Rusia

Why the Stalemate in Eastern Ukraine Will Likely Hold

Despite the Russian Buildup, the Status Quo Still Serves Both Sides

In the days leading up to and following last week’s video summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin, there has been intense speculation that Moscow is on the verge of a new military incursion into Ukraine. The United States has estimated that Russia has already deployed close to 70,000 soldiers—media reports have claimed significantly higher numbers—to several locations along Ukraine’s eastern border and in Crimea. Apparently, the Russian government is impatient with the unfinished business of the Donbas war in eastern Ukraine, which is now in its eighth year. And Putin seems to think he can prevent Ukraine’s entry into NATO by threatening a new war in the center of Europe.

Russian Expert On Turkey Starobudtsev: Russia Outflanked Turkey With Its Intervention In Kazakhstan, But The Competition Between The Two Claimants To The Turkic Parts Of The Post-Soviet Space Will Continue

Russia had congratulated itself on its textbook intervention to quell the unrest in Kazakstan but recriminations began when Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, arguably the main beneficiary of the intervention, appointed Askar Umarov minister of information in the new government. Umarov is accused of besmirching Russia’s Great Patriotic War (World War II) and has called the Russians living in Kazakhstan an imposed Diaspora. Yevgeny Primakov, head of Rossotrudnichestvo [Federal Agency for the CIS Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation], refused to work with the Kazakh official. Primakov charges Umarov with having Russophobic views. “I would like to remind you of by now an old, automatically operative and proven rule. It states that Rossotrudnichestvo doesn’t maintain contacts, doesn’t work and doesn’t cooperate with Russophobic trash,” stressed Primakov. Back in 2017, the ‘Kazinform’ agency, headed by Umarov, published a ‘Great Kazakhstan’ map, which designated the Russian cities of Omsk and Orenburg as a part of Great Kazakhstan.[1]

What To Expect From Russia-U.S. Relations In 2022

The January 13 Russia-OSCE meeting in Vienna ended a week of intensive talks on “security guarantees” between Moscow and the Western powers. As January 13 marks the Russian festivity of the “Old New Year” (“Stary Novy God,” the start of the New Year by the Julian calendar), one may summarize what “the long 2021” changed in Russia’s foreign policy and reflect on the possible consequences for 2022.

Biden’s soft-power policy faces reality of Xi-Putin big-power world

President Joe Biden took office with what was, in many ways, a soft-power vision of foreign policy. But China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin have been busy reminding the United States that today’s world is one of big-power competition.

Regional experts say one key objective of Mr. Putin’s recent actions regarding Ukraine is to convince the U.S. to deal with Russia as the great power he sees it to be. At the end of a week of inconclusive diplomacy addressing Ukraine, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Friday that if nothing else, “they are taking us seriously now.”

US special operations presses on in Ukraine amid threat of Russian invasion

U.S. special operators are continuing with a mission to build up an elite fighting force in Ukraine, military officials said, even as Russia threatens invasion with its thousands of troops, tanks and artillery massed along their borders.

“The bottom line is that our training mission in Ukraine is ongoing,” Lt. Col. Juan Martinez, spokesman for U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, said Tuesday.

Martinez said there are a “ton of outside factors at work,” but that the command hasn’t stepped back from Ukraine.

Skeptic’s Alert: Washington and NYT Expose Russian False Flag

On 14 January, a breaking news story from the New York Times informed its readers: “U.S. Says Russia Sent Saboteurs Into Ukraine to Create Pretext for Invasion.”

Unsurprisingly, Washington “did not release details of the evidence it had collected.” Why did the NYT not question the withholding of evidence? Why even deign to report what so easily could be dismissed, by definition, as hearsay? Is that because the White House is a paragon of truth-telling? Did its erroneous reporting by disgraced writer Judith Miller that Iraq possessed weapons-of-mass-destruction precipitating a US-led invasion not teach NYT a lesson?

U.S. and Russia Meet as Moscow Plans its Next Move

American and Russian diplomats met in Geneva earlier this week, with numerous items on the agenda—a high-profile showcase of diplomacy designed to head off further escalation between Washington and Moscow.

Russia has continued its saber rattling, making bellicose statements even while negotiations continue apace.

The Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive posture in Europe has garnered pushback, particularly among Nordic countries and the Baltic states, which fear Russian encroachment.

In the face of Russian aggression, the West needs to strengthen European security and Black Sea partnerships

For months, Ukraine has been a central focus for Western foreign policy as Russia has continued its military buildup on the border, reaching 100,000 troops. Moscow has threatened to carry out a military attack and has now issued an ultimatum for the United States to bless a Russian sphere of influence over sovereign democratic countries such as Ukraine. But as consultations between the U.S. and Russia take place throughout the week, the West should bear in mind that Ukraine is only one part of the broader Russian problem. It is about all independent former Soviet states and essentially about the entire European security architecture. The U.S. and NATO cannot go over the heads of independent states and give into Russian demands; instead, they should buy time and invest in long-term European security, while refraining from rhetoric and ultimatums.

A Provocative Challenge to Analytical Doctrine

The unintended consequences of analytical doctrine may make us more vulnerable to surprises.

Two recent events, the surprise Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the massing of Russian troops on Ukrainian borders, have brought to the surface the debate about the role of assessment and analysis in informing policy decisions. In the case of the former, we ask: how could this event not have been foreseen (i.e., why did the analysis not clearly predict it)? In the case of the latter, we are provided with varying estimates of the likelihood of President Vladimir Putin’s malign intentions and his probable timescales for action. Will he invade, or won’t he? By spring or after?

Kazakhstan: Peering Beyond Current Troubles

The riots in Kazakhstan may have abated, but the country’s problems remain unresolved, and its leaders’ challenges have never been greater. Dr Neil Melvin, RUSI’s Director of International Security Studies, identifies what these are.

Riots prompted by higher fuel prices are not exactly unusual. We have seen them in places as diverse as France with the so-called Yellow Vests, or Chile with public transport. Thus, in many respects, what has happened in Kazakhstan should not surprise us. Or should it?