Abstract: The world has never been safe for small and vulnerable countries. Their perilous position has been largely determined by weak economic, political and military capabilities, which deprive them of the ability to ensure their national security effectively. The existing literature concerning national security of small and vulnerable countries reveals that overemphasis is placed upon diplomacy as the major instrument of advancing the national interests of such states while overlooking the importance of their supportive institutions, such as intelligence services. The literature regarding the role of intelligence services in national security demonstrates that the secretive nature of intelligence activities and their association with “dirty tricks” of statecraft demonises intelligence services, ultimately undermining their role in national security. Moreover, discrediting the intelligence services is fueled by frequently blaming the intelligence community for strategic failure, even when the inadequate political decision-making process causes it. Inquiring into the Georgian national security environment, which exemplifies well the difficulties faced by small and vulnerable countries, allows us to review and challenge the existing trends in academia regarding the interplay between intelligence and national security.
Problem statement: How effective are intelligence services in ensuring the national security of small and vulnerable countries?
So what?: Politicians should prescribe significance to intelligence as the foundation of effective decision-making. Moreover, politicians should also set the right requirements for intelligence services to provide clear guidance to the intelligence community and their work.
A Strategic Requirement
The Georgian national security environment reflects the extent of vulnerability that some small states find themselves in. Ever since Georgia gained independence, the country has been in constant war conditions. Besides being a neighbour of the Russian Federation, which does not hesitate to violate international law, the development and maintenance of national security in Georgia is complicated by its location at the region’s crossroads. Georgia has always been a hub of spy networks of foreign countries, making it a constant target of foreign meddling in domestic affairs. Moreover, the lack of material power evident in scarce economic and military capabilities deprives Georgia of the opportunity to ensure its territorial integrity and advance foreign policy interests effectively. Unfortunately, ensuring the national security of Georgia is particularly hardened by the absence of an adequate National Security Concept that would meet the needs of contemporary geopolitical events. The recent concept was adopted in 2012 and remains the only strategic document of its kind. Besides being outdated, the document does not reflect an adequate strategy for dealing with Georgian security challenges.
Ever since Georgia gained independence, the country has been in constant war conditions.Under such circumstances, it is relevant to consider the role of the Georgian Intelligence Service in contemporary Russia-Georgia relations and its role in ensuring the country’s national security. It provides a useful example of the importance of small-state intelligence services, which can be informative for other small states’ national security concepts.
To analyse the role of intelligence services, one must define “intelligence” itself. The “father of intelligence analysis”, Sherman Kent, claims that intelligence refers to knowledge (upon which high-level national policy towards other countries is based), organisation (of skilled experts who know what the current foreign policy and strategy are so that they produce useful information or intelligence) and activity (or process through which the knowledge or “strategic intelligence” is being generated).[1]
Moreover, when it comes to defining intelligence, there is a major divide on whether the definition should include the element of “secrecy” or not. For example, intelligence is also defined as an effort to gain a strategic advantage over another country through learning sensitive and secret information. What makes intelligence distinct from ordinary information is its collection through secretive methods and on time to enable political leaders to exercise strategic advantage against foreign countries. Therefore, secrecy is an important element of the definition since, usually, the most important and sensitive information about the adversary is secret.[2]
Suppose we define intelligence as an activity or organisation capable of supporting a state in gaining a strategic advantage. In that case, intelligence can be perceived as complementary power to the overall state’s material power. This may be especially true for small and vulnerable countries that lack conventional elements of state power (military and economic capabilities) and are constantly exposed to aggression and exploitation by stronger countries. So, intelligence services can be considered valuable additional instruments for countries like Georgia as long as International Relations are shaped by two major factors – power and competition. Considering the role of intelligence, it would be rational to refer to realism to elaborate on this matter within the theoretical framework. However, most realist theories focus on the great powers as they are the most capable of affecting the dynamics of international politics. In the process, smaller countries, especially those in vulnerable positions such as Georgia, are neglected as insignificant players in world politics.
