Abstract: Today, Germany is facing heightened security alerts due to Islamist terror threats at Christmas markets in the winter, Carnival parades in the spring, public festivals, pedestrian areas, protests, and at Israeli diplomatic missions and Jewish institutions. Over the last five years, authorities have seen younger perpetrators, new online spaces for radicalization, and new targets. Attackers are using familiar methods of attack and declaring support to well-known groups such as the Islamic State. This article provides an overview of the key developments in the Islamist terror threat in Germany between 2020 and 2025 by taking an in-depth look at all nine executed Islamist terrorist attacks and the 20 publicly reported thwarted attack plots during that time. It concludes with an analysis of the five most notable trends according to the data regarding attack vectors, terrorist profiles, propaganda and recruitment, the impact of October 7, and the role of foreign intelligence.
Since the October 7, 2023, attack against Israel, German authorities have warned of an increased Islamist threat in Germany. However, even prior to Hamas’ terrorist attack, Germany had seen a resurgence in major Islamist terrorist incidents such as in Dresden, Nuremburg, and Duisburg. As Minister for the Interior Nancy Faeser stated in the Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution for the year 2023: “Since the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the threat posed by Islamist terrorism has increased further. But even before that the threat level was high.”1
So, what does this threat actually look like in Germany? How has the threat landscape evolved between 2020 and May 2025? What are the notable trends that can be seen in Islamist terror attacks as well as interrupted Islamist terror plots in Germany? Who are the perpetrators behind the attacks and are there commonalities across their radicalization processes? To find answers to these questions, this article is divided into three parts: The first section will analyze the nine executed Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany between January 2020 and May 2025.a To broaden the base of information, the second part will look at the 20 publicly disclosed failed Islamist attack plots in Germany during the same timeframe.b The third section identifies key trends based on the information collected for all 29 attacks and attack plots detailed in the previous two sections. The piece ends with some concluding observations.
Part One: Islamist Terrorist Attacks in Germany Since 2020
Between 2020 and May 2025, there have been nine executed Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany. As a foundation for the analysis of key trends and developments in the Islamist terrorist threat landscape in Germany, this article will first explore each of the attacks, looking at the target, the perpetrator, their radicalization, affiliation with any known terrorist groups, the weapon used, the subsequent trial, and any other notable information.
The April 2020 Waldkraiburg Terrorist Attack
In April 2020, a series of attacks targeted Turkish-owned businesses and a mosque in the Bavarian town of Waldkraiburg.2 The perpetrator, Muharrem D.,c a 27-year-old German citizen of Kurdish descent, carried out arson attacks against multiple locations including a Turkish supermarket, hair salon, kebab shop, pizzeria, and a local mosque. Although no fatalities occurred, four individuals suffered from smoke inhalation injuries during the fire. The perpetrator was found guilty of serious arson, 31 counts of attempted murder, and planning further attacks with firearms and explosives—including on the Turkish General Consulate in Munich.3 He was sentenced to 9.5 years imprisonment and transferred to psychiatric confinement.4 During the trial, Muharrem D. voiced remorse saying: “I really regret what I did. It was just tunnel vision.”5
The court determined that Muharrem D. suffered from schizophrenia, with the presiding judge concluding that “without the schizophrenia, the attacks by the accused would have been unthinkable.”6 However, the court also emphasized that his jihadi radicalization was an equally necessary component,7 noting that the defendant saw himself as an Islamic State member.8 In 2017, Muharrem D. started becoming a follower of an Islamic State worldview. In addition, he developed a lasting hatred of the Turkish state and “all people of Turkish heritage”9 in connection with his perception of the actions of the Turkish state in the Syrian conflict and its dealings with certain preachers in Turkey. The attacker for these reasons specifically decided to target people of Turkish descent.10 He had initially planned to travel to Syria but was unsuccessful and instead started to plan his attacks in Germany.11
The terrorist attacks in Waldkraiburg highlights two persistent issues that security agencies have been confronting in recent years. One aspect is the role of mental health in cases involving jihadi ideology. Secondly, the use of explosives in Waldkraiburg for arson attacks stood out from the more frequently employed tactics of knife or vehicle attacks, emphasizing the need to focus on suspicious purchases of other dual use items as well.
The August 2020 Attack on Berlin’s A100 Autobahn
On August 18, 2020, a 30-year-old Iraqi man, Sarmad A., deliberately rammed his black Opel Astra into three motorcyclists on the Berlin highway, causing severe injuries to three people while three others sustained minor injuries.12 After the crashes, the attacker reportedly shouted “Allahu Akbar,” claimed he was a “soldier of God,” and warned “nobody come closer or else you’ll die.”13 He also rolled out a prayer rug on the street and started praying.14 Prior to the attack, Sarmad A. had posted photographs of his vehicle on Facebook along with religious phrases and references to martyrdom.15 The subsequent investigation, however, revealed a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.16 While the attack was listed as a jihadi attack in the 2020 Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution,17 the court later stated that the attacker was mainly acting in a state of psychosis with only minor religious motives.18
The attacker had applied for asylum in Germany but was rejected and had remained in the country under a “tolerated stay” provision.19 d e He was known to authorities due to prior psychological problems, which led to incidents of physical violence.20 The attacker reportedly told a doctor after his arrest that an “angel of death” had driven the car and that the “angel’s foot had been on earth and his head under the throne of the seventh heaven,”21 suggesting religious delusions rather than coherent ideological motivation.22 The incident was treated as attempted murder and not an Islamist attack.23 Sarmad A. was judged to be exempt from criminal responsibility because of his mental state at the time of the attack.f Instead of a prison sentence, he was committed to a psychiatric facility as the court stated that he was still a danger to society.24
The case of Sarmad A. again highlights the difficulty in determining the role of religious extremism in lone-actor attacks when the perpetrator simultaneously suffers from a mental illness. As noted, after an initial suspicion of a primary ideologically motivated terrorist attack, investigations into the perpetrators background showed that his schizophrenia was the primary driver.
