Between 22 May and 15 June 2015, King Mohammed VI travelled consecutively to Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon with a view to accelerating an African development and cooperation policy in which Morocco wished to position itself. By 2020, the palace aims to at least double its trade that showed a surplus of MAD 9.1 billion (about € 837 million) in 2012 [1]. But, of all the Moroccan initiatives to make this complete u-turn towards the South, it is the religious aspect of its diplomacy which appears to be the most important, the one in which Morocco has its best hand to play, in these times of rising jihadist violence south of the Sahara (Benkirane, 2016).
2
The symbolic positioning of Morocco consists of affirming a ’middle path’ to Islam based on three doctrinal and spiritual pillars. More specifically, since 2015, Morocco’s African religious diplomacy has been making use of a specific training institute. On 27 March 2015, the ruler of Morocco inaugurated the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Morchidins and Morchidates [2]. This Arab-Andalusian style complex of nearly 30,000 m2, situated in the Madinat al’Irfane University campus district, in Rabat, the Kingdom’s capital, aims to train, not only Moroccan Imams but also those of many countries in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa, Tunisia, Libya, and even France. Indeed, these countries are looking for a moderate religious framework for their populations; that of a ’middle path’ to Islam (al wasatiyya), which Morocco wish to present as its guiding principle, particularly since the attacks that hit Casablanca in May 2003.
3
This more moderate and balanced form of Islam is based on a symbolic religious triptych with the purpose of being the cornerstone of ’Morocco’s religious identity’. Between the time of the Speech from the Throne of 30 July 2003 and the inaugural speech for the Mohammed VI Institute of 27 March 2015 by Ahmed Taoufiq, Minister of Religious Affairs, this Moroccan religious identity became more and more elaborate and publicly recognised. By looking at the way this so-called Islamic ’middle path’ is revealed in official discourses it is possible to understand its characteristics, tones, occurrences, reoccurrences, semantic fields and grasp the various notions of Islam that materialise.
4
Indeed, in addition to 150 Moroccan morchidins and imams as well as 100 morchidates (See Dirèche, 2010 for an overview of the Kingdom’s policy regarding feminine religious assistants), 447 foreign students started studying in this brand-new institute as soon as it opened [3]. These students come from: Mali (212); Guinea-Conakry (100); Côte d’Ivoire (75); and Tunisia (37) [4]. Even a small contingent of aspiring French imams (23) started a two-year course following a bilateral agreement. Libya, Nigeria, Senegal, Mauritania, Maldives and Chechnya are also getting ready to send a selection of would-be imams. In addition to Morroco’s expertise in the field of religious education and governance, these African States see, in the type of Islam promoted by Morocco, a means to counter the radicalism that is knocking at their doors or has already entered their territories in the form of the violent Daesh, Aqmi, Ansar ed-Din, Mujao, or even in the form of radical Salafism, or ’Hanbali-wahhabism’ [5], which is spreading there.
5
Firstly, this article will look at what this ’middle path to Islam’ stands for through a study of various official declarations (royal speeches, words from the Minister of Habous and Islamic Affairs), which were made during 2015 and the objectives they addressed. Next, it will question whether this ’moderate Islam’ cannot be negatively interpreted, as a response not only to the rise of jihadist ideology but also to the spread of Hanbali-Wahhabism in Morocco and throughout Africa, by means of a short sociohistorical comparison of religious education in Morocco between the previous and the current ruler. Finally, the third section, will present the views of some of the sub-Saharan/Sahelian student imams from the Mohammed VI Institute, with a more in-depth focus on one of them in particular [6].
The three pillars of the ’middle path’ to Islam (wasatiyyah)
6
Official advocates of a distinct Moroccan Islam—besides also affirming ’there is only one Islam’—present it as being based on three pillars: the Maliki school of law (maddhab), Ash’ari theology (kalâm) and Sunni Sufism (tassawûf). This recipe, a theological (and cultural) ’tajine’ slowly simmering in the Habous’ kitchen (the Moroccan Ministry of Religious Affairs) is drawn from Morocco’s long history.