Considering the role of intelligence, it would be rational to refer to realism to elaborate on this matter within the theoretical framework.Consequently, this article relies on Neo-classical Realism to emphasise small states’ role in international relations and elaborate on the possible use of intelligence services as a self-help mechanism for vulnerable countries. However, neo-classical realism fails to establish a tangible link between intelligence and national security. Consequently, for a comprehensive analysis of this matter, the thesis also refers to the theory of cybernetics as a major conceptual framework in Intelligence Studies that emphasises the interconnection between intelligence and national security. This theory is also important in emphasising the importance of effective communication between the intelligence community and policy-makers to accomplish national security goals.
While inquiring into intelligence-related matters, the lack of practical examples represents a major methodological problem, as this subject can be perceived as officially discouraged or “fenced off” due to its secretive nature. It is difficult to evaluate the efficiency of an agency that is determined by its ability to maintain its activities undisclosed. Consequently, offering conclusions about contemporary intelligence services is almost impossible. Accordingly, historical events such as the case of Sitnikov and the Russo-Georgian War can be used as examples for evaluating the efficiency of the Georgian intelligence services since their current work cannot be observed. Moreover, to avoid speculative statements, the arguments of this work rely on the results of the interview conducted with the former head of the Georgian Intelligence Service – Davit Bazgadze – who is one of the contributors in founding and development of contemporary Georgian Intelligence Service making his judgments and conclusions particularly valuable.
Theoretical Framework
Neo-Classical Realism
Generally, every realist theory suggests that the international system is driven by anarchic order in the absence of a higher authority that would regulate and limit state behaviour.[3] Under such circumstances, states refer to the principle of self-help to ensure their survival. To attain this goal, states refer to different actions or strategies based on the potential capabilities of the state, which can be measured by the material power they possess.
Most realist theories focus on the great powers, as they are perceived to have the highest material power and, therefore, are most capable of affecting the dynamics of international politics. Consequently, smaller states with less material power and small populations are often ignored as insignificant participants in the international system. By contrast, neo-classical realism emphasises small and vulnerable countries’ role in international politics. According to this theory, material capabilities, whether strong or limited, determine the status of any state in the international system rather than human nature or an anarchic international system.[4]
Smaller states with less material power and small populations are often ignored as insignificant participants in the international system.Small states have two major objectives in an anarchic system: survival and preventing the great powers from controlling or occupying them. Attaining these goals requires power or relative power. However, small states usually lack major indicators of material power – economic and military capabilities. Consequently, most small states have neither defensive mechanisms nor influential foreign policy necessary to mitigate the pressure derived from the great powers. Accordingly, small states should strive towards increasing their relative power to attain even minuscule strategic advantage. Increasing relative power is possible through improving economic and military capabilities, which means that reaching strategic advantage represents a vicious circle for small states. However, an additional instrument may enable small countries to break this circle, namely intelligence capability, since the “limited resources” or “limited material power” may not negatively impact the effectiveness of intelligence services, especially those of small states with defensive positions.
Here, it is important to emphasise the difference between the intelligence services of small and vulnerable countries and those of stronger states. As already mentioned, the position of intelligence services of small and vulnerable countries such as Georgia is defensive, which means that they are centred on protecting territorial integrity, economic and political sovereignty.[5] In contrast, intelligence services of stronger powers such as the US, Russia and Israel have an offensive position, which translates into applying intelligence capabilities for interventionist purposes ranging from the assassination of political leaders to the overthrow of entire regimes of other countries.[6] Unfortunately, the word “other” usually refers to smaller and more vulnerable countries with weaker defence mechanisms. At this point, intelligence services represent means of shaping and manipulating the environment in favour of stronger powers, while they serve as one of the self-preservation instruments for small and vulnerable countries.