The October 2020 Dresden Terrorist Attack
On October 4, 2020, 20-year-old Abdullah Al H. H. attacked two men in downtown Dresden, who were targeted specifically because of their sexual orientation.25 This Islamist terrorist attack resulted in the death of one individual and serious injury to another. The two victims were a gay couple from North Rhine-Westphalia who were visiting Dresden.26 The perpetrator attacked both men with two knives.27 According to the psychiatrist who questioned Abdullah Al H. H., he planned to die as a martyr but saw it as a sign from God that he initially was able to escape, hoping to now prepare for “bigger things” either by traveling to Syria or killing more “unbelievers.”28 Following a forensic investigation, he was arrested two weeks after the attack.29
The attacker had arrived in Germany in 2015 from Syria seeking asylum.30 Abdullah Al H. H. was not raised in a strict religious household.31 During the trial, he stated that his intention of coming to Germany had not been to carry out terrorist attack and that he had only “found Islam and his religious duties” after he had settled in Germany.32 g Starting in 2017, according to the court psychiatrist, Abdullah Al H. H. had become “addicted” to jihadi content online.33 He had little prior religious education and only few social contacts at the time.34 In particular, he watched speeches by Sheikh Khalid Mohammad Hamad Al Rashid.h Because of his own “sinful” behavior, Abdullah Al H. H. became afraid of “hell” and thought a suicide attack would bring “him to the right path again.”35 He also joined a chat group of Islamic State followers,36 became interested in building explosive belts, and began close communications with one individual who encouraged him in his plan to commit a violent attack. When he also started posting jihadi content on Facebook, he was classified as a “Gefährder” (potential threat to public safety) by security services.i
After his arrest in 2017, Abdullah Al H. H. was convicted in November 2018 of soliciting support for a foreign terrorist organization.37 j He was released after a three-year sentence from juvenile detention just days before the attack on September 29. At the time of his release, he was under observation by the authorities, had to check in three times a week with the local police,38 and had attended 10 consultations with the organization Violence Prevention Network in 2020.39 The Saxonian Office for the Protection of the Constitution, however, did not surveil him around the clock, and he was able to purchase his weapon for the attack: kitchen knives. After his arrest, Abdullah Al H. H. told the psychiatrist that he “plans to kill more people when he is released.”40 He was sentenced to life imprisonment in May 2021.41
The terrorist attack in Dresden was the first recorded Islamist attack in Germany targeting someone who is gay. Overall, the attack underlines three key concerns for security services in Germany: Abdullah Al H. H. did not arrive as a radicalized jihadi but was radicalized online by Islamic State propaganda and an individual while he was already living in Germany. In addition, his attack was an example of how some groups—in this case, a same-sex couple—can be singled out as part of the overall category of “unbelievers.” Finally, Abdullah Al H. H.’s case raises questions of how to deal with dangerous individuals who are released from jail after serving their sentences. While he was prohibited after his release from owning or carrying stabbing weapons,42 this excluded everyday items such as kitchen knives, which were used in the attack. Police check-ins, counseling, and partial surveillance did not prevent him from being able to carry out the attack.
The November 2021 ICE Train Attack
In November 2021, the 27-year-old Abdalrahman A. launched a knife attack against four passengers aboard an ICE high-speed train traveling from Passau to Nuremberg in southern Germany.43 The assailant was Palestinian, had lived in Syria, and came to Germany in 2014 as a refugee where he was granted asylum in 2016. During the attack, which was carried out with a 3.3-inch pocketknife, he attacked four male travelers, inflicting severe injuries on three of them. Directly after the attack, he reportedly told police “he was sick” and later added that he felt like he was being followed. After a two-month trial and investigations, the court rejected defense claims of paranoid schizophrenia and unaccountability. While a first assessment by a court psychiatrist had supported the claim, three separate reports later found no evidence of schizophrenia or any psychiatric condition.44 Instead, the court ruled that the perpetrator was fully aware of his actions and was “simulating a mental illness.”45 The court furthermore concluded that there was sufficient evidence of jihadi motivation behind the attack as investigators found Islamic State propaganda videos in his possession46 and ideological posts he had shared on Facebook.47 Abdalrahman A. also attended a mosque in Passau that is considered salafi by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution.48 Investigators did not, however, find any direct communications with known jihadi groups such as the Islamic State.49 The judge sentenced Abdalrahman A. to a 14-year prison sentence for attempted murder and aggravated assault.50
The case highlighted three recurring challenges for German authorities: First, the attack was conducted with a small and easily accessible weapon, a pocketknife, which is difficult to restrict. Second, the attacker acted alone and never became a member of a terrorist organization, making his radicalization process much harder to uncover. And finally, the case was another example of the challenge of distinguishing between on the one hand genuine mental illnesses of individuals as the primary driver of the attack and on the other hand religious extremism.k
The April 2023 Duisburg Double Attack
While there were no executed Islamist terror plots recorded in 2022, another terrorist attack occurred in 2023 when a single 27-year-old perpetrator carried out two separate knife attacks in Duisburg, North Rhine-Westphalia.51 On April 9 and April 18, the attacker, Maan D., killed one person and inflicted life-threatening injuries on four others across both incidents. He used a store bought 7.8-inch kitchen knife to kill “unbelievers”52 and targeted individuals who had been drinking alcohol, were listening to music, and working out in a gym.53 According to security services, the attacker had fled his home country (Syria) in 2015 in order to avoid conscription and was granted refugee status in Germany in 2016. Maan D. had grown up in a religious family but only started consuming salafi and particularly Islamic State propaganda in 2020. Trial evidence showed that in 2023, he started seeing it as his duty to kill male “unbelievers” in Germany and was anticipating dying as a martyr during police fire.54 According to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the attacker explicitly claimed that he had acted on behalf of the Islamic State.55 Maan D. confessed to all of his attacks, showed no remorse, and threatened further crimes during the trial.56 He was sentenced to life in prisonl with particular severity of guiltm and additionally ordered preventive detention if he is ever released.n
The Duisburg attack featured an easily accessible weapon, a kitchen knife. Maan D. attacked the victims on the street and at the gym, two soft targets that unlike large gatherings at Christmas markets or concert and sport venues are not heavily guarded. Finally, the perpetrator’s radicalization process emphasizes the continued influence of the Islamic State’s propaganda despite its territorial defeat in the Middle East.
The May 2024 Mannheim Market Square Attack
On May 31, 2024, a 25-year-old Afghan national carried out a knife attack on Mannheim’s marketplace, targeting anti-Islam activist Michael Stürzenbergero during preparations for a right-wing demonstration. The assailantp also stabbed six individuals, including a 29-year-old police officer who later died from his injuries.57 Eyewitness accounts and CCTV footage revealed the perpetrator specifically sought out Stürzenberger—a figure known for organizing “anti-Islamization” rallies—before turning his 11.8-inch hunting knife on intervening officers and bystanders.58
The attacker, Sulaiman A., came to Germany as a minor in 2013, and while he was not granted asylum, a halt on deportations for minors to Afghanistan allowed him to stay in Germany.59 He was not known to security services prior to the attack and was seen as “well integrated” according to members of the community.60 During the trial, Sulaiman A. recounted that he started turning to radical Islamist online preachers on YouTube in 2022 and started following links to Telegram channels. After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, he became more and more interested in the Taliban government, but after a while, he decided they were not strict enough in their enforcement of ‘Islamic’ law and started turning toward the Islamic State instead.61 Over Telegram, he was encouraged by a “religious teacher” in his plans for the attack.62 He also stated that his “life changed when this Gaza war started”63 and that “he cried every day” after seeing images of dead men women and children on Telegram.64 During the trial, he also recounted the attack itself.65 After the Mannheim attack, al-Qaida’s affiliate in Yemen, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), declared Sulaiman A. a hero for defending Islam in its online publication Inspire Guide 8.66
The knife attack in Mannheim had four important characteristics: First, Sulaiman A. was unknown to security services prior to the attack and therefore not under surveillance by law enforcement. In addition, he specifically targeted a right-wing and anti-Islam activist instead of pursuing a more general attack on “unbelievers.” Third, the stabbing in Mannheim sparked a larger debate about potentially harsher anti-immigration measures. And finally, though Sulaiman A. was not affiliated with AQAP and had primarily consumed Islamic State propaganda, his attack was used as propaganda by AQAP to inspire others with a similar ideology.
