US President Donald Trump is a radically transparent person but still manages to surprise. After promising for years that he would put pressure on Ukraine to agree with Russia to halt fighting, Trump has recently followed through. He directed his administration to extort the Ukrainian government for a natural resources agreement, ostensibly to “pay back” the American taxpayer for military assistance, and called on Europe to provide a military force to occupy the country to deter a Russian resumption of fighting after any agreement is reached.
Trump’s demands have caused a serious fissure in transatlantic relations. It is essential to understand the roots of these fissures so that the US-European relationship can evolve to meet the moment. Trump is remarkably consistent, and elements of his worldview have become mainstream, particularly his demand of Europe to do more for itself so that Washington can focus on the Indo-Pacific. The Obama administration first announced the “rebalance” towards Asia in 2011, which continued during the first Trump administration, accelerated under former President Joe Biden, and will likely fully mature during Trump’s second term. The “rebalance” always included a basic tradeoff: The United States would de-emphasize its commitments in the Middle East and Europe in favor of a reallocation of forces in Asia and Australia.
For nearly to two decades, American officials have extolled their European counterparts to spend more on defense, settling in recent years on asking for an increase in spending to 5 percent of GDP (with 30 percent of total defense spending allotted for new procurements). This call came after years of disquiet about Europe’s failures to live up to the 2014 NATO agreement in Wales to increase defense spending to 2 percent of total GDP. Europe has been slow to respond but spurred by Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and now the shock of a second Trump administration, the urgency to increase defense spending has increased. This urgency, however, has come with deep concern about the future of European security and whether or not Trump will sell out Europe to Moscow. It also may be impossible for Europe to meet under current fiscal rules. Germany remains hampered by its refusal to alter the debt brake (at least for now), France’s fiscal situation is less than ideal, and the United Kingdom remains mired in the self-induced malaise brought about by Brexit.
The 5 percent figure is currently more than the money spent on defense in the United States, so any such increase would entail a longer-term plan for getting there. It would also entail significant changes to Europe’s social contract. It may also be necessary, if European nations want to follow through on their renewed pledges to be more autonomous from the United States. There is also a different option: to agree at the next NATO summit to increase defense spending to 3.5 percent and to try and shape the future of the security of Europe—in cooperation with the Trump administration—in mutually beneficial ways. The increase may not be easy, but it is worth trying. I believe there is still a way out of this crisis, but it requires Europe to follow through and spend more and ask Washington for specific things to enhance regional security. The United States can defend Europe through a smaller presence. Europe can spend more. It is time to think about how to do this.
A Straightforward Policy
The Trump administration’s Europe policy is remarkably straightforward. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth described it bluntly:
The United States is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail … As the United States prioritizes its attention to these threats, European allies must lead from the front. Together, we can establish a division of labor that maximizes our comparative advantages in Europe and Pacific respectively.
The good news is that the administration has told anyone who will listen that it remains committed to the defense of Europe. Hegseth was very clear, telling his counterparts, “The United States remains committed to the NATO alliance and to the defense partnership with Europe. Full stop.”
However, the shift in US priorities has raised a basic policy problem almost every administration has had to navigate since NATO’s founding: how to reassure European leaders that Washington would fight for European security if a localized conflict did not directly impact American continental security. This is where the Trump administration has fallen woefully short. In a social media post, Trump extolled Europe for “failing to bring peace” and suggested that “Ukraine is far more important to Europe than it is to us … We have a big, beautiful ocean as a separation.”
This isolationism would suggest America cannot be trusted. This feeling of betrayal is made worse by Trump’s desire for a rapid peace agreement with Russia about Ukraine, which has thus far seen his administration’s talking points tilt towards those from the Kremlin. This incongruity needs to be addressed with better messaging from Washington and can be done in ways that align with Trump’s worldview.
A Very Clear World View
Trump has had very consistent views on foreign policy. In an interview with Playboy in 1990, Trump (speaking about himself in the third person) was very blunt about his approach towards US adversaries and allies:
He [Trump] would believe very strongly in extreme military strength. He wouldn’t trust anyone. He wouldn’t trust the Russians; he wouldn’t trust our allies; he’d have a huge military arsenal, perfect it, understand it. Part of the problem is that we’re defending some of the wealthiest countries in the world for nothing … We’re being laughed at around the world.