Theory of Cybernetics
Effective intelligence depends on adequate communications with the recipients – the top national policy-makers at the level of Presidents and Prime Ministers, National Security Council (NSC) members, and other senior government members, officials and service officers operating collectively.[7] Adequate communication starts with policy-makers setting the requirements for the intelligence community, which refers to identifying those policy issues and areas to which intelligence is expected to contribute.[8] Setting the requirements is important for the following three reasons: firstly, intelligence capabilities are always limited, especially those of small and vulnerable countries, so priorities must be set through requirements to define issues that require more attention and, therefore, more resources, while others little or none at all.[9] Secondly, requirements serve as “legitimation devices” for the intelligence work.[10] Lastly, the requirements enable the intelligence community to produce intelligence products that are as helpful as possible in supporting a given policy or strategy.[11]
Adequate communication starts with policy-makers setting the requirements for the intelligence community, which refers to identifying those policy issues and areas to which intelligence is expected to contribute.Requirements are extremely valuable for producing effective intelligence, especially in war and warlike situations. However, some limitations need to be recognised. For instance, the interest of the policy-makers in intelligence varies: some are fascinated by it, while others find it “improper”.[12] Intelligence may be completely ignored, as when the British command ignored the intelligence on German deployments just before the Arnhem assault.[13] Governments may exclude the intelligence community from decision-making altogether, as occurred in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.[14] Moreover, if intelligence is used, policy-makers may consciously or unconsciously select from what is presented to them. For example, Henry Kissinger valued secret single-source material but ignored all-source assessments.[15] In fact, besides information and intelligence, policy-makers’ decisions involve judgment, political sense, leadership, and determination in pursuing objectives.[16]
Despite these limitations, there is no doubt about the importance of detailed and up-to-date user requests in the intelligence process (cycle), which involves other significant steps after the requirements are set. In general, intelligence as a whole is pragmatic rather than doctrinal. However, some professional metaphors are being used to describe the intelligence process = for instance, the metaphor of cybernetic systems that reflects the intelligence cycle’s search for effectiveness.[17]
Cybernetics is a metaphor for intelligence’s role in national security: decision-makers (steersman) use the information provided by intelligence services to attain national security goals (accurate steerage of the vessel). Here, intelligence information is equated with feedback, as any change in the environment, whether mechanical or social, is fed to the system, causing that system to adapt to these new conditions.[18] In other words, cybernetics is a metaphor for the intelligence cycle. The cycle or process reflects a cybernetic system in which a control unit (intelligence services) reacts to the feedback (information) of the user (politicians) and makes adjustments to it in a quest for maximum desired feedback.[19]
The strategic intelligence cycle goes as follows: firstly, political decision-makers, who are responsible for implementing national security strategy of a state, indicate what information they need. Then, senior intelligence managers translate these needs into precise requirements, which are used to allocate resources to the “collectors” and guide their activity. Then, collectors attain the required “raw intelligence”, which the analysts transform into “finished intelligence”. The final step is to deliver and disseminate finished intelligence to political decision-makers and, based on their feedback, make necessary adjustments to improve the effectiveness of the intelligence process.
All in all, the intelligence cycle is an extremely complex process with a liability of emergence of complications at every stage of the cycle. Within the framework of Cybernetic theory, significant emphasis is made upon the first and the last stages that involve action from policy-makers, who guide the intelligence work through setting the requirements to ensure effective intelligence products and then react adequately to the produced finished intelligence to ensure national security of a country.
Case of Sitnikov
To examine the efficiency of the Georgian intelligence service in ensuring the country’s national security through the lens of Neo-classical Realism, the case of Sitnikov serves as a good example. The case demonstrates the efficiency of Georgian intelligence services, which managed to reveal a Russian spy and, consequently, disclose the direct involvement of Russia in the internal conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians. It demonstrates intelligence activities as an effective self-help mechanism for small and vulnerable countries by supporting diplomacy under limited military, political and economic capabilities up against much stronger adversaries. The case also outlines that the nature of intelligence services of small and vulnerable countries can only be defensive as their primary focus is ensuring the survival and sovereignty of the country rather than pursuing ambitious foreign policy interests.