The Solingen August 2024 Festival Attack
On August 23, 2024, 26-year-old Isaa Al H. launched a knife attack at a public festival celebrating Solingen’s 650th anniversary.67 The attacker was a Syrian citizen who had come to Germany in 2022 to claim asylum.q He was not known to any security services as an Islamist extremist.68 In the attack the assailant killed three people and wounded eight others.69 Investigations uncovered that he had been in contact with an Islamic State member over a messaging app, who encouraged him to carry out an attack in the name of the group.70 Isaa Al H. recorded videos of his loyalty pledge and an announcement of his attack and sent these videos to his contact prior to carrying out his plan.71 The Islamic State quickly claimed responsibility in a statement to the Düsseldorf police,72 characterizing the perpetrator as a “soldier of the Islamic State” who targeted “Christians” in revenge for “Muslims in Palestine and elsewhere.”73 The attack in Solingen is the first terrorist attack in Germany for which the Islamic State has officially claimed responsibility since the truck attack on the Christmas market at Breitscheidplatz in Berlin in 2016.74 The attack was later celebrated in Islamic State Khorasan (ISK’s) propaganda publication “Voice of Khurasan.”75 The trial against Isaa Al H. started on May 27, 2025, and he admitted to the knife attack saying: “I have brought heavy guilt upon myself. I am ready to accept the verdict,” further adding “I killed innocents, not unbelievers.”76
The attack in Solingen sparked major debates in Germany regarding weapon laws and gaps in immigration procedures. In response, the government coalition presented and passed a security package77 in parliament that created “knife free zones” in more public spaces and on public transportation and also gave law enforcement the ability to check for knives.78 A second aspect of the debate in Germany focused on Isaa Al H.’s failed deportation to Bulgaria. This led to new legislation giving the Ministry for Migration and Refugees access to biometric data to check the identity of people seeking protection status. The German government also decided to end social security benefits for people—except minors—where it was determined that another European country had responsibility for them and had agreed to take them back.79
The attack in Solingen showed how terrorist groups such as the Islamic State not only continue to inspire individuals but are also still pursuing direct connections and outreach through operatives in Germany. The target this time was a large gathering of people, similar to Christmas markets or Carnival parades. As noted, the attack led to the adoption of legislation measures relating to immigration and the threat posed by knives.
The February 2025 Munich Trade Union Protest Demonstration Attack
In February 2025 just before the federal elections, 24-year-old suspected jihadi extremist Farhad N. drove a Mini Cooper into a ver.di trade union march near Munich Hauptbahnhof (main train station).80 Munich was hosting the Munich Security Conference at that time, investigations so far, however, have not shown a connection to the event.81 The vehicle-ramming killed a woman and her two-year-old daughter, while injuring at least 54 protesters.82 Farhad N. had come to Germany in 2016 as an unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan seeking asylum.83 While his asylum claim was denied in 2017 and an appeal rejected it again in 2020,84 he was allowed to remain in Germany under a “tolerated stay” provisionr because he was finishing his education at the time.85 Munich authorities later granted Farhad N. temporary residency in 2021 under humanitarian provisions following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan.86 He worked as a store detective87 and was also a bodybuilder and fitness influencer on Instagram and TikTok.88 The public prosecutor said in a statement shortly after the attack that investigations suggested an Islamist religious motive, but that there were no indications that Farhad N. had been a member of the Islamic State or in direct contact with a terrorist organization.89 In reaction to the attack, Bavaria’s state premier, Markus Söder, called on the German government to revisit the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban to ensure deportations for Afghans who have committed crimes in Germany.90
The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office obtained a second arrest warrant for Farhad N.—replacing the previous one from February 2025—which states he is “strongly suspected of two counts of murder (…), 54 counts of attempted murder and bodily harm (…), and dangerous interference with road traffic.”91 He remains in pre-trial detention. While more details and evidence—especially regarding Farhad N.’s radicalization process—are still unknown prior to court proceedings, the attack in Munich shows commonalities with other jihadi attacks in Germany. As in the case of the attacks in Mannheim and Solingen, the perpetrator was not on the radar of any federal or state level security services. Furthermore, vehicle ramming, in addition to knife attacks, has been another commonly used tactic by terrorists in Germany. While there were many changes regarding protection against vehicle ramming made after the Breitscheidplatz attack in Berlin in 2016, softer targets such as the union protest march in Munich remain difficult to protect.92 Finally, the attack in Munich and the political reactions following it, are another example of the effect that terrorist attacks by individuals who applied for asylum in Germany have on the country’s public immigration debate.
The February 2025 Berlin Holocaust Memorial Attack
On the evening of February 21, 2025, an attack occurred at Germany’s central Holocaust memorial in Berlin, resulting in life-threatening injuries to a Spanish tourist.93 The victim was attacked from behind with a knife while walking through the memorial.94 After the attack, the perpetrator fled the scene but was apprehended by police three hours later. The attacker was identified as a 19-year-old Syrian refugee, Wassim Al M.,95 who was living in refugee housing in Leipzig.96 He had come to Germany in 2023 as an unaccompanied minor. In his backpack, police found a prayer rug, a Koran, a note with Qur’an verses, and the suspected weapon.97 The Federal Prosecutor’s Office stated that he had acted out of a radical Islamist and antisemitic conviction and shared the ideology of the Islamic State.98 A joint statement from the police and the Berlin public prosecutor’s office stated: “According to initial investigations and current information, there appears to be connections to the Middle East conflict.”99 The suspect reportedly had been planning for several weeks to “kill Jews.”100 After initial investigations, there was no evidence to suggest a direct connection to a terrorist organization or a larger network and no initial signs of mental illness.101 Wassim Al M. was also—according to early investigation’s results—not known as an Islamist extremist to security services.102 An arrest warrant for Wasim Al M. was issued on February 28, 2025, accusing him of malicious murder, and he was ordered to pre-trial detention.103
The attack at the Holocaust memorial underlined three key trends that have emerged for jihadi attacks in Germany: The perpetrator was young (19 years old), he was not officially affiliated with a broader terrorist organization and network, and he specifically chose a location to target Jewish people.
