The United States and NATO accused Russia of again ramping up tensions, criticizing Moscow’s plans to limit access to the Black Sea and the Kerch Strait for most of the next six months due to military exercises.
The U.S. Defense Department said Friday the Kremlin’s decision is “just the latest example” of Russian aggression in the Black Sea and insisted it would have no impact on U.S. plans.
MSNBC host Joe Scarborough’s belittling comments against fair and balanced Russia related journalism relate to an April 12-13 CNN airing on recent matters concerning Russia and Ukraine. The segment at issue begins with CNN reporter Matthew Chance joining Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the frontline of the demarcation area between the forces of the Ukrainian government and Donbass rebels. Thereafter, CNN news anchor John Vause follows up with longtime US academic/mass media journalist Jill Dougherty.
The false spin is given that Russia increased tension by amassing troops along its border with Ukraine. In actuality, the Kiev regime’s dramatic military buildup near the Donbass rebels occurred beforehand. This oversight is in line with the aforementioned CNN segment misidentifying Ukrainian forces as being Russian.
The CNN bit gives an inaccurate psychoanalysis of what’s motivating the recent Russian military activity. Omitted, is some otherwise valid insight of what could very well be influencing Zelensky and the Russian response to him. Zelensky’s low poll numbers are in part due to the miserable socioeconomic conditions in Ukraine and some faulty decision-making on the part of his government. Unable to get a prompt delivery of Western Covid-19 vaccinations, the Ukrainian government shot down the possibility of acquiring the Russian Sputnik vaccine. That stance can be reasonably seen as a shortsighted nationalist stance. It’s not as if Russia and Ukraine don’t commercially interact. Despite the differences between their governments, Russia remains a key trading partner of Ukraine.
Zelensky won the last Ukrainian presidential election on a platform that wasn’t as confrontational towards Russia as his opponent Petro Poroshenko. The former has since done an about face with brazen comments towards Russia and the Donbass rebels. The same can be said of his statement about Ukraine taking back Crimea (something that the majority of Crimean residents don’t support) and presiding over the closure of some Ukrainian (not Russian) media venues which aren’t so critical of Russia when compared to the Kiev regime’s preferred imagery. (Instead of condemning that move as a violation of press freedom, the Biden administration and some others have hailed that undertaking as a positive act against “Russian disinformation”.)
The Ukrainian government hasn’t made much, if any effort to interact with the Donbass rebels as stated in the Minsk Protocol of 2014. This aspect was casually downplayed by Dougherty in the Q & A with Vause.
In 1982, an unpopular Argentine junta attempted to militarily takeover the Falkland Islands from the United Kingdom. Initially, that move won (albeit temporarily) the Argentine regime large scale political support across the left-right political spectrum in Argentina and much of Latin America. The Kiev regime’s increased military move towards the Donbass rebels, serves as both a diversion to Ukraine’s socioeconomic problems and a testing of key particulars.
Perhaps the Argentine military were hoping that Britain’s resolve wouldn’t be so great, in conjunction with the junta getting a break from its opposition. In comparison, the overall Ukrainian enthusiasm for forcefully taking over the rebel held Donbass territory isn’t as great as the 1982 Argentine support for its government move on the Falklands.
Some Ukrainian nationalists see the Donbass area as a pro-Russian burden to the effort of a Ukraine opposed to Russia. Others see the humanitarian dilemma involved with military action relative to the civilian population in Donbass.
This last point is a concern for Russia as well. Many of the Donbass residents have Russian citizenship and/or familial links to Russia. The Russian government is well aware of a hypothetical Croatian Operation Storm scenario, which will be problematical for Russia, in terms of taking in a considerable number of Donbass residents and having nationalist anti-Russian elements in a stronger position.
In response to the increased Ukrainian government military presence near the rebels, Russia’s armed buildup along a portion of Ukraine’s northeastern border and stern statements, have sent a clear message that Moscow will not stand idly by in the event of a Croatian Operation Storm like move. The Ukrainian government could very well lose additional territory in a military confrontation with Russia.
