Future Foreign Policy: What Russia’s war means for European defense
A discussion with American and European experts on the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for European security and defense policy.
A discussion with American and European experts on the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for European security and defense policy.
The conventional wisdom in Washington is that NATO should refrain from enforcing a No-Fly Zone over Ukraine due to the risk of an all-out NATO-Russia war. This view reflects a decades-long misunderstanding of both Russia and Ukraine, and is mired in appeasement thinking. While the window to impose a No-Fly Zone has likely closed, there are still alternatives that could work. The West should implement them without delay.
Refugee agency praises neighboring countries’ compassion for ‘extreme plight’ of refugees; most of those who crossed borders to escape have entered Poland
Nearly 3.5 million Ukrainians have now fled the country following Russia’s invasion, the United Nations said Monday, praising neighboring countries for showing overwhelming compassion toward their “extreme plight.”
The big question is what else Russia has up its sleeve, but may be running out of some other munitions. It has used cruise and other types of surface-to-surface missiles.
With Russian supply columns being struck by Ukrainian artillery and Ukrainian drones still flying, harassing Russia’s invasion, Moscow has turned to a new weapon to show that it, too, has unique capabilities.
Following its invasion of Ukraine several weeks ago, Russia’s once-feared military has faced fierce resistance.
Some experts believe that Russia may have overreached, as it has struggled to make the quick progress it expected to and has reportedly lost a slew of high-profile military figures.
“We have no communication. We don’t have walkie-talkies. Nothing,” a bedraggled Russian soldier tells his interrogators in another of the videos published by Ukrainian defenders this month posted to YouTube.
The stakes in Ukraine are far higher than most people imagine, Aleksandr Skobov says. Putin’s war there is “only part of his global war against the fundamental principles of civilized relations among states,” and that means any agreement with him that accepts any of his demands will mark the end of the West and the world it created.
There can be little doubt that “the lion’s share of responsibility” for Putin’s war in Ukraine “rests with Russian society which by its political passivity and indifference to its own freedom and its own security” opened the way for the Kremlin leader to do whatever he wants to, Aleksandr Podrabinek says.
While the Ukraine crisis may put some strain on the Chinese-Russian relationship, it has also spurred deeper collaboration between them. Based on a shared desire to undermine the United States’ global order, their constructive partnership will not only endure the blowback from the Ukrainian invasion but is likely to expand.