All of the executed terrorist attacks provide important insights into the trajectory of the threat landscape in Germany. For a more complete picture of the Islamist threat environment, it is also important to take a look at interrupted terrorist plots between 2020 and May 2025.
Part Two: Failed Islamist Terror Plots in Germany (2020-2025)
Unsuccessful terrorist plots can reveal important information about trends in targets, weapons, demographics of perpetrators, and radicalization. In December 2023, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) announced that 18 Islamist terrorist attacks had been prevented since 2010.104 Since then, there have been many additional arrests of individuals planning a jihadi terrorist attack. The following section will explore all publicly reported failed Islamist terrorist plots in Germany between 2020 and May 2025.
The April 2020 Plot to Attack U.S. and NATO Facilities in Germany
In April 2020, German authorities arrested four Tajik nationals accused of operating as a cell linked to the Islamic State.105 The men—aged between 24 and 32 years old106—were suspected to have planned attacks on U.S. and NATO military facilities in Germany, including Spangdahlem Air Base and the AWACS site in Geilenkirchen.107 According to investigations, the group had downloaded bomb-making instructions via Telegram and was in contact with Islamic State operatives in Afghanistan and Syria who were directing their plan.108 Moreover, the cell had acquired weapons, ammunition, chemicals as well as explosives, and were involved in murder-for-hire schemes in Albania and Germany to fund their activities.109 A prominent Islam critic in Neuss was also suspected to have been a potential target, and members of the group had started surveilling him.110 The men received sentences between three years and eight months and nine and a half years.111
The August 2021 Hamburg Bomb Plot
On August 26, 2021, German authorities thwarted a planned Islamist terror attack in Hamburg by arresting 20-year-old Abdurachman C., a German-Moroccan national.112 He had attempted to purchase a Makarov pistol, 50 rounds of ammunition, and a hand grenade via the Darknet, unknowingly negotiating with an undercover officer.113 Following his arrest, investigators discovered bomb-making materials—including potassium nitrate, sulfur, charcoal dust, and hundreds of screws—in a Hamburg apartment.114 According to the federal prosecutor’s office, he was planning an attack along the lines of the 2013 attack on the Boston marathon.115 His father, a known Islamist figure, had been involved with the Al-Quds Mosque, which had had connections to the 9/11 hijackers.116 Abdurachman C. was also found to be a follower of al-Qa`ida’s ideology and was sentenced to eight years in prison.117
The September 2021 Hagen Synagogue Bomb Plot
In September 2021, Oday J., a 16-year-old Syrian refugee in Hagen, Germany, was arrested for planning a bomb attack on the local synagogue.118 The plot was uncovered reportedly following a tip from a foreign intelligence service,119 leading to a police operation involving 200 officers.120 Investigators found no explosives but discovered Islamic State propaganda videos121 and that the plotter had been in contact via Telegram with an individual named “Abu Harb,” who provided instructions on bomb construction and advised targeting the synagogue.122 According to the court, the teenager had “wanted to be ready if Kabul had been bombed or civilians had died in an attack by Western allies on targets in Afghanistan.”123 The 16-year-old was not previously known to security services, but German authorities reportedly received a tip from a foreign intelligence service.124 He was sentenced to one year and nine months’ probation, with mandatory placement in a youth facility for three years.125
The September 2021 Duisburg/Cologne Plot
The German Federal Police Office stated that it thwarted another Islamist attack in 2021, “a planned gun attack in Duisburg or in the Cologne area” but gave no further details on the incident.126
The January 2023 Castrop-Rauxel Chem/Bio Plot
In January 2023, two Iranian brothers, age 25 and 32, Jalal and Monir J., were arrested in Castrop-Rauxel, Germany, on suspicion of planning an Islamist-motivated chem/bio attack using ricin or cyanide.127 According to a media report, the plan was disrupted following a tip from the FBI,128 which had apparently intercepted communications indicating the brothers were seeking instructions on producing the toxins.129 The 32-year-old brother was released due to insufficient evidence, while the 25-year-old was sentenced to four years in jail.130 Prosecutors alleged that he had been in contact with members of the Islamic State via messaging services on how to acquire substances needed to produce cyanide.131
The April 2023 Sweden Church Plot
In April 2023, German authorities arrested two Syrian nationals, 28-year-old and 24-year-old brothers Anas and Ahmad K. for planning a jihadi terror attack. Both had come to Germany in 2015 as refugees, and while the younger of the two, Ahmad, was able to integrate, finish school, and learn German, the older brother Anas struggled.132 Investigations revealed that a church in Sweden was the focus of the perpetrators’ plans. The planned attack was supposed to avenge Swedish “Quran burnings” but a specific church within Sweden had not yet been chosen.133 The older brother had been in contact with someone through a messaging app who claimed to be a member of the Islamic State.s He then purchased chemical materials online via eBay to construct a homemade explosive belt intended for use against civilian targets.134 The German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel reported that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) alerted the suspicious online shopping activities to the German authorities.135 According to the court verdict, the younger brother (Ahmad K.) bought one of the supplies for the attack, but overall did not share his older brother’s extremist convictions.136 Anas K. was sentenced to four years and nine months in prison, while Ahmad K. received a one-year suspended prison sentence.137 t
The October 2023 Duisburg Plot to Target a Pro-Israel Demonstration
On October 24, 2023, 29-year-old Tarik S. was arrested in Duisburg for planning an attack on a pro-Israel demonstration.138 The German citizen had previously joined the Islamic State as a foreign fighter under the name “Osama Al-Almani”139 and had traveled to Syria in 2013.140 He was featured in several Islamic State propaganda videos while he was in Syria. After his return, he was arrested and placed in juvenile detention between 2016 and 2021.141 During that time, he participated in a deradicalization program and was certified a “successful exit.”142 A foreign intelligence service reportedly provided information about his attack plot.143 For his plan to drive a van into a pro-Israel demonstration, he was sentenced to eight years in prison.144
The November 2023 Christmas Market Plot
In connection to terrorist attacks planned at German Christmas markets in 2023, there were multiple arrests. First, on November 21, 2023, a 20-year-old Iraqi asylum seeker was arrested in Lower Saxony, on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack at the Christmas market in Hanover.145 German authorities reportedly received information from foreign intelligence services.146 Evidence indicated that he was planning to commit a knife attack.147 He had been in Germany since 2022, but his asylum application had been rejected the day he was arrested and was therefore close to being deported.148 A spokesperson for the State Office of Criminal Investigation revealed that he had declared his support for the Islamic State and was willing to commit an attack for the group.149 He was placed in preventive custody and later deported to Iraq on December 15, 2023, with a permanent Germany entry ban imposed.150
The November 2023 Leverkusen Christmas Market Plot
