After numerous questions about a Russian buildup in Crimea and along the eastern border of Russia with Ukraine, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby finally got a bit exasperated and told Pentagon reporters that “these are great questions to put to [Defense Minister Sergey] Shoygu in Moscow.”
On March 27, 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement valued at 400 billion USD and integrating Iran into the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.[1] For Russia, the agreement was received on two levels. On one level, Russia, which has been on the receiving end of Western sanctions viewed the agreement as a blow to the sanctions policy and therefore as a positive. On a different level, the Sino-Iranian agreement, coupled with recent activity by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in the region that included visits to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, Bahrain, and Oman raised the question of Chinese competition for Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was queried about this issue in a press conference at the Valdai Discussion Club think tank. Lavrov welcomed “honest competition”.
Russia’s espionage agencies are redoubling efforts to penetrate NATO, Western intelligence officials say, and are focusing on recruiting moles in the defense ministries of the pact’s member states.
Italy expelled two Russian diplomats this week after they were caught in a parking lot in Rome handing cash to an Italian naval captain in exchange for sensitive military documents, which included NATO files.
For the better part of six years since Russia and Ukraine signed the Minsk II cease-fire accord for the disputed eastern Ukrainian region of Donbass, one question has loomed: How will the U.S. and NATO respond if Russian troops again cross back over the so-called Line of Contact, dividing Ukrainian forces from Russian-backed separatists? With reports now trickling in of a buildup of Russian military forces along the border and in Crimea, Washington and Brussels may need quick answers soon.
Two years ago, Russian activist Vladimir Kara-Murza pointed out that Vladimir Putin’s Russia had more political prisoners than the USSR did when Andrey Sakharov began calling attention to them in the USSR in 1976 (rferl.org/a/activist-number-of-political-prisoners-in-russia-twice-what-it-was-in-ussr/30048022.html).
In period since Kara-Murza made that calculation, Ellen Leafstedt of St. Antony’s College in Oxford says, the numbers of political prisoners in Russia have only increased and indeed continue to rise. In an article for the Riddle portal, she suggests that it is important to recognize their diversity (ridl.io/ru/nakazanie-bez-prestuplenija/).
A war memoir written by a former Russian paratrooper who fought in Syria for the Kremlin-backed mercenary Wagner Group, owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a plutocrat nicknamed “Putin’s chef,” had been eagerly awaited.
Reports this week that the United Arab Emirates is potentially financing Russian mercenaries in Libya affiliated with the notorious Wagner Group, according to a Pentagon watchdog, appear to be sending mini shockwaves through Washington. But the UAE has long had a fixation on mercenaries, and the fact that Russia is a regular supplier of soldiers of fortune should surprise no one. Much more worrying is the lack of policy coherence in Washington on what to do about it.
Turkey has announced that an agreement was reached with Russia on the technical details of a joint center soon to be established to monitor the ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.