If this sounds familiar, it is because the man hasn’t really changed at all in nearly four decades. He has a very black and white approach to global security, believing that the United States has to have a strong military that is not tasked with defending allies, nor specifically looking to fight adversaries. He also has a healthy aversion to nuclear conflict, telling Playboy and the New York Times, almost three decades apart, virtually the same thing.
I’ve always thought about the issue of nuclear war; it’s a very important element in my thought process. It’s the ultimate, the ultimate catastrophe, the biggest problem this world has, and nobody’s focusing on the nuts and bolts of it. It’s a little like sickness. People don’t believe they’re going to get sick until they do. Nobody wants to talk about it. I believe the greatest of all stupidities is people believing it will never happen because everybody knows how destructive it will be, so nobody uses weapons. What bullshit.
Now, compare to his thoughts in 2016.
Look, in the perfect world everybody would agree that nuclear would, you know, be so destructive, and this was always the theory, or was certainly the theory of many. That the power is so enormous that nobody would ever use them … And, you know, we have been under the impression that, well we’ve been, I think it’s misguided somewhat, I’ve always felt this but that nobody would ever use them because of the power. And the first one to use them, I think that would be a very bad thing. And I will tell you, I would very much not want to be the first one to use them, that I can say.
Trump is neither articulate, nor diplomatic, but he is very consistent. The basic outline of his foreign policy, therefore, is easy to understand: Trump does not view alliances as additive to US power unless allies can defend themselves; Russia is not to be trusted, but also not to be unnecessarily quarreled with, and nuclear war should be prevented at all costs.
However, Trump’s zero-sum approach to diplomacy also provides clear opportunities for European actors. It is naive to suggest Trump’s policy is simply more of the same from America. It is not. His policy vis-a-vis alliances is an anathema to how the US-European defense partnership is currently structured and explains why so many are now concerned about the future of the transatlantic partnership. I understand the anxiety. However, it is important not to fall into the trap of manifesting an outcome that does not need to happen.
At their core, Trump and his foreign policy cadre are asking Europe to defend itself with America acting as a backstop to deter, with nuclear weapons, further Russian aggression. Hegseth did not say so directly during his recent trip to the continent but overtly implied it when he said that NATO “will require our European allies to step into the arena and take ownership of conventional security on the continent.” This division of labor, it appears, will involve Europe assuming the conventional defense of Europe, with Washington providing nuclear guarantees, along with some elements of continued conventional assets.
The question, then, is how to make the US nuclear guarantee more credible, even if such actions could raise the risk of nuclear conflict. The solution is actually a dual-track approach to US-Russian dialogue, of the type favored by Trump, alongside a clear vision of how nuclear guarantees could be additive to the “division of labor” approach the administration favors.
The test case is Ukraine, where the administration is seeking to deploy European troops in the country if an agreement on a ceasefire can be reached with Russia. The Trump administration, however, has refused to specify whether or not any European presence in Ukraine would come with a US security guarantee.Hegseth has said the troops would be deployed outside of the NATO structure and, therefore, not be covered under the Washington Treaty’s mutual defense clause. This could work with some combined European force under the leadership of a European general and be structured in a way similar to the ad-hoc coalitions that Washington has cobbled together for every military endeavor it has launched since the end of the Cold War. However, it appears that both France and the United Kingdom would condition any such deployment on a US security guarantee backed by US platforms based in Poland or Romania.
Options for Mutual Defense
Ground Forces and Limiting National Caveats
The basic outline does provide Europe with a way out of this crisis with Washington. It is absolutely vital for France and the United Kingdom to offer up at least a division of troops to be deployed in Ukraine. Without providing a specific military proposal, Europe may be pushed to the side and only presented with a final outline of requirements by Washington. These troops need to be garrisoned near the front line and have very clear rules of engagement and clear reporting lines. One of the many concerns I have is that a multinational European force will be bogged down by bureaucracy, beset by national caveats and rules about how they can be used, thereby making the force impotent from the start. Somebody needs to be in charge and national caveats about how to use force minimized from the start. This will require a strong European leader and all parties to the European-led force to agree to subordinate national commands to a non-American leader. This will be tough. The Trump administration would be very wise to consider deploying special forces with these European brigades to augment capabilities and, importantly, to train Ukrainian units in the country.
