Rusia

Al-Sharaa Regime Strengthening Ties With Russia Amid Public Disapproval Due To Russia’s Past Alliance With Assad Regime

In recent weeks, there has been a noticeable warming of relations between Syria’s new regime, led by President Ahmad Al-Sharaa, and Russia. This rapprochement has met with criticism from many Syrians, given that Russia was a key ally of the Bashar Al-Assad regime. During Syria’s civil war it took brutal action against Assad’s opponents,[1] and today it provides asylum to the ousted president himself, his family and senior officials of his regime, while refusing to extradite them.[2] Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the organization led by Al-Sharaa before he became president,[3] was frequently a target of these Russian attacks. But despite this, since coming to power in December 2024 Al-Sharaa has taken are not to alienate Russia and has not acted to remove its remaining military presence in Syria. This approach has also been evident in statements by Al-Sharaa and senior members of his regime, who have consistently taken a neutral, and at times even positive, tone towards Russia.[4] In addition, there have been mutual visits between the two countries: a senior delegation of Syrian ministers headed by Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani visited Moscow on July 31, 2025, and a Russian delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak visited Damascus on September 9, 2025. On both occasions the sides expressed a mutual desire to “turn over a new leaf of genuine cooperation.”[5] The highlight was Al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow on October 15, 2025 and his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which lasted about two and a half hours and during which both sides emphasized their desire to strengthen the friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries.[6]

Un véritable plan de paix pour l’Ukraine

La publication surprise, la semaine dernière, d’un projet de plan de paix pour l’Ukraine a suscité l’espoir d’une fin imminente à ce conflit sanglant qui dure depuis près de trois ans. L’Ukraine a subi des pertes terribles qui pourraient bouleverser sa démographie pour les décennies à venir.

The Reconstruction Trap: The Next Failure in Gaza and Ukraine?

Recent history in Afghanistan and Iraq teaches that rebuilding in active conflict zones comes with its share of hazard and futility, but it is a necessity in Gaza and Ukraine despite its uncertainty.

With only a series of brief respites in long-term conflicts, Ukraine and Gaza present a familiar dilemma: how to rebuild in active conflict zones. Given Russia’s apparent commitment to a forever war, Ukraine has been forced to carry out a piecemeal reconstruction as the war grinds on. In Gaza, both Israelis and Palestinians may see reasons to resume hostilities. The countries which will fund efforts to rebuild in these conflict zones should keep in mind that reconstruction brings its own kind of minefield, and any missteps will be costly.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14, 2025

Toplines

The Russian military command appears to be prioritizing the seizure of Pokrovsk over efforts to close the wider Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Russian advances in and around Pokrovsk over the last several days suggest that Russian forces in Pokrovsk are prioritizing the seizure of the settlement itself. They do not appear to be focused on supporting efforts by the 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) to close the pocket from the north and northeast with a complementary attack from the south at this time.[1] Russian forces may be prioritizing the seizure of Pokrovsk for a number of reasons. Russian leadership may seek to exploit the informational effects that the town’s seizure will likely generate, or may hope that the seizure of Pokrovsk will facilitate a subsequent effort to close the pocket. Ukrainian counterattacks on the northern shoulder of the pocket and a continued Ukrainian presence within Pokrovsk are complicating Russian advances and Russia’s ability to close the pocket, but that fact should not be enough in itself to cause the Russian command to be distracted from the effort from the south. The 51st CAA has also been struggling to advance from the northeast, moving more slowly than the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) is moving within Pokrovsk and on the western flank of the pocket.[2] The 51st CAA’s slower tempo could also be contributing to Russia’s apparent and possibly temporary prioritization of the seizure of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command is notably not pursuing the standard measures one would expect in such a battlefield configuration, namely focusing forces and means on completing the encirclement, which would normally be the fastest and least costly way to seize the entire area. The Russian military command can change its focus at any time, however.

“This isn’t the Middle Ages, and we’re not serfs.” Residents of the unoccupied part of Donetsk Oblast on Putin’s territorial demands.

American sources claim that Vladimir Putin is offering to renounce his claims to the partially occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia regions in exchange for full control over Donbas, making this a condition for a ceasefire. By the end of the fourth year of the war, Russia has managed to capture only 70% of the Donetsk region. Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Kostyantynivka, and Pokrovsk—important industrial centers and well-defended fortress towns—remain under Ukrainian control. The Insider spoke with residents of the unoccupied part of the Donetsk region about how they have endured shelling for three years and how they view the prospects of a “Russian world” coming to power in exchange for an end to the war.

Moscow’s Balkan Recruits: Russia’s Drive to Enlist Serb Fighters for Ukraine War

epa04638458 Pro-Russian rebels walk at the destroyed Donetsk International Airport, in Donetsk, Ukraine, 26 February 2015. The Russia-backed separatists have said that they have unilaterally begun withdrawing their heavy weapons. Ukraine was to begin withdrawing heavy weapons from the front line in the country’s east, the Defence Ministry in Kiev said.

Albania Emerges as Destination Port for Illicit Oil from Russia and Libya

It was a cold and windy day in January this year when the Besart and the Aya Zanoubya approached the port of Porto Romano near Durres on Albania’s Adriatic coast, the latter being towed due to an electrical failure that had supposedly prevented it from continuing to its stated destination.

Their declared cargo was cement, but, acting on a tip-off, investigators discovered something else – 600,000 litres of undeclared diesel fuel.

A high-stakes gamble

Like our earlier reports on the combat situation in Ukraine, this article takes stock of the recent developments on the battlefield based on open-source information. Meduza has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the very start, and our detailed military analyses are part of our commitment to objective reporting on a war we firmly oppose.

Our map is based exclusively on open-source photos and videos, most of them posted by eyewitnesses on social media. We collect available evidence and determine its geolocation markers, adding only the photos and videos that clear this process. Meduza doesn’t try to track the conflict in real time; the data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old.