7
A few ingredients come from the famous al Murshid al-Mu’in manual (commonly known as “al Matn”) by Malikite jurist (Ash’ari) and Sufi Master, Ibn Ashir (1582-1631) [7], and are still commonly used today in small medersas, from Tangier to Lagouira (Moroccan expression to outline the total extension of the Kingdom), all the way up to Al Qaraouiyine University and other notable religious institutions in the kingdom. However, in order to become a national or cultural doctrine, each theological output must be the subject of a particular and constant institutional and discursive investment. Bourdieu revealed that “every ideology invested with a historical efficiency is the result of the work of all those that it represents, inspires, legitimises and mobilizes, and the various moments of the circulation-reinvention process are equally fresh starts” (1971, p. 324). Yet, Moroccan religious diplomacy is taking a qualitative leap [8]: as observed by the reiteration of the Malikism/Ash’arism/Sufism triptych at the opening ceremony of the Mohammed VI Institute, the desire to make it shine south of its borders and the substantial resources that the kingdom has committed to achieve this ambition (notably by funding student scholarships).
8
Immediately after the Casablanca attacks (May 2003) the King clearly outlined an Islam specific to the history and traditions of Morocco: “In fact, Moroccans have remained attached to the rules of the Maliki rites, which are characterized by a flexibility [herein emphasised] that enables consideration of the aims and purposes of the precepts of Islam, and also by its openness to reality. It has been enriched through the imaginative effort of Ijtihad, hereby demonstrating that moderation goes hand in hand with the very essence of the Moroccan personality, which is perpetually interacting with civilisations and cultures [herein emphasised]. Is it therefore necessary for the Moroccan people, who are strong in the uniqueness of their religious rites and the authenticity of their civilization, to import ritual rites that are foreign to their traditions [herein emphasised]? We will not tolerate this, especially given that these doctrines are incompatible with our specific Moroccan identity. To those who would like to try to advocate for these foreign rites for our people: [herein emphasised] [9] We will oppose them with whatever force is necessary to ensure that Morocco’s uniqueness of rite is preserved, hereby reaffirming our desire to defend our choice of the Maliki rite […].”
9
It is primarily this affiliation with the Maliki rite, one of the four major law schools within Sunni Islam that is acknowledged. Its foundation in the Cherifian Kingdom can be shown in many ways. As further elaboration is not possible, only the symbolic aspect will be mentioned here: the long avenue on the eastern side of the royal palace in Rabat bears the name of ’Imam Malik’. In addition to introducing the start of a classification, and even critical approach of the hadith (in particular it cast doubts on the validity of those coming from Iraq), this school of thought is characterized by “its attachment to the customs of Medina […], the interest of the Muslim community, the preferential argument, as well as its concern for moral coherence” (Dupret, 2015, p. 73). However, it is interesting to note that the King subsequently attaches the characteristic of ’flexibility’ to it in his declaration. Despite its original rigorousness, Malikism gradually moved from the Medina region towards the west between the 9th and 10th centuries until settling permanently in Morocco (as well as throughout the rest of the Maghreb and West Africa), and found itself wriggling into an anthropological space where numerous Imazighen customs already prevailed (in family matters and property law in particular), and having to deal with the dense networks of turûq (Sufi brotherhoods) which developed almost concomitantly when Islam arrived in Morocco. Thus, from the outset of its exportation, right up to the present day, this Islamic legal school has been the subject of re-elaboration, even if the ulema provide continuity of the doctrine. The reform of the Personal Status Code (mudawana) in 2004 (Mouaquit, 2005-2006), of which the caste of senior religious dignitaries had to take note whether they liked it or not, is proof of this: Moroccan Malikism does not prevent a form of normative pluralism from developing.
