The Biden administration discusses a “take it or leave it” cease-fire proposal
Brian Katulis
Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy
Brian Katulis
The murder of six Israeli hostages in Gaza more than three months after Biden released his cease-fire plan demonstrates the limits of the administration’s policy approach.
Biden may try to use the moment to get Israel and Hamas to end months of negotiations and achieve a cease-fire, but the odds of a successful outcome seem low.The Biden administration is reportedly talking with Egypt and Qatar about presenting a “take it or leave it” deal to Israel and Hamas on a cease-fire and hostage release agreement this week. But for the past few months, the two main parties to this conflict roiling the Middle East have effectively already repeatedly responded in the negative.
Actions speak louder than words, and ever since President Joe Biden publicly presented a three-phase plan for a cease-fire at the end of May, both Israel and Hamas have spent more time pointing fingers at each other than taking any concrete steps toward an agreement that could end the fighting and result in the release of hostages held by Hamas in exchange for Palestinian prisoners in Israel.
The cease-fire talks, the centerpiece of the Biden administration’s efforts to calm the tensions in the Middle East, have gone through various phases ever since the one and only cease-fire collapsed last December. This past weekend’s discovery of the bodies of six Israeli hostages, including one dual national American citizen, put the spotlight once again on these cease-fire talks and sparked large demonstrations inside of Israel.
President Biden pointedly declared that he did not think Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was doing enough to free the hostages and get a cease-fire deal. At the same time, his Secretary of State Antony Blinken has publicly pointed the finger at obstructionism by Hamas at various times during the nine trips he has made to the region since Hamas started this war.
Months of quiet and public diplomacy did not prevent Hamas from executing six hostages and threatening to kill more, nor has it dissuaded Israel’s current government from continuing to prioritize military operations and security moves that have hampered either a short-term deal or a longer-term settlement envisioned in Biden’s three-phase plan. If the United States works with Egypt and Qatar to present some sort of “last best offer,” a likely outcome is more diplomatic stalemate and stonewalling.
The fundamental challenge with these negotiations is that the US and its key partners in mediating the talks have had to work with two parties, Israel’s current government and Hamas, that fundamentally reject each other’s legitimacy. The central irony in the Biden administration’s diplomatic efforts on ending the Israel-Hamas war is that the tactics it uses have actually ended up empowering opponents of the two-state solution it seeks to achieve in the long run and that multiple US administrations have endorsed in the past.
The Biden administration’s record of handling the Israel-Hamas war and the broader Middle East is mixed — it has prevented a wider regional war, but it has staked a lot of its efforts on achieving a cease-fire and hostage release deal opposed by the two main parties to the war.
The limits of Biden’s Middle East diplomacy are on full display right now.
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Intensifying Israeli raids in the West Bank threaten to worsen the region’s violent conflict
Nasir Almasri
Graduate Fellow, Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs
Nasir Almasri
Although Israel claims its West Bank operations — the largest in more than two decades — are intended to “thwart Islamic-Iranian terrorist infrastructures,” it has not produced evidence of such a threat.
More than 600 Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank since Oct. 7, 2023, due to continual and worsening Israeli raids, leading to elevated responses there from Palestinian militant groups such as Lion’s Den and the Jenin Brigades.On Aug. 28, the Israeli military announced it would significantly expand its operations in the northern West Bank by launching air and ground attacks in Jenin, Tulkarem, Tubas, and Nablus. The shift toward war in the West Bank comes amid continuing withdrawals of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip, the rolling back of threats to launch a war in Lebanon, and the, for now, diminishing danger of regional war. Although Israel claims its West Bank operations are intended to “thwart Islamic-Iranian terrorist infrastructures,” it has not produced evidence of such a threat. Moreover, Israel’s offensive there, the largest in more than two decades, aligns with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire to expand and prolong the war amid stalled cease-fire negotiations as a means to stay in power.
Israel’s Foreign Minister Israel Katz referred to the operations in the northern West Bank as a “full-fledged war.” The area, known historically as the “Triangle of Fire” for its armed confrontation of British and Zionist forces in the 1930s, is now home to several militant groups, such as Lion’s Den and the Jenin Brigades, composed of members of Fatah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These groups appeared and expanded in response to constant Israeli raids into parts of the West Bank that are ostensibly under Palestinian control. As a result of these raids, over 600 Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank since Oct. 7, 2023; and the use of air attacks on the enclave represent the first such attacks since the Second Intifada two decades ago.