Since ancient times, Abkhazia has been an integral part of Georgian culture and politics. The relations between ethnic Georgians and Abkhazians worsened when the Russians arrived in the Caucasus. In the 19th century, Tsarist Russia forcefully began changing the ethnic composition of Abkhazia. Abkhazians, along with Ubukhs and Adigheans, were displaced by the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, Abkhazians became a minority in their home. Moreover, to resist Georgian influence over the Abkhazians, on the one hand, Tsarist Russia developed Abkhaz nationalism through the creation of the Abkhaz alphabet based on Cyrillic, and on the other hand, the Tsarist government pursued Russification Policy to replace the historical Georgian orientation among Abkhazians by Russian orientation.[20]
The Soviet Union continued a “divide and rule” policy by separating Abkhazia from Georgia and declaring it as an independent Soviet Socialist Republic and then as an autonomous republic. During the Soviet period, Moscow was encouraging Abkhazian separatism to maintain the “hot pot” against Georgia in case it decided to strive towards independence.[21] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rising tensions culminated in the 1992-1993 War in Abkhazia. This war could have been avoided if not for the Russian-fueled violent separatism of Abkhazians and the careless and destructive effort of Georgian authorities to resolve this conflict as quickly as possible. The Russian position in this war is crucial for appreciating the importance of Georgian intelligence activity to pursue Georgian interests.
The Soviet Union continued a “divide and rule” policy by separating Abkhazia from Georgia and declaring it as an independent Soviet Socialist Republic, and then as an autonomous republic.Officially, the Russian Federation was maintaining a neutral position, demonstrating itself as the mediator between the conflicting sides. On August 21, 1992, at a press conference, President B. Yeltsin announced that Russia did not intend to interfere in the conflict, thereby taking a neutral position. At that time, it was important for Russian officials to demonstrate themselves as committed to the principle of International Law to maintain a positive image in the eyes of the West. Officially, Moscow was adhering to the territorial integrity of Georgia. However, in reality, Russia was intervening in the domestic conflict between ethnic Georgians and Abkhazians in the worst possible manner. Russia was actively providing Abkhazian separatists with weapons and live forces that were organised into the battle groups on the Russian territory. In fact, there was an established anti-Georgian military coalition that included North Caucasian peoples, Armenians, and Cossacks.[22]
This support played a decisive role in defeating Georgia in this war. There was not much that Georgia could do to defend its territorial integrity due to its military inferiority in comparison with the joint forces of Abkhazian separatists and Russia. Diplomatic efforts were not much help due to Russia’s official position to remain neutral. Under such circumstances, the only solution for a defeated and humiliated Georgia was to reveal Russia’s non-neutral position and disclose its support to the Abkhazian separatists to the international community. This objective was achieved by the Georgian intelligence services and the operation they undertook to reveal the actions of a Russian spy – Alexander Sitnikov. In essence, the Information and Intelligence Service of Abkhazian Autonomous Republic conducted a special operation that carried counter-intelligence features to detect and suppress the enemy’s espionage activities. The results of this operation were effectively used by the Georgian government for political purposes through diplomatic channels and media to publicly disseminate information to gain attention and support from the international community.[23]
By fuelling the conflict, Russia was trying to pressure then-President Shevardnadze and force Georgia to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which would allow Russia to deploy its military forces on Georgia’s territories.[24]
To attain this strategic objective, Russians and Abkhazian separatists worked jointly to obtain precise military intelligence. This task was prescribed to the spy Alexander Sitnikov, who was included in the operational group to be sent to Abkhazia.
Sitnikov’s major source of information about Georgian military positions was Georgian citizen “Z”, who was recruited, or so they thought, by Russian and Abkhazian Separatist intelligence operatives.[25] Sitnikov managed to meet his source only twice as during the second rendezvous, both of them were arrested by the representatives of Abkhazia’s Information and Intelligence Service (former State Security Committee of Abkhazia), which was under the authority of the Information and Intelligence Service of Georgia. Accordingly, the intelligence operation conducted by the GRU failed. However, the scope of the failure exceeded the disclosure of its spies as the operation’s fiasco exposed Russia’s real position towards this conflict to the international community, something Russia was desperately trying to avoid to secure its international reputation.
