In Libya, a new conflict is flaring up: Companions of the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar, who recently met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, tried on May 28 to take control of oil production. This internal conflict entails a clash of interests of larger players. After the fall of the Syrian regime, Bashar al-Assad, Libya becomes a key country for the Kremlin in the struggle for the preservation of a military presence in the Mediterranean and Africa, but Turkey was on the way to Russia. During the first years of the civil war, the Turkish authorities supported the “pro-Western” Government of National Accord in Tripoli, while the Haftar, which took the east of the country relied more on the help of Egypt, the UAE and Russia. However, in the spring of 2025, there was an unexpected разворотturn: Turkey began to actively establish direct contacts with the LNA, the traditional ally of the Kremlin. Now Russia, having connected Belarus, is trying to counteract this. Putin personally receives Haftar in Moscow, because now Libya has become a key point for Russian projects in the Sahel belt in Africa. But Turkish arguments in the form of investments and weapons may be much more profitable for Haftar than ephemeral advantages from cooperation with Russia.
Libya – the new Syria
The fall of Damascus in December 2024 was a strike for Moscow, comparable in scale to the infamous US flight from Afghanistan three years earlier. Two key pillars of its Middle East presence were under question: the Tartus Naval Base and Hmeymim Airport. Therefore, Libya, which until then was considered only as a spare airfield, suddenly turned into the main springboard for the Kremlin in this region. Flights of the Il-76 and An-124 from Russian military bases in Syria in the direction of Libya since December 2024 have been significantly increased, and in the port of Tobruk they began to hastily unload heavy containers under the enhanced protection of the Russian military.
According to The Soufan Center, for the first quarter of 2025, the number of Russians placed on only one Libyan airbase Brak al-Shati increased увеличилосьby one and a half times (from about 300 to 450 people). Space images also point to указываютa construction fever at Ma’athan al-Sarra airbase in the south of the country near the Chad border. There, runways are hastily restored, military hangars are being mounted, new tanks for fuel and lubricants are being laid. Obviously, this object is being prepared for the role of a “long-dertain shoulder” for operations in the Sahel, where Russia is entrenched (primarily in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger).
Libya is being prepared for the role of “falk shoulder” for operations in the Sahel, where Russia is entrenched in Mali, Burkina Faso and NigerAt the same time, land corridors from the coast came to the continent. Through the central part of Libya controlled by Haftar, convoys of Russian military equipment and contingents of instructors, including employees of the newly created African Corps in Russia, are moving. Thus, a thin supply line, urgently created in Libya as insurance after the loss of Syria, has grown into a large network of Russian military infrastructure in North Africa in just a few months.
The Libyan Triangle
Against this background, as a thunderstorm, news was voiced among the clear sky that Ankara, which for a long time publicly supported the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, that is, Haftar’s opponents in the civil war, dramatically changed its approaches. On April 4, 2025, the chief of staff of the LNA Saddam Haftar (son of Khalifa Haftar) flew to Turkey unexpectedly for many.
It immediately became clear that this is not just a protocol visit. During it, the parties concluded an agreement on defense cooperation, covering the most important strategic areas – from the supply of weapons, including modern UAVs, and military training programs to the development of military infrastructure and joint naval exercises on the east coast of Libya.
According to the Azerbaijani channel “No brakes”, Turkey intends to create a military base in the city of Gat (south-west of Libya), where the Turkish delegation has already inspected two airports. Moreover, against the backdrop of strengthening bilateral ties between Turkish Airlines, for the first time in ten years, resumed flights to the city of Benghazi controlled by Haftar.
According to Jeune Afrique, the agreement is long-term and includes 30 training programs for the Libyan military for five years, with a focus on UAV development, maintenance and engineering (including mine clearance) and other technical support. In addition, joint exercises and the modernization of the military infrastructure of Eastern Libya are being discussed as part of efforts to unite its disparate armed forces today.