10
The King’s first attribution of ’flexibility’ to the Maliki legal doctrine is reinforced by his addition of the fact that it takes into account the “aims and purposes of the precepts of Islam, and is open to reality.” By the “aims and purposes of the precepts of Islam”, the sovereign refers to the concept of maqasid. It was the 14th-century Andalusian theologian and jurist, Al Shatibi, who first developed the notion that, in some cases, the strict application of Shari ’a law could backfire against the major ethical aims of Islam whereas it is rather these that should take precedence over any automated consideration of the rules. At the end of the sentence, room for manœuvre vis-à-vis this doctrine is included through the admission of its “openness to reality”. In addition to the relativisation of the general norm—al hukm, that which is formulated out of context—through the maqasid, an opening has been left for the interpretation of the doctrine based on reality, meaning for the needs of a modern society. Thus, it is not surprising to see the notion of ijtihad (effort, physical or mental, expended in a particular activity for the purpose of renovation) mentioned in the next sentence.
11
Similarly, when the “essence of the Moroccan personality,” is mentioned, it is not so much as to reify it in a specific doctrinal and ethnocultural ontology, as to affirm that it happens to be “in constant interaction with cultures and civilizations”. The condemnation of “foreign religious rites” repeated in the following two sentences, thus cannot be conceived as an identity crisis but rather appears to target the ideology of criminal leaders, and beyond that any belligerent rhetoric in the name of Islam. Herein lies the delicate Moroccan diplomatic equation that consists of containing the influence of the “foreign—Hanbali-Wahhabi—rite” whilst trying to avoid offending their rich Saudi partner, also a Sunni monarchy.
12
At the inauguration of the Mohammed-VI Institute, officials repeated, alongside the ruler himself, that Islam—as Moroccan religious institutions strive to understand and profess—is a religion of the ’middle ground’ (’juste milieu’ in French). Indeed, this was the meaning behind the inaugural sermon (khutba) of the official imam of MVI Institute’s brand new Al-Oukhoua al-Islamiya Mosque on Saturday, 28 March 2015, and that of Ahmed Taoufiq’s statement at his press conference on the same day. Ahmed Taoufiq indicated that one of the objectives of the new institute would be to “ensure the values of tolerance, balance and moderation are disseminated” [10]. In its 28-29 March 2015 edition, the daily newspaper, Le Matin (closely linked to the government), details the inauguration by repeating that the MVI Institute will be used to “preserve the religious identity of Morocco, which is balanced, open and tolerant” [herein emphasised]. Furthermore, the author of this article also indicates that religious personnel will be trained there “in the fields of Islamic and human sciences [herein emphasized], so as to qualify them to undertake research and actively participate in the treatment of current issues and religious debates”.
13
Since 2015, the “wasatiyyah policy” has thus been given a higher status of symbolic affirmation in official speeches. It is quite revealing that a party with fundamentalist, ideological roots (which have since evolved), the Justice and Development Party (PJD), of Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, now calls for this wasatiyyah [11]. This is to ensure his own sustainability and political legitimacy, given that this ’religious-word concept’ was established as a showcase for the official orientation of religious policy for the palace and the Ministry of Habous. Ownership of this concept has seen the Moroccan Islamist party gradually distance itself—from a rhetorical standpoint at least—from its Muslim Brotherhood heritage.
Reorientation of religious education to compete with Hanbali-Wahhabism?
14
In July 2015, Minister Ahmed Toufiq took part in the ’Islam and the Promotion of Peace’ Symposium in Dakar; a sign of the importance of this subject for the Cherifian Kingdom and confirmation of its shift in terms of African religious diplomacy. During the conference, he reiterated the main principles of openness, tolerance and the need for a peaceful interpretation of Islam, and was seen to be even more aggressive in one sentence. Targeting those he named as “common reductionist literalists” as well as “takfiri jihadists”, he complained that “in the course of history, the march of Islam had suffered greatly from a certain reductionism that wanted to make this religion a simple ritual and legal structure”, explaining any “hostility to Sufism” [12].
Six months later (end of January 2016), this speech was echoed in a royal address to the Congress of Marrakech on ’The Rights of Religious Minorities’ (read by the same Minister of Habous). He repeatedly stated that Muslims and non-Muslims were to enjoy the same rights, maintaining that Jews and Christians should not, under any circumstances, be forced to give up their faith, legitimizing this position by referring to the Caliph Omar, as well as the Qur’anic verse that states that there shall be “no compulsion to religion,” and then stressed that their places of worship should be protected. The sovereign’s text ended with the assertion that “religion must not be used to justify any attack on the rights of religious minorities in Muslim countries” [13].