This failure, on the one hand, was determined by the incompetency of the head of the GRU-led intelligence operation and, on the other hand, by the efficiency of Georgian intelligence services.[26] The GRU failed to recognise that “Z” was a double agent working for the Georgian side by providing false information to Sitnikov and working jointly with the Information and Intelligence Service of Abkhazia to arrest a Russian spy at the right time and reveal strategic intentions of Russia.[27] As for Georgia, the intelligence service was competent enough to recognise the spy in “Z” and convince him to work on their side.
Accordingly, this case demonstrates well how helpful intelligence activities can be in the effort of small countries to defend their national interests even in the most vulnerable position, such as Georgia found itself during the War in Abkhazia. Georgia had military inferiority in comparison with joint forces of Abkhazian separatists and Russia, which deprived it of the opportunity to ensure its territorial integrity by force. Diplomatic means were not much help either, as Russia’s declared position was to remain neutral in the conflict. At this point, the only solution for Georgia was to reveal Russia’s non-neutral position and disclose its support to the Abkhazian separatists to the international community, which was achieved by the Information and Intelligence Service of Georgia and the operation it undertook revealing Russian spy – Alexander Sitnikov.
This case demonstrates well how helpful intelligence activities can be in the effort of small countries to defend their national interests even in the most vulnerable position, such as Georgia found itself during the War in Abkhazia.Russo-Georgian War
The Five-Day War between Georgia and Russia is analysed through the lens of the Theory of Cybernetics, which shows that the efficiency of the intelligence services does not solely depend on the intelligence community and the quality of the work they do. Rather, it also depends on effective communication between the intelligence community and the top policy-makers of the country. Georgian political decision-makers were not competent enough to set the right requirements for the intelligence community, which is evident in their full ignorance of Russian foreign policy behaviour. Consequently, the Georgian intelligence service was left to fill this gap by focusing on spontaneous events. Even so, the intelligence service warned Georgian policy-makers about the danger of their provocative rhetoric towards Russian leaders and the potential escalation of the conflict in the Tskhinvali region. However, Georgian top-level decision-makers ignored the intelligence and information available in the open sources to pursue their pre-determined biased perceptions and objectives. One may conclude that national security was not even a priority for the Georgian political leadership of that time. However, as the common view in the intelligence communities suggests, “there are only policy successes and intelligence failures. There are no policy failures and intelligence successes.”[28]
The intelligence service warned Georgian policy-makers about the danger of their provocative rhetoric towards Russian leaders and the potential escalation of the conflict in the Tskhinvali region.Before getting into the details of the Russo-Georgian War, it would be proper to note that there is an overlap between the responsibilities of the Georgian Intelligence Service and that of the Ministry of Defense when it comes to gathering military intelligence.[29] Accordingly, inquiring into the role of the Georgian Intelligence Service in this war would be quite relevant.
Existing literature concerning the analysis of the Russo-Georgian War suggests that this war is the fatal consequence of intelligence failure.[30], [31], [32], [33] The Georgian Intelligence Service is blamed for improper monitoring of Russian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian military activities and inadequate strategic and tactical warning on Russian intentions, political decisions, and military preparations.[34] The principal causes of the insufficiency of the Georgian Intelligence Service are claimed to be structural weakness, underfunding, and limited assets before the outbreak of the conflict.