Shortly after, on November 28, 2023, 16-year-old Rasul M. was arrested in Brandenburg as was his accomplice 15-year-old Edris D. near Leverkusen.151 Rasul M. is a Russian citizen with Chechen origins, and Edris D. is a German Afghan dual citizen. Both met each other in a chat group of Islamic State sympathizers.152 The crucial alert for the attack plot had reportedly come from a foreign intelligence service.153 According to investigators, plans had been in the early stages as not all material had been purchased yet, but the two teens had specifically focused on exploding a van filled with gas cylinders at the Christmas market in Leverkusen.154 Edris D. had shared a video in a chat group announcing the attack, and authorities arrested the two only a few days later.155 Both were sentenced to four years of juvenile detention.156
The December 2023 Cologne Cathedral Plot
In December 2023, 30-year-old Tajik national Mukhammadrajab B. was arrested for having scouted the Cologne Cathedral as a potential target for a terrorist attack.157 He was later extradited to Austria in early 2024 where he was known to security services as it was also believed that he was planning an attack on the St. Stephen’s Cathedral in Vienna.158 Six individuals believed to be related to the plot were arrested as well but five were released hours later.159 A 25-year-old man from Tajikistan who was considered an accomplice of Mukhammadrajab B. was ordered to be deported.160
The December 2023 Terror Plotting by Hamas Members
On December 14, 2023, German authorities arrested four alleged members of Hamas, between 34 and 57 years old,161 identified as Abdelhamid Al A., Mohamed B., Ibrahim El-R., and Nazih R.162 u The group had tried to amass weapons and bring them to their weapons collection point in Berlin.163 The prosecution stated that possible targets included the Israeli embassy in Berlin, the U.S. air base in Ramstein, and the area around the former airport Tempelhof in Berlin.164 All four individuals were known to security services prior to their arrest165 and were reported to have “had close ties to leaders” of the military wing of Hamas.166
The April 2024 North Rhine-Westphalia Plot Against Police and Places of Worship
In early April 2024, law enforcement in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia arrested a 15-year-old girl from Düsseldorf, a 16-year-old girl from Iserloh, and a 15-year-old boy from Lippstadt who had planned an Islamist attack.167 The fourth member of the group, a 16-year-old boy from Ostfildern was also arrested in the state of Baden-Württemberg.168 While the group had not settled on a specific target or location, they had decided to attack police stations or churches/synagogues during Ramadan to set people on fire with Molotov cocktails and to use firearms and stabbing weapons with the goal of killing as many people as possible.169 The four teenagers communicated through the messaging apps Telegram, Session, and Discord.170 Security services were alerted to the four teenagers because the 16-year-old from Iserloh consumed Islamic State propaganda and planned to travel to Syria.171 According to the court, all four had become radicalized through Islamic State propaganda online.172 The three from North Rhine Westphalia were sentenced to three years juvenile detention,173 and the fourth member was sentenced to two years suspended juvenile detention.174
The May 2024 Heidelberg/Frankfurt Synagogues Plot
In May 2024, authorities in Bad Friedrichshall and Weinheim arrested an 18-year-old German Turkish man (Ö.) and a 24-year-old German (Y.) for planning attacks on synagogues in Heidelberg or Frankfurt.175 The older of the two had planned to travel to Syria to fight with HTS, but returned after a first stop in Turkey and was turned in by his family.176 Through a chat, they had discussed their plan to use a knife to attack synagogues and later die a “martyr” death by being shot by the police.177 During a search of his apartment, the 24-year-old attacked police with a knife and was shot at by the police.178 Both, however, showed remorse during the trial, recounting “setbacks at school and professionally, receiving support from Islam and finally becoming radicalized on social media” as well as “being desperate and angry.”179 Y. was sentenced to six years in prison, and Ö. was sentenced to two years and 10 months in juvenile detention.180
The June 2024 Esslingen Explosive Drone Plot
In Esslingen, on June 19, 2024,181 authorities arrested 27-year-old Mahmoud A., an Iraqi citizen182 who had planned to fly a drone with an explosive into a not-yet-defined target. He was going to detonate the explosive remotely with a car key.183 When the suspect started buying different chemical components online, police arrested him.184 According to investigations, Mahmoud A. had been an Islamic State member since 2016 in Iraq and had also fought for the group.185 He then came to Germany in 2022 to prepare a terrorist attack.186 He was sentenced by the court to five years and six months in prison.187
The September 2024 Attempted Munich Rifle Attack
On September 5, 2024, an 18-year-old Austrian citizen, Emrah I., shot with a rifle at the Munich Documentation Centre for the History of National Socialism and wanted to attack the neighboring Israeli General Consulate in Munich.188 v In a confrontation with the police, the suspect was shot at the scene.189 The perpetrator was stopped in his attack as he struggled to identify the General Consulate, which was also closed that day in memory of the attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972.190 Emrah I. did not have any direct contact with terrorist organizations or operatives but investigators alleged that he was a supporter of by then disbanded group Jabhat al-Nusra.191 He lived socially isolated and had watched many videos about the Israeli intervention in Gaza.192 Authorities described his motive as primarily anti-Israel and that Islamist ideology had only played a minor role.193
The September 2024 Attempted Linz Police Station Attack
On September 6, 2024 at 02:30 am a 29 year-old Albanian citizen stormed the Linz police station with an 18.5 inch machete.194 His goal was to kill as many police personnel as possible but he was held up in the security gate area and later stopped by a specialized unit with a taser before he could injure anyone.195 A witness stated that the attacker had said he was fighting for the Islamic State.196 In a search of his apartment investigators found an Islamic State flag197 and the court stated that he had radicalized online in Islamic State forums.198 It was determined he had acted alone. He was sentenced to eight years in prison by the court.199 w
The September 2024 Wuppertal Plot Against Jewish Institutions
On September 20, 2024, a 15-year-old male teenager in Wuppertal, North Rhine-Westphalia, was placed into preventive custody awaiting trial on suspicion of planning attacks on Jewish institutions.200 Security services were alerted to him after the attack in Solingen in August 2024; investigations found no direct connection to that attack, however.201 He had been in contact with another Islamist abroad through a chat and was encouraged by that individual to carry out a knife attack.202 Moreover, he had posted content with Islamic State flags on TikTok and had become radicalized online.203 According to the verdict in his case, “the teenager has fallen victim to pied pipers who know their trade as Islamist recruiters.”204 The suspect confessed and was sentenced to two and a half years in prison.205 x
The November 2024 Schleswig-Holstein Rifle Attack Plot
Authorities in northern Germany, in Schleswig-Holstein, arrested 17-year-old German citizen Emin B. on November 6, 2024, on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack with a truck or rapid-fire rifles.206 The tip reportedly had come from foreign intelligence.207 According to investigations, he was allegedly in contact and planning the attack with another person abroad and planning to “die as a martyr.”208 According to the indictment, he was looking to kill “non-believers” and had been an Islamic State sympathizer on social media.209 A friend of the suspect told reporters that Emin B. had been impacted by the situation in Gaza.210 The trial started on April 25, 2025.211
The November 2024 Rhineland-Palatinate Pipe Bomb Plot
On November 26, 2024, authorities arrested a 17-year-old in Rhineland-Palatinate who allegedly planned an Islamist terrorist attack using pipe bombs.212 Prosecutors stated that he downloaded manuals for bomb making online, and in a search of his apartment, investigators found two bayonets and four pieces of pipe with caps on both sides.213 He is suspected to have radicalized online as well as to have shared Islamic State propaganda content.214 The suspect was indicted in late April 2025 and has been in custody pending trial since his arrest.215 y