Air Support, Space Assets, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
The United States Air Force should also consider deploying aircraft from Lakenheath, England to Poland to support this European force. Europe should be asked to provide tanker support in Poland, thereby allowing for a smaller number of jets to patrol the NATO-Russian border. These jets would also be on-call for Allied troops in contact situations to support European troops in Ukraine. Finally, any European force in Ukraine would be almost entirely dependent on US-provided space assets, as well as unmanned aircraft to monitor the line of contact. These assets should be deployed in support of the European force, ideally based out of Poland (or Germany) and be modeled on the myriads of air operations America and Europe have launched together over the past three decades around the world.
This approach should also include a robust role for US contractors, who are critical for the servicing of Ukraine’s armed forces.
Air and Missile Defense
There is also a role for NATO. The Alliance has provided augmented air and missile defense to Turkey for more than a decade. The deployment of both Patriot and SAMP/T missiles in Turkey was spurred by the Syrian civil war spilling over the border. Bashar al-Assad is now deposed. Ankara now occupies Syria. There is simply no reason to continue to deploy European missile defenses on a border that Ankara now controls. The mission should be repurposed, with NATO providing air and missile defense interceptors in Poland. The combination of these missile interceptors, alongside US and European Air Forces, should spur renewed debate about how best to patrol Ukrainian air space in the event of a ceasefire.
The obvious model to pull on would be the multinational air defense of West Germany during the Cold War, complete with a dedicated reporting structure, established air corridors, routes for Allied jets to transit in and out of, and procedures to intercept any aircraft that crossed the line of contact. This all can be done from a hub in Poland, with US support, and in ways that does not require anything more than a slimmed down special forces presence inside Ukraine. A multinational air defense would also obligate the United States to NATO’s territorial defense—a goal Trump and Hegseth have both said they would honor—and help to extend those guarantees across the border into Ukraine.
Finally, there is a way to tie the future of European security to Trump’s future policy agenda in ways that could be additive to the settlement of Ukraine. The early warning infrastructure for current and future US missile defenses is deployed throughout Europe. There also are two interceptor sites in Poland and Romania. These facilities are important for the administration’s “Golden Dome for America” missile defense concept, where Hegseth has said future Pentagon budgets should spend more funds.
The Role of Nuclear Weapons
The final proposal is a bit more controversial but would also fit with US priorities over the next four years. If the United States is serious about providing nuclear guarantees for Europe without a large troop presence, it should consider soliciting European opinion about deploying more nuclear weapons in Europe. As of now, Washington has approximately 200 gravity bombs stored on five airbases in Europe. The weapons are not really usable in a crisis, and instead, the security of the Alliance is guaranteed by US long-range forces deployed on submarines and in the continental United States.
The United States should propose deploying a nuclear armed, ground launched missile for deployment in Europe. The Typhon launcher can carry both the Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles. The Tomahawk could be assigned a modernized nuclear warhead and be deployed in Poland or Germany. The return of more usable nuclear weapons in Europe would have an obvious deterrent effect on Russia and put more “American skin in the game” without a dramatic increase in troops. The role of nuclear weapons could also raise the stakes of a Russian violation in Ukraine and, ironically, more tightly tether the United States to the future of Europe. The defense of Europe would take on a more pronounced nuclear dimension, ensuring that any conflict that expands beyond Ukraine’s border could “go nuclear” and therefore risk catastrophic escalation to include strikes on the US homeland. This fear of escalation would require the United States to think about future security on the continent, perhaps assuage some European concerns, and fit with Department of Defense funding priorities.
France should consider a once-a-year European-only nuclear exercise modeled on NATO’s annual Steadfast Noon exercise. The basic idea would be to integrate the European Air Forces into a simulated nuclear strike mission. The exercise would obviate the need to deploy French nuclear weapons outside the country (a very unlikely scenario) or undercut the US nuclear guarantee to the continent. NATO agrees every time it rewrites its strategic document that the ultimate security of the Alliance is American nuclear weapons deployed primarily on submarines and inside the United States. The Allies have agreed that French and British nuclear weapons “have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly” to Alliance security. France has overtly suggested that it is ready to have such a discussion, but too often these calls lead to a fracturing of European opinion rather than a serious debate about the future of nuclear deterrence on the continent.
The transatlantic relationship is changing rapidly. It is vitally important to think about how to manage the change so that the Alliance endures and adapts. There is a clear pathway forward to ensure the United States remains engaged, Europe remains protected, and a ceasefire in Ukraine is enforced. There is also a way to do this that advances the European project, continues to roll back Russian revanchism, and works within the quirks of Trumpism. The United States is finishing its pivot to Asia, but it can and should be able to defend the continent with a more pronounced European effort and additive US capabilities.