Furthermore, a parliamentary commission studying the causes of the Russo-Georgian War demonstrates that Georgian intelligence services could not provide political and military authorities with the necessary information, which led to the unpreparedness of the Georgian side to deal with the Russian aggression properly. The Georgian military intelligence department was blamed for inadequate watch over the borders.[35]
The Georgian military intelligence department was blamed for inadequate watch over the borders.To comprehend the real circumstances of the war, it would be proper to note that Georgia triggered the Russo-Georgian War on August 07, 2008, when the Georgian military launched an offensive on Tskhinvali, claiming to be reacting to the shelling from South Ossetian positions.[36] In thirty minutes, Russian armoured vehicles entered South Ossetia from the Roki Tunnel. Interestingly, the counter-attack by the Russian military took Georgian forces by surprise, which means that Georgian authorities believed that Russia would not intervene. Now, the question is why Georgian authorities believed so.
It is quite difficult to analyse this war comprehensively due to the lack of information from the battlefield and the deliberate attempt of the conflicting sides to distort the facts motivated by a tendency to justify their mistakes in the eyes of their people and the international community. However, the fatal consequences of the war enable us to conclude that Georgian political decision-makers failed to organise military operations and defend civilians. Accordingly, statements of the Georgian authorities concerning the invincibility of the Georgian military forces made before the war turned out to be a myth.[37] Clearly, Georgian military forces were not able to defeat the Russian military. So, the only intention of the political leadership while claiming the invincibility of the Georgian military could have been deceiving the population into thinking that an offensive on Tskhinvali was a reasonable or low level of competence, simply did not allow political decision-makers to incorporate the warnings of the intelligence community regarding irrationality of the escalating situation in Tskhinvali into their plan of action.
An interview conducted with the former head of the Georgian Intelligence Service in 2023 within the framework of this research revealed that the Russo-Georgian War was not a consequence of intelligence failure but rather inadequate political decision-making caused by the autocratic mode of governance. The absence of a transparent and clear decision-making system led to making vital steps for the country based on personal beliefs and perceptions of one person – the president (Mikheil Saakashvili) – and his closely affiliated circle, instead of objective information provided by the intelligence service and other available sources. Evidently, months before the war, the intelligence service informed Georgian political authorities about a possible escalation of the situation in the Tskhinvali region and warned them to reverse the hostile and provocative rhetoric towards Russian leaders that often contained elements of public insults. However, Georgian authorities continued to behave provocatively as if deliberately escalating the confrontation.[38]
Accordingly, it seems that the Georgian political elite of that time did not comprehend Russia and its government, nor did they understand the norms of behaviour of small and vulnerable countries on the international scene or the essence of intelligence services and their purpose. Otherwise, a military offensive aimed at regaining control of Tskhinvali would not have been conducted. This is evident in Saakashvili’s decision to engage in a war with Russia without any deliberation and cost-and-benefit analysis by the National Security Council (NSC). This decision was made within the narrow circle of closest associates of Saakashvili. Interestingly, Minster of Defence Davit Kezerashvili was not even in Georgia when the war broke out.[39]
It seems that the Georgian political elite of that time did not comprehend Russia and its government, nor did they understand the norms of behaviour of small and vulnerable countries on the international scene or the essence of intelligence services and their purpose.Furthermore, even without timely and adequate secret intelligence, it would have been possible to predict the Russian invasion based on analysing the information available in the open sources. For example, in 2005-2008, Russia conducted military exercises in which Georgia was positioned as an enemy of the Russian Federation. Surprisingly, the National Security Concept of Georgia issued in 2005 did not mention the potential military confrontation with Russia. Furthermore, in 2008, the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation demonstrated that the integration of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was unacceptable for Russia. Accordingly, Russia used Saakashvili’s provocative assault on Tskhinvali to justify invasion, occupy separatist regions and deprive Georgia of the opportunity to become a member of NATO. Interestingly, one week before the outbreak of the war, the Kremlin sent Igor Sechin and Nikolai Patrushev to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua within the framework of unofficial visits. After the five-day war, Venezuela and Nicaragua recognised the independence of Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia.[40] This should have served as an indicator that Russia was preparing to recognise the independence of separatist regions of Georgia, and political leadership should have tried not to give Russia justification for the recognition.