Thus, Turkey invests money, technology and builds infrastructure, and the Libyan National Army provides it with exclusive access to its territories and military bases in the south-west of the country. Thanks to this, Ankara is now openly acting in fact as a new patron for the LNA, signaling a serious intention to gain a foothold in Eastern Libya as opposed to Moscow. This opens to Turkey, like Russia, direct access to the Sahel. Ankara’s “Libyan Gambit” – to donate previous ties with the GNA for the speedy development of its influence on the once pro-Russian LNA – is already yielding results.
The classic “love triangle” emerges: two influential actors (Moscow and Ankara), still remaining geopolitical competitors, are fighting for the favor of the same Libyan general. As for Haftar himself, he seems to be doing so, hoping to reduce the growing dependence on Moscow and gain greater independence. This is an unpleasant surprise for Russia.
After the loss of Tartus, the Kremlin seriously intended to turn Tobruk into the main stronghold of its operations in Africa. But now Erdogan is working with the same partner in Libya with a much more attractive package of proposals. Putin cannot offer the Libyan marshal the most valuable weapons, because after Russia got bogged down in Ukraine, military aid opportunities have sharply declined, and armored vehicles and modern weapons are now in short supply.
The diminishing power of Moscow
Moscow has traditionally provided considerable support to Haftar. By the beginning of 2020, there were about 1.2 thousand mercenaries of Wagner PMCs in Libya, performing a wide range of tasks – from point guard of facilities to direct participation in hostilities. By September of the same year, according to AFRICOM (US Army Command in Africa), their number had already reached 2 thousand people.
Thanks to Putin’s support, Haftar remained one of the first contenders for a decisive victory in the civil war – and, as a result, to completely seize power throughout Libya. However, due to the extremely low efficiency of Russian military assistance, despite its impressive scale, Haftar could not achieve such a victory.
Since 2022, Moscow’s ability to sponsor ambitious operations at long-range borders has begun to decline rapidly. The reason for this was, of course, the war in Ukraine, which began to burn the military potential of Russia at an incredible pace. So, in March 2022, 1.3 thousand PMC fighters of Wagner were hastily withdrawn from Libya through Syria for transfer to the Ukrainian front. By the end of 2024, only about 800-1000 Russian mercenaries remained in Libya, who, after the actual defeat of the Wagner PMCs, were formally reassigned to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and reformatted into the so-called “African Corps”.
Since the war in Ukraine demanded an increasing concentration of forces from the Kremlin, with the presence of large military bases in Syria, which seemed unshakable, the Libyan direction began to fade into the background and at times even seem a strategic burden. Moreover, the investments made by Russia in the Haftar regime did not bring the expected return. Haftar could not fulfill his main task – to capture the whole of Libya. His campaign against Tripoli in 2019-2020 failed, and after that blow, he was unable to fully restore his strategic potential.
Among the population in Haftar-controlled eastern Libya, irritation began to grow by his regime, and the bet on the Kremlin has ceased to look like a panacea. In the Middle East, it is well known how Russia consistently betrays one of its ally after another, never preventing them from being overthrown and without coming to the rescue. The former dictator of Libya’s neighboring Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, who was dropped in 2019, still remains in prison at home, awaiting the issuance of an ICC on a war crimes warrant in Darfur. The former state minister of Moscow’s left to the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh, Ruben Vardanyan, a former influential Russian businessman, is still in an Azerbaijani prison.
The shelter on the territory of Russia so far could find only the deposed presidents of Ukraine and Syria Viktor Yanukovych and Bashar al-Assad, who reached it, could find refuge. However, for Haftar, the attempt to flee to Russia would be complicated at least for purely geographical reasons. Therefore, the problem of optimal distribution of dependence on external partners by 2025 has become especially acute for him.