16
The royal post-attack speech of 2003, which appeared at the start of this article, can be considered an important milestone for the confirmation of this Moroccan triptych (Malikism-Ash’arism-Sufism), the pillars of wasatiyyah. At the time, the present dynast (re) affirmed this rhetoric, but there was no institution responsible for its dissemination (this is not the role of Dar al-Hadith al Hassania that trains traditionalists in a conventional manner, and not directly the role of the Rabita Mohammedia League of Ulemas). Twelve years later, with the creation of the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Morchidins and Morchidates, this triptych finds a privileged nest from which to hatch and take flight. But, even before the Casablanca attacks in 2003, and beyond jihadism, concerns about the rise of Hanbali-Wahhabism were apparent in the royal decision to appoint Ahmed Taoufiq as Minister of Habous, replacing Abdelkébir Alaoui M’daghri, who was reputed to be too ’wahhabi-compatible’.
17
Ahmed Taoufiq is reputed to be a member of the zawyia boutchichiya, one of the most powerful Sufi brotherhoods in Morocco (Hlaoua, 2015) whose headquarters are in Madagh in northeastern Morocco. The Moroccan government wanted to try and reduce the growing influence of Hanbali-Wahhabism, whose progress indicators in Moroccan society are numerous and quantifiable (Aboullouz, 2012; Lauzière, 2012): most obvious is the increase in the number of niqâb (the full veil, which is foreign to the Moroccan traditional dress) in working-class neighbourhoods. In terms of reorienting Morocco’s religious policy, as for the Africanization of the same, Ahmed Toufiq seemed to be the right person for the job as he studied history, he was Director of the Institute of African Studies at Mohammed-V University of Rabat-Agdal from 1989 to 1995 and was the author of a historiographical essay, “Morocco and West Africa Through the Ages”, in which the religious chapter is key.
18
For the French-Moroccan Scholar in Islamic Studies, Rachid Benzine, the objectives are clear: “By creating the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, the King evidently wanted to protect the sustainability of Maliki Islam in the face of the global hegemonic growth of Wahhabi Islam, enabled by oil money” [14]. The speeches of 2003 (post-attacks), 2015 (MVI Institute’s inauguration and Dakar Symposium) and 2016 (Marrakech) therefore put forward—directly or indirectly—obscurantist currents, which give Islam negative press, by proposing a Moroccan alternative within the same movement. Faced with terrorist movements such as AQIM, Mujao or Ansar Dîn (in Mali), close West African neighbours are sensitive to this rhetoric, especially since they do not have Morocco’s experience in terms of religious governance, or religious training institutions of such a magnitude, able to effectively deal with the Islamic domain. Apart from armed terrorism, it can be assumed that this convergence between the conveyance of religious diplomacy in Morocco and the request for training and expertise in religious management from countries such as Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Senegal or Niger in the near future represents an objective ’Maliki alliance’ against the spread of Hanbali-Wahhabism in these countries.
19
This seems to be a way to contain the effects of more than forty years of spreading this ideology through scholarships for students: 140,000 students of 170 nationalities, trained by the Islamic University of Medina many of which are obviously north African (as is the case of two contemporary Moroccan Salafism figures, for example) or sub-Saharan/Sahelian. In addition to this in situ training is the dissemination (sometimes free) of the Wahhabism magnum opus, ’King Fahd’ translations of the Qur’an (with comments), and satellite channels, websites, funding for the construction of mosques, foundations, humanitarian NGOs, the influential work of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the World Islamic League (LIM) … Everything that Mouline (see below) calls the ’riyal politik’.
