Can Shara’s Government Unite a Country Ready to Explode?
In late March, Ahmad al-Shara, Syria’s new leader, introduced a caretaker government that would supervise the country’s transition from five decades of dictatorial rule. He gave some cabinet positions to figures outside his Islamist milieu, including naming a Christian woman minister of social affairs, a Kurdish official minister of education, a Druze minister for agriculture, and an Alawite minister for transport. Those appointments reflect the pressure Shara is under to demonstrate to Arab and Western governments—and to the Syrian people—that he can build an inclusive government that represents the country’s religious and ethnic minorities. It is a challenge made all the harder by an eruption of bloodshed in March in which fighters affiliated with Shara’s government (but not under its direction) targeted minority Alawites in the west of the country, killing hundreds.
Ever since Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Shara’s rebel group, swept down from northwest Syria in December 2024 and helped topple the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, outside powers have wondered whether an Islamist such as Shara can govern such a large and diverse country. With Turkish backing, HTS operated in northwestern Idlib Province through much of the Syrian civil war and managed to extend its sway over the territory. But it’s unclear if what worked in Idlib will work in Syria writ large. Doubts also hang over the sincerity of Shara’s professed ideological moderation. The group began as zealous jihadis allied with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). But during the 2010s, HTS split from both al-Qaeda and ISIS, making it clear that its struggle was local and particular to Syria. By 2020, HTS was fighting pitched battles against al-Qaeda-aligned forces and ISIS in Idlib. After ousting Assad, Shara reached out to Arab and Western governments, assiduously presenting himself as a moderate who would protect the country’s religious and ethnic minorities.
For now, Shara holds the cards in Damascus. The temporary constitution stipulates that the interim government will be in place for five years before it stages presidential elections, which means he will be in power for the foreseeable future. The most powerful ministries remain in the hands of Shara’s allies, and he sits atop the executive. The temporary constitution, declared in March, recognizes a bill of rights, including freedom of belief and opinion and equality before the law. But it grants Shara tremendous latitude. He will fill the constitutional court and appoint one-third of parliamentary seats, while the remaining parliamentary seats will be selected by a high committee—made up of members appointed by him. At any time, he can declare a state of emergency and remove the weak institutional checks on his rule. Many Western officials are worried about the possibility of a return to a one-party state—much like that of the Assad regime. Many Syrians perceive Shara, correctly, as a radical pragmatist, willing to make concessions and abandon problematic commitments and alliances as long as such decisions accord with his relentless pursuit of power.
But it does not look as if Syria is about to once again become a one-state autocracy, even if that were an outcome that Shara secretly wanted. What is emerging under Shara is a government that has elements of both authoritarian rule and more federated, decentralized organization. It faces an uphill battle in consolidating its hold on Syria and in getting all the country’s constituent groups on board. The HTS leadership exerts tight control at the top, even as it makes concessions to other groups that it is trying to integrate at lower levels, including the armed ethnic factions that run parts of the south and east of the country. This effort is already reaching its limits, with a bottleneck at the highest levels, as only a few officials make all the decisions, and divisiveness on the ground, as rival factions resist being absorbed by the new regime.
As long as many groups, such as Druze militias in the southwest and the Kurds in the northeast, remain out of its orbit, HTS will only have partial control over Syria. At some point, HTS will have to try to co-opt these groups, confront them, or tacitly accept a de facto reality in which it does not exert control over all of Syria. Inaction risks making the reconstruction of a centralized state impossible. Syria faces grave problems, including a collapsed economy, the prospect of renewed internal conflict, and disruptive meddling by outside powers. The caretaker government will not be able to address any of these issues if its own hold over the country remains contested.
RINGS OF POWER
Shara and HTS have proved themselves nimble and capable of adaptation. When HTS took over Idlib in 2019, it not only rejected al-Qaeda and ISIS but also distanced itself more generally from jihadism and Salafism. It aligned closely with the Shafii school of Muslim jurisprudence, which was popular among locals, and reconciled with Sufi Muslims, people whom previous incarnations of HTS had treated as adversaries. HTS abandoned its once overt aim of correcting people’s beliefs and renounced its ideological tenets and political prescriptions. For instance, last year, HTS decided to freeze a morality law proposed by conservatives in Idlib that called for strict gender segregation in most public spaces and imposed restrictions on various cultural matters, including music, women’s clothing, and homosexuality. In June 2020, HTS cracked down on al-Qaeda in Idlib while carrying out an all-out war against ISIS.
This approach derived from a realistic assessment of the group’s position in the late 2010s. HTS realized that it didn’t have the personnel to effectively run Idlib. It had to appeal to a silent majority of Muslims in the region—those who had no strong allegiance to any particular actor and probably rejected HTS’s more strident ideological views. The group cemented its control of Idlib by positioning itself as the alternative to the radicals, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, and the Assad regime. That left little space for competing political forces. In practice, HTS still delegated much of the governance of Idlib, including in sectors such as education and health, to third parties such as foreign nongovernmental organizations. It did not permit any organized political opposition or criticism of its provincial political monopoly. But by 2024, it felt secure enough in its position in Idlib that it eased some of its authoritarian controls, including opening up space for civil society groups and broadening the inclusiveness of the local parliament after popular protests spread in the province. Shara was politically astute in recognizing that his group’s survival depended on both maintaining firm political control and allowing a limited, nonthreatening space to his rule for dissenting and alternative voices.