Russia’s response seems to have paved the way for a possible de-escalation of tension – something that the CNN segment didn’t bring up. Confrontation with Russia is in line with a sensationalist media, influenced by neocons, neolibs and flat out Russia haters.
Put mildly, it’s wishful thinking for pro-Kiev regime supporters to hope for a robust NATO backing, in the event of an armed Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. Rhetorically bashing Russia shouldn’t be confused with seeking a foolish war with that nation. Likewise, it’s quite doubtful that the Russo-German Nord Stream 2 Pipeline will get quashed at this very late stage of its development.
Following Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s approval last month of a new naval base to be built on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, official Kremlin statements have billed the facility as a logistics center that will be defensive in nature—for principal use as a resupply station for Russian warships. In spite of these assurances, Russian media outlets have touted the base as Moscow’s gateway to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, widening the reach of its naval forces. The basing agreement’s terms, which were released on Dec. 8, appear to support this latter view: In exchange for military aid, Sudan will allow Russia to maintain its facility in Port Sudan for at least 25 years, allowing it to bolster its influence in key maritime theaters.
Ukraine’s defense minister said on Wednesday that Russia is potentially preparing Crimea for storing nuclear weapons.
Ukraine’s defense minister said on Wednesday that Russia is potentially preparing Crimea for storing nuclear weapons and warned that Moscow could attack Ukraine to ensure water supplies for the annexed peninsula.
After numerous questions about a Russian buildup in Crimea and along the eastern border of Russia with Ukraine, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby finally got a bit exasperated and told Pentagon reporters that “these are great questions to put to [Defense Minister Sergey] Shoygu in Moscow.”
Conflict between Ukraine and Russia has flared again, reigniting a dormant yet uneasy stalemate between Kiev and Moscow in the seven-year war.
Peace talks have stalled and Russian military exercises along the border could be an attempt at intimidation, or something beyond mere posturing.
On March 27, 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement valued at 400 billion USD and integrating Iran into the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.[1] For Russia, the agreement was received on two levels. On one level, Russia, which has been on the receiving end of Western sanctions viewed the agreement as a blow to the sanctions policy and therefore as a positive. On a different level, the Sino-Iranian agreement, coupled with recent activity by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in the region that included visits to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, Bahrain, and Oman raised the question of Chinese competition for Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was queried about this issue in a press conference at the Valdai Discussion Club think tank. Lavrov welcomed “honest competition”.
Russia’s espionage agencies are redoubling efforts to penetrate NATO, Western intelligence officials say, and are focusing on recruiting moles in the defense ministries of the pact’s member states.
Italy expelled two Russian diplomats this week after they were caught in a parking lot in Rome handing cash to an Italian naval captain in exchange for sensitive military documents, which included NATO files.
For the better part of six years since Russia and Ukraine signed the Minsk II cease-fire accord for the disputed eastern Ukrainian region of Donbass, one question has loomed: How will the U.S. and NATO respond if Russian troops again cross back over the so-called Line of Contact, dividing Ukrainian forces from Russian-backed separatists? With reports now trickling in of a buildup of Russian military forces along the border and in Crimea, Washington and Brussels may need quick answers soon.
Two years ago, Russian activist Vladimir Kara-Murza pointed out that Vladimir Putin’s Russia had more political prisoners than the USSR did when Andrey Sakharov began calling attention to them in the USSR in 1976 (rferl.org/a/activist-number-of-political-prisoners-in-russia-twice-what-it-was-in-ussr/30048022.html).
In period since Kara-Murza made that calculation, Ellen Leafstedt of St. Antony’s College in Oxford says, the numbers of political prisoners in Russia have only increased and indeed continue to rise. In an article for the Riddle portal, she suggests that it is important to recognize their diversity (ridl.io/ru/nakazanie-bez-prestuplenija/).