The December 2024 Mannheim/Hesse Attack Plot
On December 8, 2024, police arrested three men: two German Lebanese brothers aged 15 and 20 from Mannheim and a 22-year-old German Turkish man from Hesse.216 All three were suspected of planning an Islamist terrorist attack together. Investigations alleged that they held sympathies for the Islamic State and were making attack plans.217 In a search of the 22-year-old’s apartment, police found an assault rifle and ammunition.218 The three men were placed in custody pending further investigations.219
The February 2025 Israeli Embassy Plot
At the time of publication, there has only been one publicly disclosed failed Islamist terror plot in Germany so far this year. On February 20, 2025, police arrested an 18-year-old Russian citizen with Chechen origin in Brandenburg for planning an attack on the Israeli embassy in Berlin.220 He was arrested at the Berlin airport and suspected of trying to travel to join the Islamic State, potentially in Somalia.221 He was connected to a group of three Islamists in Berlin, two of whom had already traveled to Somalia to join the Islamic State’s branch there.222 Information about his attack plans reportedly had been shared by a foreign intelligence service,223 and authorities found an “unconventional explosive device” in his apartment.224 Investigations of the attack plot are being led by the Office for the Public Prosecutor General.225
Part Three: Key Islamist Terror Trends in Germany
With the data from all executed as well as publicly disclosed failed Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany between 2020 and May 2025, the following section will look at five key trends that stand out.
- Attack Vectors: Most attacks are low-tech, involving knives and vehicles, but these are not the only threat.
Looking at the data of Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany since 2020, knife and vehicle attacks are the dominant attack vectors. Out of the nine executed Islamist terrorist attacks between January 2020 and May 2025, six were perpetrated by a knife, two by vehicles, and in one case arson. Although these statistics suggest that knives and vehicles are the predominant weapons used by Islamist extremists in Germany, they offer only a partial view of the broader landscape.
Taking into account the thwarted and intercepted Islamist attack plots during that same time period reveals that individuals and groups still consider other weapons and methods. Out of 20 failed Islamist terrorist plots in Germany between 2020 and May 2025, only three involved either a van, truck, or car and five included knives. Instead, at least eight cases involved explosive devices including pipe bombs, a drone with an explosive, multiple bombs, Molotov cocktails, and a homemade explosive belt. In seven cases, the attackers were planning to use firearms, which due to German weapon laws are much harder to obtain and often illegal. There was also notably a chem/bio attack plot involving the use of ricin or cyanide as a weapon. One explanation for these findings is that German security services are much more successful at intercepting attack plots that do not involve everyday items such as knives and cars. The purchase of certain components for explosives, firearms, or even chemicals is more likely to alert authorities to illegal activities. In some cases, the planning process itself, especially the procurement and use of explosives can be lengthier, giving law enforcement and security services more time to become aware of someone’s plans.
This also highlights that while ISK celebrated the knife attack in Solingen and AQAP declared the attacker in the Mannheim stabbing attack “a hero,” terrorist organizations and operators affiliated with the groups also still widely distribute bomb-making instructions online and encourage using explosives. While the following analysis will look at the German response specifically to knife and vehicle attacks, security services nevertheless need to continue to guard against terrorist plots involving explosives and other attack vectors.
As knives were the most used weapon by terrorists in Islamist terror attacks in Germany between 2020 and 2025, they have been at the center of many security debates. One response by officials has been the call for more “weapon-free zones.” On a federal level, public events such as markets, sporting events, theaters, movie theaters, and public festivals are by law weapon-free zones.226 Implementing additional permanent geographical weapon zones is up to the states in Germany, and many cities such as Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Cologne, and Stuttgart have indeed created them.227 z However, the effectiveness of these weapon-free zones remains debated, and initial evaluations have presented mixed results. As a prevention for crime and terrorist attacks, weapon-free zones alone cannot address the problem. Police have argued that enforcement often poses a challenge, especially considering a lack of personnel for controls or exceptions to some of the prohibitions such as for “barbeque and picnic equipment” in Berlin.229 More generally, as criminologist Elena Rausch has argued, “if someone is planning an extremist act, they know they are not allowed to do it. Even a weapons free zone doesn’t matter then.”230
The new German government under chancellor Friedrich Merz has looked at a potential legal tool for preventing knife attacks. The Coalition Agreement231 proposes to include everyday items such as knives and vehicles in §89a of the German Criminal Code (“Preparation of a serious act of violence endangering the state”)232 that currently focuses on firearms, explosives, radioactive substances, poisonous substances, and so forth. This law is used most in indictments against people planning an attack. Including knives and vehicles on the list will criminalize the planning of an attack using these attack vectors and allow for additional surveillance and investigative tools in these cases.233
The second-most used weapon in executed Islamist terrorist attacks between 2020 and 2025 in Germany were cars. Vehicle rammings have been used by terrorist actors around the world.234 As they are often perceived as being successful, they can inspire a copycat effect, in particular in the immediate time period following an attack.235 Security services, as a result, in addition to general security measures, may have to increase their preventive efforts in the aftermath of such attacks.
After the 2016 Christmas market attack in Berlin, Germany changed and implemented a lot of security procedures to prevent vehicle ramming attacks, especially those targeting crowded events. Organizers of such events, together with municipal administrations provide security concepts with different kinds of barriers.236 As targets for vehicle attacks, however, are not limited to larger public events, Director for Public Security at the German Ministry for Interior and Community Dr. Christian Klos recently noted in this publication: “We have to be honest, we cannot protect all our public spaces. It’s impossible, especially with spontaneous gatherings. We have to look into this, but no 100-percent security is possible.”237 This points to the limitations of hardened security as counterterrorism measures in the case of every day, dual-use items such as knives and cars.
Technological advances can potentially play a role for the type of weapon used in attacks, recruitment—in particular, communication—and online propaganda. For weapons, as seen above, Islamist terrorists in Germany continue to choose simple everyday items such as vehicles and knives in eight out of the nine executed attacks and “old school” bombs or firearms in the case of the failed plots. A notable exception is the drone attack plot using explosives that was stopped in June 2024. Given the fact that most attacks are planned by a single individual or with one accomplice instead of larger cells, the level of attack planning might be limited to simpler methods. Most importantly, as knives and cars continue to be used successfully in terrorist attacks in Germany, Islamists planning a future attack might not see a reason to purchase more expensive or technologically advanced tools.