The escalations in the West Bank have expanded slowly since October: attacks from Israeli settlers on Palestinian civilians and extensive Israeli raids of refugee camps have led to elevated militant responses. The director of Israel’s domestic security agency, Shin Bet, reportedly warned Netanyahu that Israeli actions in the West Bank would lead to an “explosion” that “would be a disaster and catastrophe for Israel.” Even sympathetic analysts have noted that the deteriorating situation in the West Bank has encouraged recruitment by these groups. The Israeli military has moved forward with its operations anyway, using bulldozers to plow up roads, blocking entrances and exits to towns and villages, surrounding hospitals, and cutting off water, electricity, and phone services to various areas, especially to Jenin.
The consequences will be far-reaching. Palestinians in the West Bank have long been under immense economic and military pressure from Israel, with anger and disillusionment boiling over for years. There is also concern that the West Bank could begin to look like Gaza. Of course, there are several important differences: the West Bank is broken into many enclaves, surrounded by Israeli settlements and military outposts, making internal movement more difficult; militants in the West Bank do not have the same capacity as those in the Gaza Strip; and many West Bankers work across the “Green Line” for Israeli companies and are therefore reliant on them for income. As a result, many Palestinians fear that Israel ultimately intends to expel them from the West Bank, a concern shared by the Jordanian regime as well.
The actions of the Netanyahu government risk opening a new war front in the West Bank, further engulfing the region in violent conflict. Without concerted international and especially US pressure on Netanyahu to obtain a cease-fire and end Israel’s new assault on the West Bank, the situation is likely to spiral out of control.
Houthi Red Sea attacks exploit era of increasingly limited and reactive international interventions
Fatima Abo Alasrar
Non-Resident Scholar
Fatima Abo Alasrar
The Iran-backed Houthi attacks on oil tankers in the Red Sea represent a calculated escalation in their campaign of maritime disruption, exploiting current constraints to an assertive international military response.
Houthi activities support Iran’s objectives of dominating the region’s strategic waterways and forcing its participation in global energy markets.Recent Houthi targeting of oil tankers in the Red Sea, including the boarding and detonation of explosives aboard the Greek-flagged vessel Sounion as well as attacks on Saudi- and Panamanian-flagged vessels, reflects the strategic goals of Iran and its Axis of Resistance — namely, to leverage current geopolitical tensions to maximum effect in order to benefit Iran and, in this case, solidify the Houthis’ regional role.
In a report released on Sept. 3 on Houthi media channels, the group claims responsibility for targeting over 186 ships in the Red Sea since autumn of last year. It details the seizure of one vessel, the sinking of three others, and the destruction of another by fire — all allegedly aimed at preventing Israeli or Israel-linked ships from passing through key maritime routes around Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula — vowing to continue these attacks. Although Houthi and Iranian media outlets routinely frame these actions as efforts to enforce a blockade and exert pressure on Israel over the Gaza war, the true strategic goal appears much broader. Instead, this Gaza-related narrative serves as a convenient but secondary pretext for increasing Iranian leverage over key global maritime shipping routes and leveraging its influence over Western powers.
The Houthis’ aggressive posture reflects a keen understanding of the international community’s limited appetite for direct military intervention — particularly true in the case of the United States in an election year. While the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian has generated sustained attacks on Houthi military infrastructure since late last year, such stand-off strikes are unlikely to deter the group from its current course, given the Houthis’ deep entrenchment in Yemen, their ideological alignment with Tehran, and the strategic importance of their actions to Iran’s wider regional objectives. The Houthis leverage asymmetric warfare tactics, and their operations are designed to exploit the limitations of traditional military responses, making it difficult for even robust initiatives like Prosperity Guardian to fully neutralize their influence or disrupt Iran’s strategic ambitions in the region. Indeed, as early as 2018, Iran telegraphed its willingness to leverage regional instability to counter economic pressures, with then-President Hassan Rouhani overtly threatening oil shipments from neighboring countries if Iranian exports were curtailed — a prescient warning that foreshadowed the current crisis and underscored Iran’s long-term commitment to using asymmetric tactics to achieve its strategic objectives.