Maritime Power of Belarus
In a difficult situation, Russia’s shoulder in Libya was substituted by the Union Belarus. In February 2025, at the initiative of Haftar, an unprecedented trilateral protocol was signed on the joint use of LNA logistics facilities in Minsk. Formally, the document is issued as an annex to the previous memorandum on military-technical cooperation between Russia and the LNA. The Ministry of Defense of Belarus unexpectedly joined it bypassing a long mandatory ratification procedure.
The agreement is designed for 25 years with the possibility of automatic renewal. It fixes the allies of 11.7 sq. km of the inner water area of the port of Tobruk, the adjacent land plot, as well as many port infrastructure facilities in the ten-kilometer zone – fuel warehouses, repair shops, sites for launching UAVs, etc.
A source of The Insider, familiar with the text of the agreement, claims that Moscow allegedly also received the right to place up to 1.2 thousand of its military personnel (the Navy’s logistics battalion) plus helicopters, drones and air defense systems, and Minsk – its engineering specialists. There are rumors about the battery of the modernized “Bukov”. Moscow took over the reconstruction of the northern wave and the laying of the main fiber-optic cable to the al-Abrak airbase, and Minsk – the modernization of the port power plant and the installation of the mobile dock.
In fact, Russia and Belarus in Libya have a joint headquarters, and part of the operation, the Kremlin conducts “under the roof” of Belarus by agreement with Lukashenko. Military personnel of the two countries are exempt from Libyan jurisdiction and taxes. Inspection access of UN observers is allowed no more than once a year and only on prior notification.
Thus, Libya, first stuffed with Russian, and now also by Belarusian specialists, literally in a few months has turned from a “spare airfield” into a full-fledged reference point for projecting Russian influence into the Central Mediterranean and the Sahel region (the central part of Africa).
Share the areas of cooperation and conquer
However, Moscow’s efforts do not interfere with the diversification of Haftar’s external relations, which allows him to solve several major strategic and geopolitical tasks at once. First, it significantly reduces its dependence on Moscow. If earlier the support of the Kremlin had no alternative, now Haftar has another major ally, on which you can rely. This powerfully strengthens his position: the balance between several patrons not only expands the space for maneuver, but also allows you to avoid excessive guardianship, and therefore pressure from one player.
Secondly, Haftar is insured in this way in the event of possible changes in the policy of the former ally. It should never be completely ruled out that the Kremlin, pursuing narrow opportunistic interests, can both change priorities and go to a direct rapprochement with its opponents. Not to mention the fact that Putin, tired of major failures, could find Haftar guilty of his failures in Libya and begin to act directly against him. Therefore, the establishment of relations with Ankara is also a good signal to Moscow that the LNA has alternatives to external cooperation and ways to protect itself from a possible reduction in Russian assistance in the future.
Finally, Haftar continues to seek to strengthen its position within Libya itself. Receiving support from both Russia and Turkey – two geopolitical opponents – he thereby shows other Libyan players that he is able not only to fight, but also to build complex diplomatic structures. This increases its weight in any negotiations on the future of the country. After all, the Eastern administration is now involved in a dialogue not in isolation, but with the support of at least two large external forces – the best way to force the government in Tripoli to reckon with its demands.
Stability in exchange for recognition
Turbulence in the south has seriously alarmed Italy, the main European investor in Libyan energy, as any threats around Sirte can significantly hit the country’s energy security. In 2023, the Italian energy company Eni and the National Oil Corporation of Libya signed an agreement of $8 billion on gas production (750 million cubic feet per day) for 25 years, starting in 2026. Therefore, the extreme upheavals in North Africa, Rome is obviously not needed.
Eni and Libya’s National Oil Corporation Sign $8 Billion Agreement on Gas Production for 25 YearsTraditionally frightens the Europeans and the risk of a new migration wave from Africa in case of aggravation of the military and humanitarian situation there. According to Agenzia Nova, against the background of some decrease in the total number of illegal immigrants by April 2025, compared with 2024, the share of migrants arriving from the coast of Libya has increased, and the possible onset of the LNA on Tripoli can add tens of thousands of more refugees in a matter of weeks. Therefore, the Italian Navy promptly strengthened reconnaissance off the coast of Libya, the coast guard of a number of Mediterranean countries is already updating the protocols to counter the migration threat, and humanitarian NGOs are increasing additional resources.