20
More than half a century after his article devoted to this question, Georges Makdissi’s (1962, p. 37-80) position on Ash’arism in relation to Hanbalism in terms of Muslim theological possibilities confirms, in a timely manner, that the assumption of the Malikism/Ash’arism/Sufism formula can also be seen as a means to curb (without directly mentioning it) the expansion of Hanbalism in its Wahhabi form in North and West Africa. After mentioning the defeat of Mu’tazili rationalism (from which he recalls Al Ashari was born), the Lebanese-American Islamologist considers that Hanbalism, though still alive, has shown its many inabilities to cope with the challenges of time because of what he calls a die-hard traditionalism, whereas the Ash’arites “have remained at a fair distance from these two extremist groups [15] […] to become the most important theological school bearing the orthodox banner through the centuries until today”. It must be remembered that Makdissi wrote that in 1962 and in the meantime many observers may have considered that Hanbali-Wahhabism had taken first place (Mouline, 2011; Redissi, 2007).
21
Morocco understood that it had a good card to play by offering its African Muslim neighbours an attractive, alternative religious product (and essentially familiar since it is stamped with the seal of Malikism and Sufism) not too far from home. Thus, at almost the same time as the revival of the concept of a more moderate Islam in the public arena, emerged the notion of ’spiritual security’, that Moroccan religious institutions proposed to provide. It is set out as a public health objective due to all citizens under the authority of Amir al-Mu’minin («Commander of the Faithful»). This same mission has now been extended to southern Muslim neighbours, who have experienced a lot of unrest in this area since at least 2012.
22
There seems to be a significant qualitative leap between the reign of the previous sovereign and that of the present. Interviewed on 7 December 1988 by a French journalist, King Hassan II said: “Morocco is certainly one of the most fundamentalist countries […] because it has kept a single rite, Malikism and the Maliki rite comes directly from Medina where the prophet lived. […] If there is fundamentalism, it is Morocco that is fundamentalist, it is the most fundamentalist […], on the other side there is fundamentalism. Fundamentalism means a lack of tolerance, a unilateral interpretation of faith” (reported by El Ayadi, 2014 [2004], p. 305).
23
This statement, coupled with his many studies on the subject, allowed the specialist of sociology and history of Islam and education in Morocco, Mohammed El Ayadi—who died in 2013—to say that “the 1970s saw the groundwork for this new political role of religion being laid and which we can consider as the starting point for State fundamentalism” (El Ayadi, 2014 [2001], p. 339). The dissemination of this ’fundamentalist’ approach is viewed as political, as above all it was aimed at destroying the Moroccan left at a time when Marxism, socialism and pan-Arabism began to establish themselves in Moroccan campuses, amongst the teaching staff (of social sciences and humanities) and even in the public and political arena (El Ayadi, 2014 [2001]). Malika Zeghal—and others—assumes “an objective but short-lived alliance” between Chabiba islamiya («Islamic Youth», ancestor of the PJD, in a more obscurantist and militant version) and the government (Zeghal 2005, p. 197-199).
24
Moreover, in his research on the content of school textbooks at the time of Hassan II, particularly those devoted to religious education, El Ayadi highlights the serious downfall suffered by Jews and Christians, and more broadly the ’West’, portrayed as all-encompassing and the cause of all evils. Released by the French press, El Ayadi’s results sparked a small media storm followed by an initial timid attempt to reform religious education programmes in 1996 (2014 [2001], p. 349). At this time, Hassan II was on an official visit to the United States where he met, as he usually did, the American Jewish community of Moroccan origin. Twenty years later, the recent Marrakesh Declaration is of a totally different nature. It remains to be seen whether the content of religious education in primary and secondary schools is aligned with these public statements or not. One of the few to have addressed this issue more recently (between 2010 and 2013, ten years after El Ayadi’s last study), is the philosophy professor and Berber and human rights activist, Ahmed Assid. He seems to say that the description of the prophetic gesture that is made here, as well as the notion of otherness found within, remain highly problematic and incompatible with the proclaimed ideals of openness and tolerance (interview, 3 February, 2015). More recently, at the end of December 2016, the syndicate of philosophy teachers criticised the contents of an Islamic educational textbook (Al Manar al tarbia al islamia) in which it is written (apparently through a thirteenth century religious scholar who is mentioned in the book) that philosophy is “contrary to Islam” and promotes “degeneration” (Le Monde Afrique, 27 December, 2016). However, this controversy followed the official announcement in February 2016 of a major reform of religious education (see No. 25, p. 126).