Moreover, the near-miss environmental catastrophes that are produced continue to pose a challenge and deflect from the Houthis’ violations inside Yemen. The attacks on vessels like the Saudi Amjad, carrying two million barrels of oil, demonstrate the scale of potential economic impact, threatening to further drive up oil prices and maritime insurance rates in a highly sensitive global market.
As the international community struggles today to contain these ever-present threats, the Iran-backed Houthi campaign in the Red Sea stands as a clear testament to the intricate challenges confronting global maritime security. The current crisis underscores the urgent need for fresh thinking that transcends the outdated playbook of conventional military responses. This crisis calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying regional instabilities and the adaptive tactics of non-state actors, all unfolding in an era in which international intervention is increasingly limited and reactive.
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Unease in the Horn of Africa
Mirette F. Mabrouk
Senior Fellow and Founding Director of the Egypt program
Mirette F. Mabrouk
The first Egyptian military aid in four decades has arrived in Somalia, making Ethiopia nervous.
Somalia has been livid at an agreement between Ethiopia and the breakaway Somali region of Somaliland, involving Red Sea port access for the former in return for recognition of the latter.On Sunday, Egypt addressed a letter to the United Nations Security Council president, in response to statements made by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed regarding the fifth phase of filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ahmed had announced the activation of the third and fourth turbine of the dam — the continent’s largest hydroelectric power dam and the cause of almost 13 years of negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Those negotiations were often acrimonious and consistently fruitless. More specifically, they were fruitless for Egypt and Sudan; worried about their water supply, they’d desired two outcomes — a legally binding agreement on the filling and operation of the dam and international arbitration — and got neither.
It’s doubtful that the Egyptian letter, officially sent by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Emigration, and Expatriates Badr Abdel Atty, generated much excitement in Ethiopia. That seems to have been achieved by something more tangible than diplomatic disapproval.
Last Tuesday, two Egyptian C-130 military planes arrived in the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu, carrying arms and ammunition. The first such military aid in four decades, it was the result of a deal signed when Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Cairo in mid-August. The plan is for 5,000 Egyptian troops to join a new iteration of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is less than four months away from its expiry date. The AU’s Peace and Security Council has endorsed the creation and deployment of a new force, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), and the Egyptian troops will be part of this new force.
On the surface, this isn’t particularly surprising; Egypt is a major contributor to the 55-member continental bloc’s African Peace and Security Architecture and is a member of the AU Security Council. However, the Egyptian agreement with Somalia (which, admittedly, had been in the works for some time) came eight months after an initial agreement signed in January, by landlocked Ethiopia and Somaliland, to use the latter’s Red Sea port of Berbera in return for Ethiopia being the first country to recognize the breakaway Somali region. Not surprisingly, Somalia has not taken kindly to the agreement, which essentially recognizes the fragmentation of its territory; it promptly threatened to expel 10,000 Ethiopian peacekeeping troops from the country and has said they will not be part of the new AU force. The agreement also raises the stakes in the already fragile Horn of Africa. White House National Security Spokesperson John Kirby noted during a presidential briefing that “Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity had to be respected,” and, more importantly, perhaps, from a US security standpoint, the agreement “threatens to disrupt the fight that Somalis, Africans, and regional international partners, including us, are waging against al-Shabaab.”
Ethiopia has reportedly been so unsettled by the prospect of Egyptian troops arriving in Somalia that it has sent its own troops to the border. While it’s highly unlikely that Egypt, which consistently maintains a conservative foreign policy, would initiate any aggression, it has warned that its water security, linked to its concerns over the GERD, is “an existential threat.” And the withdrawal of Ethiopia’s troops from Somalia makes the former vulnerable to extremist attacks. No one in the Horn can afford any more conflict, and neither can the rest of the world — any such conflict would invariably further destabilize traffic in the Red Sea, a critical maritime chokepoint for 12% of global trade.
