Jubaland state continued with operations against Al-Shabaab even in the middle of a planned slow-down by the federal government, targeting the militants in the latest offensive which comes days after the Jana Cabdalle battle which left several militants dead just weeks after the town was taken by the group.
The killing of a prominent Islamic State financier in Somalia sheds light on the group’s transnational financial networks and shifting centre of gravity.
On 25 January 2023, US special forces killed well-known extremist Bilal Al-Sudani, together with nine associates, in northern Somalia. This has drawn media and expert attention to the role Somalia plays as a piece in the international jihadi jigsaw. Somalia is important not just because of the presence of Al-Shabaab but also because of the globally networked structure that Islamic State (IS) has created for finance and other purposes.
On March 16, 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced—during his visit to Niger—that the United States government will provide $150 million in aid to the Sahel region of Africa. This money, Blinken said, “will help provide life-saving support to refugees, asylum seekers, and others impacted by conflict and food insecurity in the region.” The next day, UNICEF issued a press release with information from a report the United Nations issued that month stating that 10 million children in the central Sahel countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger need humanitarian assistance. UNICEF has appealed for $473.8 million to support its efforts to provide these children with basic requirements. According to the Human Development Index for 2021, Niger, despite holding large reserves of uranium, is one of the poorest countries in the world (189th out of 191 countries); profits from the uranium have long drained away to French and other Western multinational corporations. The U.S. aid money will not be going to the United Nations but will be disbursed through its own agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance.
Introduction: The Islamic State’s Sahelian Affiliate
The Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) is a salafi-jihadist militant group and the Sahelian affiliate of the transnational Islamic State (IS) organization. It is primarily active in the border areas between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — known as the tri-state border area, or Liptako-Gourma — but it has also engaged in sporadic activity in Algeria, Benin, and Nigeria. The group’s composition reflects the social fabric in the areas where it is active. Its members belong to the Fulani, Arab, Tuareg, Dawsahak, Songhai, and Djerma ethnic groups, although its core leadership was historically composed of Western Saharan militants.
The central Sahel — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — is buffeted by three main forms of armed conflict that overlap and fuel each other: communal conflict, banditry, and violent extremism. These conflicts are partly rooted in a crisis of governance in rural areas, and are exacerbated by climate change, demographics, and internal and cross-border migration. On the frontline of this unfolding security and humanitarian crisis are rural populations, a majority of whom bear the brunt of atrocities and abuse. A minority, however, has been used as cannon fodder for violent extremist groups and other disruptive and destabilizing armed actors. The fact that rural areas have become a ripe breeding ground for militancy and banditry is a manifestation of a profound dislocation of the rural socio-economic order, the biggest casualties of which have been nomadic pastoralists.
What’s new? The Somali government has gained ground in its war with the Islamist insurgency Al-Shabaab, mainly in central Somalia. Most of the progress is due to Mogadishu’s leveraging of local discontent with Al-Shabaab to form alliances with clan militias.
In 2020–2022, Tunisian illegal migrants traveled through Serbia to reach Western Europe, as an alternative to the hazardous, more monitored Mediterranean route. This was driven by push factors in Tunisia, including deteriorating economic conditions and government acquiescence, and pull factors in Europe, namely smuggling networks and Serbian authorities looking the other way. While the route was sealed for Tunisians in November 2022, as long as transit states can use illegal migration to secure geopolitical leverage, such actions will continue.
Entretien avec l’essayiste Loup Viallet autour de la tournée africaine du président Macron.
Emmanuel de Gestas. Dimanche 12 mars, la chaîne LCP a déprogrammé une interview de Kemi Seba tournée par Yves Thréard, à la suite d’une polémique. Pourriez-vous nous éclairer sur cet événement ?
Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at the International Parliamentary Conference Russia – Africa in a Multipolar World held in Moscow under the auspices of the State Duma of the Russian Federal Assembly March 20.
Après un an d’intenses tractations, Wassim Nasr, le spécialiste des mouvements jihadistes à France 24, est parvenu en exclusivité à envoyer ses questions à l’émir d’Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi), Abou Obeida Youssef al-Annabi. Départ de Barkhane, menace terroriste sur la France, stratégie d’expansion vers le Golfe de Guinée… notre chroniqueur décrypte et met en contexte les réponses du chef de l’organisation terroriste.