Paris, also traditionally active in Libya, took a wait-and-see position. The French Total Energies, which is already involved in major oil and gas production projects in the Gadames and Sirte Basin, is also interested in further expansion of production and research of new fields, and therefore, like Italy, does not want to see chaos there. Therefore, if Turkish military facilities ensure the security of Libyan deposits, the Elysee Palace is likely to be ready to turn a blind eye to the growth of Ankara’s influence.
Key European capitals are clearly interested in supporting forces in Libya that can ensure the safety of oil production and contain illegal migration. And while the only player capable of quickly and effectively taking on this role is Turkey, which, through agreements with Haftar, intercepts control over the key hubs of eastern Libya from Russia. Moscow, which has long invested a lot of resources in the same territory and in the same people, but demonstrating the objectively modest effectiveness of its efforts, now risks at best to be in the shadow of Turkish banners.
Will Turkey push Russia out of Libya?
Despite loud statements and accelerated deployment rates, Moscow is not working fast and confidently enough compared to Ankara. Deficit resources that could significantly strengthen the Russian contingent in Libya are now burned in huge quantities in Ukraine. Therefore, to transfer additional aircraft or armored vehicles to Africa now is possible only at the cost of a critical weakening of the onslaught in the conditional Donbas, and in the Kremlin is clearly not ready for such a step.
Turkey, on the contrary, aggressively increases all its possible assets in Libya. Modern UAVs, engineering teams, direct investments and growing portfolios of infrastructure contracts give it all new levers of influence on (perhaps now former) Russian allies. If Russia works in Libya (however, as elsewhere) mainly through clumsy state structures and corrupt military advisers, then Turkey relies on much more efficient and transparent bundles of private contractors, defense concerns, commercial and sovereign funds. This allows it to act much faster, more flexible and, most importantly, more effective than Russian competitors.
It is significant that Turkey’s interaction with Haftar is developing not only through the military line, but also on the economic one. Thus, Turkish private companies are actively involved in the post-war reconstruction of eastern Libya. In 2023-2024, firms from Turkey have already participated in the reconstruction of infrastructure in the territories controlled by the LNA – for example, in the restoration of the cities of Derna and Benghazi. In the latter, with their participation, a new large stadium of international class was built.
In April 2025, the Foundation for Development and Reconstruction in Eastern Libya, led by Belgashim Haftar (another son of an apprenticeship), signed 12 contracts with Turkish companies to implement major construction projects in Benghazi, Beydeh, Shahat and Tobruk. Through such tools, Ankara attracts the loyalty of local elites and the population with visual benefits – investments in the economy, jobs and the restoration of infrastructure.
The Russian presence in Libya, however, remains noticeable: strike drones, air defense systems, training centers in Sabha and Benghazi, perhaps as long as they keep Haftar from radical steps. However, this may not be enough to contain the growing Turkish expansion.
The spring of 2025 will obviously go down in the history of North Africa as a turning point in the geostrategic alignment of forces. Turkey, using a combination of military and economic tools, began to actively oust Russia from the positions of a key partner and ally of the LNA. Transgression in Ukraine and limited in resources, Russia appears to no longer be able to prevent the strengthening of Turkish influence in the region. Ankara’s flexible strategy, based on investment, “soft power” and more equal cooperation, already looks more attractive for Haftar’s entourage than Moscow’s purely military support. And Haftar himself, maneuvering between the external patrons, gets more and more space for independent play.
If the trend continues, Eastern Libya will first turn from the zone of exclusive Russian influence into the arena of tough Turkish-Russian rivalry, and then Ankara’s position in Libya may finally strengthen. And then Putin will have to look for a new Tobruk. Or the new Haftar.