Its experience in Idlib offered Shara a model to build on. But governing all of Syria from Damascus is not like governing Idlib. As in Idlib, HTS cannot depend on personnel alone to rule Syria. The country is far larger and more diverse than the province. To maintain control, the new government has to rely more heavily on foreign countries for diplomatic backing—especially when it comes to lifting sanctions—and for financial and economic support from Gulf states and the West to rebuild the bureaucracy and finance the army. The new government cannot impose its views unilaterally in many areas, particularly in those where other armed groups remain strong and where local pushback is already forcing some concessions from the government. Syria’s foreign backers, both in the Gulf and the West, might not push for democracy, but they expect Damascus to guarantee some degree of inclusiveness in political participation.
HTS operates through multiple circles of power. At its core, Shara relies on his group and a network of trusted insiders to oversee political affairs, security, and military operations. The second circle comprises veteran Islamist commanders and influential figures with governance experience in Idlib who, while not formally part of HTS, play key roles in staffing the civil administration. The third circle consists of those involved with Turkish-backed Syrian militias under the umbrella of the Syrian National Army. These groups have remained outside government control despite efforts to integrate them into the new defense ministry. The fourth circle includes Sunni Arab communities that HTS wants to build into a reliable source of support for the new regime.
The interim government organized a “national dialogue” conference in late February, inviting many prominent individuals and opposition figures, in a bid to expand the social base of the new ruling order. Such a forum helped give Shara’s transitional government a veneer of legitimacy as well as integrate peripheral actors who might otherwise remain alienated and could act as spoilers. But this approach is reaching its limits. Shara’s reliance on a tight network of trusted advisers has resulted in overcentralized decision-making, which raises doubts about inclusivity and exposes a lack of institutional capacity. The current government’s domination by HTS members and their Islamist allies has also intensified fears among many Syrians of the “Idlibization” of the state—the transplanting of Idlib’s more conservative, Sunni, and revolutionary anti-Assad milieu into the mosaic that is Damascus. At the same time, other groups less close to HTS are pulling away. The groups with the military and political leverage to carve out autonomous spaces—such as certain Druze factions in the south, or the Sunni Salafi group Jaysh al-Islam, which is trying to construct its own civilian-military apparatus in the suburbs of the capital—are resisting overtures from the new government. This distance from the state is even more pronounced for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast. The SDF, which presides over a largely autonomous stretch of territory along the borders of Turkey and Iraq, has nominally agreed to integrate into the defense ministry. But it has left the details of that merger vague while making several demands of the government regarding the future constitution, guarantees of minority rights, and the retention of some military autonomy.
What is emerging is hardly a one-party state—especially since HTS lacks the strength to establish one—but a more intricate, hybrid authoritarian one. In this system, HTS retains the most powerful positions while delegating lesser roles to others. Shara and his allies largely control the most significant ministries—foreign affairs, defense, interior, and the newly formed national security council—while non-HTS ministers play only a secondary role. Time will tell if these partners grow tired of this arrangement and decide to stop playing along.
NO TIME TO LOSE
Unfortunately, Syria is in dire need of a stable and competent government. It faces many immediate threats. The economic situation for millions of Syrians is catastrophic, and the country stands on the brink of collapse. According to the UN, the economy on its current trajectory will not return to its pre-conflict GDP levels for nearly six decades. Without short-term economic assistance—particularly through the easing of the sanctions that outside powers placed on the Assad regime—the situation will likely worsen, making it harder for the new government to build both a functioning bureaucracy and security apparatus. The European Union has suspended several sanctions in the energy, transport, and banking sectors while extending the humanitarian exemptions indefinitely, but Syria remains heavily sanctioned by the United States. The centrality of U.S. financial institutions in global markets—notwithstanding the Trump administration’s current attempts to reorient the world economy—means that both major states and private actors are unlikely to make significant investments in the country any time soon without a change in the U.S. position.
Shara must also contend with the fallout from sectarian killings in March in Alawite villages along the Syrian coast. Assad came from the Alawite community and drew strong support from it. After battles with holdouts affiliated with the Assad regime, armed groups officially under Shara’s defense ministry but operating independent of its orders, along with some foreign fighters and local militias, assaulted Alawite areas. The violence caused up to 1,000 deaths, including among civilians, security forces, and insurgents. Human rights organizations have also documented the wanton execution of Alawite civilians by fighters aligned with the government. There is a very concerning surge in sectarianism among some Sunni communities in central and coastal Syria, with growing calls for revenge against Alawites. This strife could have significant implications for Shara, as outside powers may become more reluctant to help the new government if they doubt its ability to prevent communal violence. So far, the government has largely excluded Alawites from political and security structures. That general exclusion could fuel an insurgency by former regime security officials and Alawites and destabilize the new government’s efforts to steady the country.
Shara has appointed a committee to investigate the killings and hold those responsible to account. Other states—both in the Gulf and the West—are watching closely. A clear and transparent process that addresses the killings and reassures the Alawites could send a positive signal abroad about the new government’s intentions and capacities to rebuild an integral Syria. But failure to act—and any repeat of the events that took place on the coast in March—could ignite renewed cycles of violence and erode confidence in Shara. Outside powers would be even less willing to ease the burden of sanctions on Syria and the crisis would invariably deepen, with eruptions of social strife and violence. Far from bringing a new dawn to Syria, Shara would have ushered in yet another uncertain night.