25
At least here it is clear that whilst Hassan II professed a ’fundamentalist’ Islam and fought against the left’s secular progressivism of the 1970-1980s, his successor, accompanied by his Minister of Habous and his advisers, publicly advocates for an ’Islam of the middle path’, which can also be interpreted as a desire to stem the momentum of Hanbali-Wahhabism in Morocco and beyond. Abu Naïm, one of the main figures of this movement in Morocco, has also been quick to react, in his characteristic takfiri style. For him, the Ministers of National Education and Islamic Affairs, Rachid Belmokhtar and Ahmed Toufiq respectively, “do not fear God, and are aiming to please Christians, Jews and other enemies of Islam”; they are at the head of “secular lobbies” within their respective ministries. Through his ultra-orthodox prism, he sees Toufiq as a “secular extremist” [16]. However, it should be noticed that two other figures of contemporary Moroccan Salafism, Maghraoui and Fizazi, have remained fairly discreet or have confined themselves to relatively legitimist positions with regard to the government since the 2011 political demonstrations and changes.
Apprentice African imams in Morocco
26
Despite assurances from the MVI Institute that its sole purpose is to ensure and disseminate ’spiritual security’, aspects of control (if not of security) of activities linked to places of worship can be seen on a sign placed at the entrance to the al Oukouya al Islamyyia mosque attached to the institute. The notice urges students to head to the mosque only five minutes after hearing the muezzin’s call to prayer. Adherence to the course timetable is put forward by way of justification: but the note also asks students to avoid praying in groups once the imam’s official prayer is over. Countries of sub-Saharan Africa are also looking to Morocco for expertise beyond the mere training of imams.
27
Additionally, non-Moroccan imams are limited and controlled in terms of going out of the Institute. Nevertheless, some students were met outside the school in 2015, including Ali [17], a Malian student in his second-year. Ali reports that he is part of a group of Malian students who have already been in Morocco for two years, as the agreement between his country and the Kingdom predates the Institute: “His majesty has provided symbolic and financial support for the teaching of a moderate Islam in Mali by offering 10,000 copies of the Qur’an published in the Kingdom and has also provided help to restore and look after mosques in the country. Morocco is therefore also helping imams in Mali who do not have the chance like us to come here to Rabat for training” [18].
28
In turn, Ali will train aspiring imams when he goes back to Mali, “convinced of the teaching standards [of the Institute] to spread and defend a more moderate Islam in our country”. In fact, the traumatic episode of Ansar al-Dîn’s advance in northern Mali, before the French military intervention, clouds much of what he says: “Throughout the Sahel region, Islamic extremism is widespread and fed by networks of radical groups. We are convinced that our training will provide a solution to combat the ignorance and fear that these groups are trying to instil” [19].
29
This expatriation to Morocco is also seen as an opportunity to increase his symbolic legitimacy: “We are no longer traditional fiqh students in a mosque in a remote part of the country, but in a very modern institute equipped with a multi-disciplinary library and a wealth of science and knowledge [20]. We can therefore assume that this opportunity—significantly broader—offered to aspiring imams is an advantageous symbolic alternative (Malikism, the country of Amir al-Mouminine) and practical (geographical proximity) compared to Saudi scholarships and the Egyptian option (Bava, 2014). Ali not only mentions the “memorization of the Holy Qur’an” but also “communication methods”, particularly with non-Muslims, as well as “learning Arabic and French” to describe this curriculum that is in contrast with “non-formal traditional education, or even clandestine”, that is to say the prevailing anomie in the religious field (not only Muslim) of some countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Dozon, 2008), which, according to Ali, is often the cause of obscurantism.
