Orientul Mijlociu

Issue 287 of the Islamic State (ISIS) weekly magazine Al-Naba’, which was published on May 20, 2021, includes an editorial discussing the current violence between Israel and the Palestinians.[1] Although clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinian protestors have been ongoing since the beginning of Ramadan in the second week of April and militant groups in Gaza began to fire rockets at Israel on May 10,[2] ISIS has refrained from commenting on the situation in Al-Naba’ until now. This is in sharp contrast to Al-Qaeda’s Central Command and its affiliates, most of which have issued statements expressing solidarity with Palestinians, praising the rocket attacks on Israel, and calling for jihad against Israel and Jews since Palestinian groups first began to fire rockets at Israel.[3]

n the wake of the latest round of fighting between Israel and Hamas, Israel remains in the spotlight for the civilian casualties and widescale destruction of civilian areas caused by its attacks on Gaza. Like most democracies whose air wars kill large numbers of civilians, Israel claims the moral high ground. Though acknowledging that the harm caused to civilians was regrettable, Israel argues that its armed forces took all feasible precautions to avoid it, while taking care to aim their strikes at Hamas military targets. By contrast, according to Israel, Hamas was targeting Israeli civilians directly and intentionally.

Dans Dix Petits Mensonges et leurs Grandes Conséquences (Editions l’Artilleur, 2021), Yves Mamou s’attaque à l’antisionisme. L’ancien journaliste du Monde postule qu’une série de mensonges déforme la perception de l’État d’Israël en Europe. Il a recensé dix de ces mensonges et démontre qu’ils ont un effet dévastateur qui va bien au-delà de la mauvaise perception que nous avons de l’État hébreu : les Français et les Européens sont désarmés face au djihad.

The policy paper, “Preserving Free Society, Promoting Social Cohesion, Fighting Political Islamism,” which whole-heartedly commends law-abiding Muslims who respect Germany’s democratic order, argues that the debate about Islamism in Germany is often reduced to violence and terror, but that it is necessary to focus more on ideology. The proposals include improving research and analysis of political Islam in Europe and the methods by which it spreads; banning the foreign funding of mosques; and reducing the number of foreign imams active in Germany.

It is important to expect that whatever the deal, the Iranian regime will continue to pursue its nuclear ambitions and clandestine nuclear activities: there are historical precedents for it.

Tehran claimed that the “secret atomic warehouse,” located in a village of Turquz Abad in the suburbs of Tehran, was a place where carpets were cleaned.

The IAEA at first ignored the reports. This should not come as a surprise: the IAEA has a long history of misreporting the Islamic Republic’s compliance with the deal and declining to follow up on credible reports about Iran’s illicit nuclear activities.

In April 2018, Saudi Arabia’s crown prince and de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Salman, said in an interview with The Atlantic that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, “makes Hitler look good.” MBS, as the crown prince is widely known, also dismissed the possibility of any talks between the two regional rivals.