- Profiles: Most attackers carried out their attacks alone and did not have direct links to terror groups. A significant number of plotters are teenagers. Mental health challenges are a feature of some cases.
One significant trend many practitioners and scholars have pointed out over the last couple of years is that the average age of Islamist terrorists in many countries, including Germany, has decreased.238 While the average attacker in the executed attacks between 2020 and May 2025 was 25 years old, the trend toward younger radicalized individuals becomes especially visible when looking at the thwarted attacks. Half of the interrupted terrorist plots were planned by individuals who were 18 or younger. In 2024 alone, there were seven uncovered terrorist plots of people 18 or younger.
A shift in the demographic of terrorists has consequences for counterterrorism as well. Peter Neumann noted that younger individuals in Germany are increasingly undergoing full radicalization cycles online without the need for personal interaction, marking a recent trend in jihadi recruitment. Platforms such as TikTok are playing a key role in this shift, contributing to the emergence of a new generation of perpetrators.239 Consequently, preventive programs and measures aimed at countering extremist content should be tailored specifically to this younger demographic. Additionally, educators and others working closely with youth, such as sports coaches, volunteers in community centers, or religious youth groups, could benefit from training to effectively identify early signs of radicalization.
For the executed and thwarted attacks between 2020 and May 2025, the analysis reveals a clear pattern of attacks by individuals with no direct links to terror groups. The majority of attackers were not official members of the Islamic State but were instead inspired by its propaganda and propaganda shared by the larger Islamic State online ecosystem, as seen in the November 2021 ICE train attack, the April 2023 Duisburg attack, and the May 2024 Mannheim attack.
The cases in Germany echoed a trend seen in other countries as well where those who carried out successful attacks tended to view themselves as part of the Islamic State’s broader struggle, believing they were fighting for the group even without formal affiliation. A notable exception was the August 2024 knife attack in Solingen for which the Islamic State officially claimed responsibility and celebrated the event in its propaganda channels. While isolated incidents involving more structured coordination were uncovered—such as the December 2023 case involving four Hamas members closely tied to the group’s leadership, the former fighter Tarik S. in 2023, and the Tajik cell in 2020 linked to the Islamic State—the overwhelming majority of perpetrators had only consumed Islamic State propaganda or, like the brothers involved in the April 2023 Sweden Church Plot with explosive belts, maintained contact with individuals who were either Islamic State members or sympathizers.
Looking at the number of participants in each plot, it is notable that while all executed terrorist attacks involved only a single individual, the uncovered terrorist plots during that same time period also included smaller groups of two or four members. In fact, eight out of the 20 uncovered terrorist plots involved at least two potential attackers. It stands to reason that this is a function of the fact that as in the case of the four teenagers arrested in April 2024, communication between different individuals increases the chances of being discovered. When security services become aware of one member of a small group, this is likely to lead them to any other members.
Finally, it is notable that two attacks out of the nine executed terrorist attacks were carried out by individuals diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. While it is dangerous, incorrect, and counterproductive to equate terrorism and radicalization with mental illness, there are cases where both may overlap as seen in Waldkraiburg and the Autobahn attacks in 2020. Here, it is important to exercise caution and acknowledge that there are cases that show a complicated connection of Islamist ideology and psychological disorders. This can be helpful for prevention efforts as well as security services when identifying violent individuals but cannot be generalized for every or even most jihadi terrorists in Germany.
- Propaganda and Recruitment: YouTube preachers and TikTok algorithms are fueling the threat.
A 2025 report by the Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb) on Islamist propaganda on social media in Germany identified three different groups of online propaganda.240 First, individuals such as Pierre Vogelaa and Abul Baraaab who present themselves as religious preachers. While religious teachings are the focus of this group of online jihadis, most have very little actual religious education, which does not keep their followers from seeing them as a religious authority.
The second group includes actors such as “Botschaft des Islam,” “Generation Islam,” “Realität Islam,” and “Muslim Interaktiv.”241 They have a farther reach on social media—for example, on YouTube—and are more focused on political and societal aspects like spreading the narrative that German society is fighting against Islam.242 The third group is made up of individual influencers especially on TikTok who do not clearly belong to a larger group. They are able to reach the largest audience in Germany, and many accounts have gained followers since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel.243 The intersection of TikTok and jihadi terrorism has therefore become a pressing concern for security agencies.244 The platform’s algorithmic design, which promotes content based on user engagement, has facilitated the spread of extremist ideologies among younger people. Peter Neumann has explained that the presence and rise of online Islamist influencers is also a logical consequence of bans of in-person activities in Germany by jihadis groups, such as preaching in the street.245
Looking at Islamist terrorist attacks and failed plots in Germany between 2020 and May 2025, there are several cases that exemplify these trends. One example is the attacker in Dresden in 2020 who was influenced most by speeches of Sheik Khalid Al-Rashid and came in contact with other jihadis through the comment section of a YouTube video. He then joined a chat group where he and others shared Islamic State propaganda.246 Another example is the case of the Duisburg attack in April 2023 where the attacker did not grow up in an extremist household and found the Islamic State through the internet. Or the May 2024 Mannheim attacker who adopted more radical views through listening to Islamist preachers on YouTube and then followed links to Telegram chats. An important pattern these cases share is the interest and initial introduction to Islamist content through mainstream platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok and later a transition to more private chat groups or channels such as Telegram or Discord that allow for interaction between likeminded individuals, often in encrypted online environments.247
In the thwarted attacks, other examples of online radicalization included the four teenagers in April 2024, the 17-year-old in November 2024, and the 15-year-old in September 2024. The last case specifically included a radicalization through TikTok. These examples show that content on mainstream social media platforms such as TikTok specifically targets and successfully reaches younger audiences.ac Moreover, it also demonstrates a pattern where minors connect online in virtual groups with connections to the larger Islamic State ecosystem.248 These trends likely explain the significant number of teenagers getting involved in jihadi terror plotting in Germany (and farther afield). Overall, Islamic State propaganda online is highly decentralized with content being created and shared by smaller groups of supporters across the world.249
- The Impact of October 7: There has been a rise in threat activity and especially against Jewish institutions and Israelis.
Of course, it is still too early to tell the final impact of October 7, but there are a few trends that are notable and significant for counterterrorism efforts. First, Jewish institutions and Israeli diplomatic missions have come under greater threat. There were no successful attacks on Jewish institutions or Israelis and only one failed plot (the September 2021 Hagen Synagogue Bomb Plot) in the 2020s prior to October 7, 2023. In the period since October 7, 2023 (despite it being a shorter time interval), there has been one executed terrorist attack at the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin in 2025 as well as seven unsuccessful attack plots that involved either synagogues, pro-Israel protests, the Israeli consulate or embassy, and Jewish institutions more broadly.
