US President Donald Trump has expressed growing frustration with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, as the war in Ukraine drags on, saying he is considering imposing new sanctions on Moscow.
In comments made at the White House on July 8, five days after his latest phone call with Putin, Trump indicated he was making little progress in his goal of ending the more than 40-month war.
Les pays du flanc oriental de l’OTAN ont annoncé qu’ils étaient prêts à frapper sur le territoire de la Russie en cas d’agression. Pour eux, la question n’est pas de savoir si cela va avoir lieu, mais quand ?
Les pays, qui se trouvent sur le flanc oriental, déclarent une nouvelle stratégie de défense contre la Russie, menaçant d’attaquer la Russie et de la bombarder s’ils se considèrent en danger jouant avec l’activation de l’article 5 de l’OTAN. «Dans les pays baltes – Lituanie, Lettonie et Estonie – on vit au quotidien la menace russe», rapporte Le Temps signalant une forme de paranoïa qui agite les élites de ces pays pourtant minuscules qui sont dans l’OTAN et dans l’UE, et qui, de ce fait, entraînent les autres pays de l’UE et de l’Alliance dans une escalade du conflit contre la Russie, menaçant de déboucher sur une guerre directe.
President Donald Trump seemed confident he could quickly end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But more than 150 days into his second term, peace seems no closer than it did on day one. Although headlines focus on high-stakes diplomacy and Moscow’s nightly aerial bombardment of Ukrainian civilians, policymakers in the United States should not overlook the Kremlin’s mistreatment of ethnic minorities under its control—particularly the continued persecution of the Crimean Tatar community.
Russia may have recently tested a new Iranian-made Shahed (Geran) drone with new precision capabilities, while likely simultaneously fielding new Russian-made radio-controlled Shahed drones. Ukrainian forces discovered Shahed drone debris on June 18 that had an advanced camera, a computing platform with artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning (ML) capabilities, and a radio operation system that allows the drone operator to remotely operate the Shahed drone from Russia.[1] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov told the Associated Press that the new Shahed variants are white and have no markings or labels consistent with Russia-made drones, instead having stickers consistent with the standard Iranian labeling system. Drone experts told AP that Iran may have sold new Shahed variants to Russia for combat testing. Beskresnov also commented on the footage of a black Shahed drone with a radio-controlled camera striking a Ukrainian target in Kramatorsk on June 24.[2] Beskresnov noted that while this Shahed variant appears to be different from the white, possibly Iranian-made Shahed drone. Beskresnov noted that Ukrainian intelligence previously warned that Russia sought to integrate radio communications and cameras into a portion of Shaheds and argued that the Russian-made radio-controlled Shahed variants likely have “primitive” and cheap video and radio communications, whereas the Iranian-made drone likely had expensive components. Beskresnov added that the Russian-made Shaheds are still likely vulnerable to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) due to their reliance on radio communications.
Un contexte explosif
Depuis plusieurs années, le climat international est marqué par une montée des tensions, des sanctions économiques et des démonstrations de force. Les grandes puissances s’affrontent par médias interposés, et chaque décision semble précipiter le monde vers une nouvelle ère de confrontation. La Chine et la Russie, longtemps cibles de pressions et de critiques, ont décidé de ne plus subir et de répondre ensemble, de manière spectaculaire.
The Russian paramilitary group Wagner has left Mali, and its units there have been taken over by the Moscow-run Africa Corps, diplomatic and security sources told AFP on Sunday.
“Officially, Wagner is no longer present in Mali. But the Africa Corps is stepping up,” one diplomatic source in the Sahel region said.
Two years ago, I outlined eight lessons from the Ukraine War. Though I warned that it was too early to be confident about any predictions, they have held up reasonably well.
When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he envisaged a quick seizure of the capital, Kyiv, and a change of government, much like what the Soviets did in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the war is still raging, and no one knows when or how it will end.
The joint investigation of The Insider, Bellingcat and CNN, with the participation of Der Spiegel, established the names and titles of FSB officers who poisoned Alexei Navalny “Novichok”. As it turned out, the poisoning in Tomsk was the second attempt, two months earlier, the same FSB officers made an attempt on the oppositionist in Kaliningrad and almost killed Yulia Navalny. A key role in the attempt was played by a special unit of the Institute of Criminalistics of the FSB.
In Libya, a new conflict is flaring up: Companions of the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar, who recently met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, tried on May 28 to take control of oil production. This internal conflict entails a clash of interests of larger players. After the fall of the Syrian regime, Bashar al-Assad, Libya becomes a key country for the Kremlin in the struggle for the preservation of a military presence in the Mediterranean and Africa, but Turkey was on the way to Russia. During the first years of the civil war, the Turkish authorities supported the “pro-Western” Government of National Accord in Tripoli, while the Haftar, which took the east of the country relied more on the help of Egypt, the UAE and Russia. However, in the spring of 2025, there was an unexpected разворотturn: Turkey began to actively establish direct contacts with the LNA, the traditional ally of the Kremlin. Now Russia, having connected Belarus, is trying to counteract this. Putin personally receives Haftar in Moscow, because now Libya has become a key point for Russian projects in the Sahel belt in Africa. But Turkish arguments in the form of investments and weapons may be much more profitable for Haftar than ephemeral advantages from cooperation with Russia.
Le ministère de la Défense russe communique : «Kiev attaque les terrains d’aviation de cinq régions russes. Pas de victimes signalées ni chez les militaires ni chez les civils». Selon les informations diffusées par Kiev (reportées par le Wall Street Journal), l’attaque a été menée de cette façon : «L’agence des services secrets de l’Ukraine (SBU) a passé en contrebande en Russie des éléments de drones ukrainiens et les a assemblés dans un lieu secret. Les agents de la SBU en Russie ont utilisé des camionneurs inconscients pour consigner une version moderne du Cheval de Troie, cachant les drones dans les toits en bois des containers. Dimanche, les toits activés à distance se sont ouverts sur les camions à côté des bases aériennes russes. Plus de 100 quadricoptères -petits drones avec quatre rotors- ont décollé et ont foncé sur leurs objectifs, détruisant 13 avions russes parqués sur les pistes». Ce que Kiev ne dit pas c’est qu’une opération de ce type requiert des hautes technologies et des réseaux satellitaires militaires que l’Ukraine ne possède pas. De toute évidence ils ont été fournis à l’Ukraine par l’OTAN. Que les services secrets ukrainiens sont formés et entraînés par ceux des États-Unis et de l’OTAN n’est pas un secret. «La CIA – confirme le New York Times – aide secrètement l’Ukraine à combattre Poutine. Pendant plus d’une décennie, les États-Unis ont cultivé un partenariat secret d’intelligence avec l’Ukraine qui est maintenant fondamental pour les deux pays pour contrer la Russie».