On July 18, 2008, GRU-controlled electronic media outlets such as “Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks” published an interview with the famous Lieutenant-General Yuri Netkachov where he provided a detailed description of Georgia-Russian armed confrontation, including the attack of Georgian forces upon Tskhinvali and Russia’s counter-measures. Moreover, in the middle of July, the websites controlled by the Chechen nationalist movements stated that the Russian-waged war against Georgia was inevitable.
Russian activity in the North Caucasus was especially indicative of the preparation for the war. The Kremlin intensified the anti-Georgian sentiments in the region. Days before the war, the Circassian Congress was established in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, led by the former high-ranking official of the GRU. Moreover, Russia was pursuing mobilisation in Adygea, Chechnya, and Dagestan by propagating the doctrine of “Caucasian Solidarity” against the common enemy – Georgia. As a result, almost 30% of the military personnel of the Russian forces that invaded Georgia were composed of the peoples of the North Caucasus.
Russian activity in the North Caucasus was especially indicative of the preparation for the war.Despite the series of clear indications of Russia preparing for the war, the government of Georgia perceived full-scale armed confrontation as highly unlikely. This position was reflected in the Strategic Defence Review, in which full-scale military invasion was considered an unlikely worst-case scenario. Accordingly, the Russian invasion caused chaos in Georgian armed forces, leaving them surprised by the use of air forces by the Russian side and causing them to lose Kodori, villages of Liakhvi valley, and the entire region of Akhalgori. At this point, the Russo-Georgian War serves as an example of a scenario in which intelligence analysts produce objective information (intelligence). Still, political decision-makers neglected to pursue it due to their personal and biased perceptions. Intelligence was discounted as it questioned the pre-determined policy path of decision-makers – obsessively striving towards regaining control over Tskhinvali. When fatal consequences of the war were at hand, the blame was shifted upon the Georgian intelligence community, and the Russo-Georgian War was designated as an intelligence failure.
Vital Intelligence
For small and vulnerable countries such as Georgia, intelligence services represent power-enhancing mechanisms through the support of defensive and diplomatic efforts. Even under the circumstances of limited economic resources, intelligence services of small and vulnerable countries manage to operate efficiently as their position is defensive – oriented upon preserving territorial, economic and political sovereignty – which is less expensive than conducting ambitious covert actions in the pursuit of interventionist foreign policies like those conducted by countries with greater material capabilities.
However, considering the complexity of the intelligence process (cycle), which has a liability to failure at every stage of its implementation, the efficiency of intelligence services in ensuring national security is limited. Complications in the intelligence process start with decision-makers’ inability to identify priorities and set clear requirements. Often, policy-makers do not know which questions to ask and, therefore, what they need to know, leading to the intelligence community filling this gap by focusing on spontaneous external events that may cause a change in strategic prioritisation. Ultimately, this may lead to deviation from national security goals altogether. In this case, even if intelligence communities produce useful and helpful intelligence, political decision-makers may neglect it in pursuing their personal and biased perceptions. When undesired consequences are at hand, the blame is usually imposed upon the intelligence community, and policy failure is designated intelligence failure.
Complications in the intelligence process start with decision-makers' inability to identify priorities and set clear requirements.All in all, every stage of the intelligence cycle is difficult to undertake due to the challenges associated with organisation, personnel, the competence of government, and relations between the intelligence community and policy-makers. However, no matter the reason, intelligence services are almost always in a “lose-lose” situation where even if the intelligence process is successful, policy or strategy failure caused by wrong political decision-making is demonstrated as an intelligence failure. Such a tendency is problematic as it allows policy-makers to avoid responsibility for their incompetence or power abuse, which often leads to fatal consequences for the entire country and its population.
[1] Sherman Kent, “Strategic Intelligence,” (Connecticut: Princeton University Press, 1965), 3-67.
[2] Mark M. Lowenthal, “Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,” (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 22-34.
[3] Ioannis Konstantopoulos, “Intelligence and IR Theory: Economic Espionage and the Levels of Analysis,” (University of Greece, 2014).