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Baloch militancy poses a growing threat to Pakistan
Marvin G. Weinbaum
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies
Marvin G. Weinbaum
Balochistan faced a series of coordinated attacks last week that left over 70 people dead and caused extensive damage to key infrastructure, contributing to a growing sense that the state of Pakistan is losing control over the province.
The federal government’s heavy-handed response has added to the multiple grievances the Baloch population has against state security agencies, fueling an outbreak of protests across the province.The recent surge in terrorism in Pakistan has raised doubts about the effectiveness of the state’s security measures, especially as the country undertakes one of its most expensive counter-terrorism efforts to date, Operation Azm-e-Istekham (Resolve for Stability). Last week, Balochistan, the most volatile region in Pakistan, faced a series of coordinated violent attacks that left over 70 people dead and caused extensive damage to key infrastructure. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), an ethnic separatist group engaged in a decade-long insurgency, claimed responsibility for the attacks. Shortly afterward, videos surfaced online showing convoys of BLA militants brandishing weapons as they moved through various parts of Pakistan’s westernmost province, celebrating with the locals. Together with the insurgents’ growing success in closing roads and extending their influence within urban areas, the recent attacks have created an impression that the state is losing control over the province.
In reaction, the Pakistani government, known for its heavy-handed approach to managing the Balochistan issue, convened an emergency meeting of the top national security committee and reiterated its commitment to forcefully suppressing those who threaten the region’s peace and stability. The military has already launched intelligence-based retaliatory operations, and the government has pledged billions of rupees to bolster law enforcement agencies’ counterterrorism capabilities. However, for the first time, the federal government acknowledged that a shortage of appointed personnel is hampering its effort. In an unexpected move, it decided to depute officials from other provinces, particularly Punjab, to take up posts in Balochistan. This decision has drawn bitter criticism as clear evidence of an attempt to marginalize the local population by denying it the governance and policing of its own province.
The federal government’s actions add to the multiple grievances the Baloch population has against state security agencies, which are accused of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and other infringements of basic rights. The government is also often accused of exploiting the province’s resources and failing to provide local employment opportunities as part of the multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Recently, a Baloch human rights group organized region-wide protests, blocking access to Gwadar city’s Chinese-operated deep-sea port. The BLA’s armed attacks are being seen as coordinated with the ongoing protests to pressure the government into compliance, as the Baloch group’s demands remain unmet. The government cannot afford instability in Balochistan, especially as it prepares to host a crucial Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in October. The civil-military regime has labeled the recent wave of insurgency as an attempt by hostile foreign elements to sabotage the upcoming meeting and has also characterized the protesters as proxies for terrorists, describing them as the political wing of the Baloch separatist militants.
The continuing alienation of the Baloch people, combined with the lack of distinction between non-violent protests and armed militancy, increases the risk of escalating violence. Through its recent attacks, the BLA has gained significant attention, bolstering its reputation as a formidable rebel movement capable of striking Pakistani security forces and reinvigorating its appeal to the province’s ethnic Baloch to join their struggle for independence from Pakistan. Exploitation by the BLA of the genuine grievances of the Baloch population has helped legitimize the separatists’ cause and expand their recruitment. Other nationalist parties in the province are widely viewed as proxies of the military establishment and responsible for government abuses and corruption. In a province where 65% of the population is below the age of 30, the many frustrated, unemployed Baloch youth are prime recruits for the BLA. Another key element in strengthening the BLA is the increasingly active participation of women. As a possible measure of how effectively the BLA’s cause is gaining traction among the province’s populace, the militants are now recruiting women as suicide bombers.
The government is bound to fail to meet the challenges posed by the Baloch uprising if it relies almost entirely on a military-focused strategy. A more holistic approach is needed, one that calls for more soft power to address the root causes of unrest. These include implementing justice reforms and curbing corruption together with addressing the province’s especially high poverty and mortality rates, poor literacy, as well as insufficient infrastructure and job opportunities. Continuing in the current fashion undoubtedly plays directly into the hands of those forces both internal and external that have an interest in destabilizing Pakistan. Present policies in Balochistan may ultimately threaten the integrity of the Pakistani state and are neither wise nor effective at bringing stability, security, and development to the province.