

Intellectuals and writers of modern Russia with great enthusiasm take care of the search for adequate socio-political explanations of the former gigantic empire, which after the collapse of the Soviet Union was lost and disoriented. At the same time, the universal vacuum was affecting Russia’s integral environment due to the fall of the Marxist-Leninist development project. After all this, philosophers and social activist tried to make a foundation to the actual ideological goals of Russian society. However, so far, many of ideological aspirations to create new national policy was unsuccessful.

The West cannot relinquish the sense of itself at the centre of the Universe, albeit no longer in a racial sense, Alastair Crooke writes.

A strategic aim would require a unitary purpose that could be succinctly outlined. It would require additionally a compelling clarity about the means by which the aim would be achieved and a coherent vision about what a successful outcome would actually look like.

There are no valid arguments against a liberation of Novorossia, see the list below and contemplate.

“There will be sanctions if Russia intervenes” – well the sanctions are already there, so Russia might as well get something for the “price” she is paying anyway.

The ongoing events in South-eastern Ukraine indicate a very important phenomenon. This is not only an indicator of the front of the geopolitical fight between the West and the club of the multipolar world structure, it is also the following: the break of Ukrainian statehood, serving in recent time as a satellite and client of Washington and Brussels; the growth of the political consciousness of the citizens (in the sense of the citizens who defend their rights and freedoms with weapons in their hands, and not subjects of the weak Weber State who cannot defend them from the arbitrary rule of political opponents and continue to fulfill their social obligations); and also the emergence of a new nationalism, unique in its characteristics and goals.