[4] Abdelraouf Mostafa Galal, “External Behavior of Small States in light of Theories of International Relations,” Review of Economics and Political Science 5, No. 1 (September 2019): 38-56.
[5] Dancho Markovski, “Diplomacy and Intelligence Services: Reflection on small states,” International Scientific Journal on European Perspectives11, No. 1 (April 2020): 17-39.
[6] Adam D.M. Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations,” Intelligence and National Security 24, No. 5 (September 2009): 700-729.
[7] Michael Herman, “Intelligence Power in Peace and War,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 257.
[8] Mark M. Lowenthal, “Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,” (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 106.
[9] Idem.
[10] Michael Herman, “Intelligence Power in Peace and War,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 304.
[11] Mark M. Lowenthal, “Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,” (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 326.
[12] Michael Herman, “Intelligence Power in Peace and War,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 289.
[13] Ibid., 142.
[14] Idem.
[15] Idem.
[16] Ibid., 141.
[17] Ibid., 304.
[18] Norbert Wiener, “The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society,” (Boston: The Riverside Press, 1950), 1-19.
[19] Michael Herman, “Intelligence Power in Peace and War,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 61-113.
[20] Fatih Mehmet Sayin & Valeri Modebadze, “The Role of Russia in Provoking Conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians,” International Journal of Alanya Faculty of Business 7, No. 3 (2015): 111-115.
[21] Idem.
[22] Г. Х. Дауровна, “Война в Абхазии в 1992-1993 гг. и политика России,” Исторический журнал: научные исследования, (2017): 1-11.
[23] Davit Bazgadze, Interview, 2023.
[24] Amiran Kavadze, “Foreign Policy of Contemporary Georgia: Formulation, Decision-Making and Implementation,” (Tbilisi, 2020), 317-407.
[25] Дело Ситникова. Из истории провалов ГРУ, Часть I (Live Journal December 07, 2010), https://usahlkaro.livejournal.com/280281.html.
[26] Idem.
[27] Idem.
[28] Mark M. Lowenthal, “Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,” (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 320.
[29] Hans Francis Felber-Charbonneau, “Intelligent Design? Transforming Intelligence in Georgia and Serbia,” (MA diss., Carleton University, 2012), 11-29.
[30] Stéphane Lefebvre & Roger N. McDermott, “Intelligence Aspects of the 2008 Conflict Between Russia and Georgia,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22:1, (February 2009): 4-19.
[31] Hans Francis Felber-Charbonneau, “Intelligent Design? Transforming Intelligence in Georgia and Serbia,” (MA diss., Carleton University, 2012), 11-29.
[32] Jim Garret, “Human Intelligence: The Discipline the Intelligence Community Must Struggle to Rediscover,” (MA diss., American Military University, 2015), 1-12.
[33] დაჩი სახლთხუციშვილი, „სადაზვერვო სამსახურების როლი სახელმწიფო მართვაში: საქართველოს რეალობა, შესაძლებლობები და ლიმიტები,“ (სამაგისტრო ნაშრომი., თბილისის ღია უნივერსიტეტი, 2021), 12-20.
[34] Stéphane Lefebvre & Roger N. McDermott, “Intelligence Aspects of the 2008 Conflict Between Russia and Georgia,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22:1, (February 2009): 4-19.
[35] Jim Garret, “Human Intelligence: The Discipline the Intelligence Community Must Struggle to Rediscover,” (MA diss., American Military University, 2015), 1-12.
[36] Hans Francis Felber-Charbonneau, “Intelligent Design? Transforming Intelligence in Georgia and Serbia,” (MA diss., Carleton University, 2012), 11-29.
[37] Davit Bazgadze, Interview, 2023.
[38] Idem.
[39] Amiran Kavadze, “Foreign Policy of Contemporary Georgia: Formulation, Decision-Making and Implementation,” (Tbilisi, 2020), 317-407.
[40] Davit Bazgadze, Interview, 2023.