Between January 2020 and October 7, 2023, there were five successful Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany. Since then (as of May 2025), there have been four additional executed Islamist terrorist attacks. While this does not show a significant change in the number of attacks, there has been a notable increase in reported thwarted attack plots overall since October 7 (15), compared to the period between January 2020 and October 2023 (five). This, however, may also be due to other factors, and the final impact of October 7 on jihadi radicalization has to be the subject of further monitoring and research. One indicator to look at for this development is violent crime. The 2023 Report of the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution noted that in the category of “politically motivated crime because of religious ideology,” which also includes non-violent crime, antisemitic crimes increased dramatically mainly due to incidents after October 7, from 33 crimes (two of those violent) in 2022 to 492 crimes (22 violent) in 2023.250 ad
Third, as online propaganda, especially by the Islamic States, plays a significant role in the radicalization process of most terrorist attackers in Germany, it is crucial to point out that jihadi terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida—despite their differences from Hamas—have utilized the October 7 attack for their propaganda.251 The head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution Thomas Haldenwang said in November 2023 that “in the jihadist spectrum, we see calls for attacks and a ‘latch-on’ of ‘Al-Qaeda’ and IS to the conflict in the Middle East. This threat is now encountering highly emotionalized individuals inspired by trigger events … The danger is real and higher than it has been for a long time.”252 Early in 2024, the Islamic State published a video by its official spokesperson that, among other things, emphasized the events in Gaza and called for attacks with explosives in Western cities.253 German jihadi online propaganda since October 7th has been rife with antisemitic messaging and content related to Gaza.254
Three examples of how this may impact the radicalization of individuals can be seen in the case of the terrorist attack in Mannheim in May 2024, as well as the two thwarted attack plots in Munich and Schleswig Holstein in September and November of 2024. In Mannheim, the attacker already held extremist views prior to October 7, and in the two other cases, additional factors may have played a role as well. Nevertheless, as noted before, the perpetrator in Mannheim stated in court that “the war in Gaza changed his life,”255 the teenager in Munich consumed numerous videos of Gaza and specifically chose the Israeli Consulate as a target and a witness described the personal impact of the war in Gaza on the attacker in the case of the teenager from Schleswig Holstein. At the very least, the war in Gaza accelerated the radicalization of these individuals.
And finally, it is also important to point out the ways in which October 7 has not changed previously existing patterns: Christmas markets and other public festivals remain one of the most prominent targets for attacks. This includes the executed knife attack in Solingen in 2024 as well as at least two disrupted attack plots against Christmas markets in 2023. In addition, the Islamic State called for attacks at the European Soccer Championship in 2024256 hosted by Germany and on Carnival parades in 2025.257 ‘Soft targets’ such as pedestrian zones, shopping areas, gyms, and public transportation also remain popular targets.
- Recent cases have underscored the importance of foreign intelligence and Germany’s dependence on it.
According to the author’s data, in the first half of the 2020s, out of the 18 Islamist terrorist plots that were stopped before the perpetrator could start the attack,ae at least eight were reported to have relied on important information from foreign intelligence services. Between 2011 and 2021, out of the 13 attacks that were prevented by security services, in six cases information from foreign intelligence was “of essential importance for the prevention.”258 The role of information by foreign security services in German counterterrorism represents is a positive dynamic. Given the transnational connections of terrorist networks, especially online, international cooperation in counterterrorism is crucial. The data shows that Germany has good working relationships with other countries and in particular the United States when it comes to counterterrorism efforts. As Director General of Public Security at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community Christian Klos recently stated:
We are very thankful to our American partners to receive important information, which is sometimes or actually often, much more accessible for American colleagues than for us because of legal reasons and very different perceptions of privacy. Data protection plays a very big role—I would even say from my perspective, an exaggerated role in Europe. Of course, I wouldn’t go so far as fully endorsing the American approach but something in between for Europe and Germany would be much better. Therefore, we sometimes rely on information gathered in the online world by our American partners. It’s extremely worthwhile. We have prevented a high number of terrorist attacks in Germany due to such information—not only from the U.S. but a large part of this information has come from the U.S. agencies—and this is very important for us.259
Still, there is some cause for concern. While CT cooperation in the European Union as well as with partners such as the United States is working well, the reliance on foreign information highlights the constraints Germany’s security services face.
Over the last three years, different German officials have called for legislative changes to address a lack of tools and access for security services because of privacy regulations. Thuringia’s head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Stephan Kramer, argued in October 2024: “The good and trusting international cooperation is working. But it also shows that we finally need to have a fundamental discussion about the powers of the German intelligence services to collect information and data and draw conclusions.”260 Similarly, Rainer Wendt, federal chairman of the German Police Union, stated in December 2024: “We urgently need to improve the technical and personnel conditions of our state security authorities and intelligence services. Their legal powers also need to be extended.”261 Hesse’s Minister of the Interior Roman Poseck had previously said in October 2024: “We must strengthen our security authorities in order to become more independent of foreign intelligence services.”262 He furthermore called for the ability to store and use certain data and IP addresses for counterterrorism as well as additional competencies on the darknet: “Terrorist activities are usually prepared there. Our intelligence services need the means to decrypt encrypted communications.”263 Two former heads of the BND, Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, August Hanning and Gerhard Schindler, argued in August 2023 that “German services should once again become partners on an equal footing with other Western services.”264
The new Coalition Agreement acknowledges the challenges German security services face in light of data protection requirements and declares that the new government will “make full use of the scope provided by European and constitutional law to ensure the highest level of security for our citizens. The tension between security policy requirements and data protection regulations must therefore be rebalanced.”265 It remains to be seen whether such rebalancing will occur.
Conclusion
The terrorist threat landscape in Germany has evolved in the first half of the 2020s. A significant number of young perpetrators are being radicalized online, often inspired by groups such as the Islamic State. They are using the same simple weapons while seeking out new and familiar targets. At the same time, German authorities are seeing the effects of October 7 and are trying to find ways to stop the most successful methods of attacks with knives and cars. In addition, they are looking for innovative approaches to prevent teenagers from getting radicalized online while relying on outside information from foreign security services.
Closing gaps in the German counterterrorism toolkit will be critical to containing what is likely to be a persistent threat. The new Coalition Agreement promises to address some of these problems and hurdles encountered by the CT community by, for example, looking to include knives and cars in new criminal legislation regarding the planning of an attack, and adding enhanced investigatory and CT tools for security services.266 In the end, while complete security is never possible, the attacks that got through over the last five years has shown that improvements are necessary in stopping Islamist terrorists in Germany.