30
Observed at the cash desk of a bookshop selling Islamic works in Casablanca’s Habous neighbourhood in the summer of 2015 and accompanied by a young woman wearing a light fuchsia hijab, another Malian imam student was going to buy a work of the well-known Matn of Ibn Ashir, legal and Sufi theologian. However, before making his purchase, he asked the bookseller to show him where ’Sufi science’ (ilm at-tasawwuf) books were in an excellent Arabic. This brief encounter shows the desire to formalize and rationalize the learning and dissemination of the Maliki mahhdab, and at the same time preserve its mystical dimension. The second without the first would have opened it up to too much criticism from rigorist movements. The first without the second would have been perceived as self-denial, as Sufism has structured the religious history of both Morocco and Mali.
31
Cissé [21], a PhD. in History from a Moroccan university and Islamic Financial and Jurisprudence Consultant, supervised the arrival of the first group of Ivorian imams (a total of 75) on behalf of the Embassy of Côte d’Ivoire. Côte d’Ivoire, where almost 40% of the population is Muslim, nearly 30% is Christian (with a clear increase of Pentecostalism), and more than 15% are involved in animist and pantheistic cults, is also experiencing tension over denominational affiliations, even if they are, more often than not, the result of, rather than the source of, conflict (Miran-Guyon, 2015).
32
Moreover, at the time of writing this article, the country was struck by an attack in Grand-Bassam that AQIM claimed responsibility for, which left 19 dead on 13 March 2016. Even before this attack—the first of its kind in this country—Cissé, like Ali, was filled with a sense of urgency: “You can’t just let anyone become an imam. The role is far too important. However, in Côte d’Ivoire the Islamic domain is not very structured, not as formalised as in Morocco. And these days, we have to be careful…” Thus it is also this long tradition of religious control that the sub-Saharan African countries are coming to look for in Morocco. This has been forged throughout a (in) game “between a State in need of control and an intellectual Islamism operating at the level of civil society, the challenge being the ownership of a legitimate/credible/relevant discourse on the definition of the eschatological horizon” (Tozy, 1992; p. 408. See also Darif, 2010). And certainly beyond—or below—the eschatological horizon alone.
33
Less than four months after the inauguration of the Mohammed VI Institute, the Mohammed VI Foundation of African Ulemas (FMEA) was launched on 13 July, 2015 [22]. Unsurprisingly, the Minister of Habous, who has been delegated by the Commander of Believers (the King of Morocco) to manage this foundation, declared that its goal is “to unify the efforts and forms of collaboration between Moroccan Ulemas and their African counterparts” in order to “raise awareness of and promote a more tolerant, moderate Islam” [23]. The Malikism/Ash’arism/Sufism triptych strikes yet again. The recognition by African States, members of this preeminent foundation of ’Moroccan Islam’ (note that the expression is assumed here), is perceived as an amanah (fulfilling or upholding trust) of these sub-Saharan/Sahelian neighbours. The notion of “Commander of Believers” is repeated three times in a few minutes and Ahmed Toufiq presents it as a common symbolic good (i.e for all African Muslims at least). As such, it can be said that the FMEA, like the MVI Institute, falls into the category of ’Transnational Religious Enterprises in West Africa’, put forward by Fourchard, Mary and Otayek (2013), with a highly institutionalized aspect: two institutions that are now tasked with the ’stabilization’ of the African geopolitics of Islam.
Conclusion: Moroccan institutional Islam compared with its competitors
34
The emergence of a new Moroccan religious institution with transnational ambitions provides an opportunity to clearly understand how the Moroccan Muslim identity is officially asserting itself. Its foundations are built on Malikism, Ash’arism and Sufism, adopted and now repeated urbi et orbi.
35
It also helps us to understand that if national and continental (and further afield) religious leaders are the first to be trained, then there is also a desire to resist jihadism and probably Hanbali-Wahhabism that is discernible in this corpus and the initial implementation of this religious policy. Moreover, it should be recalled that the palace must also fight symbolically against internal religious competition represented by the al-Adl wa-l Ihsane movement, which is relatively well established in the working-class realm (Baylocq, Hlaoua, 2013).
36
However, are there not different or even dissimilar conceptions, behind this contemporary national narrative, of what is and what should be the Moroccan Islamic identity on an internal level? In 2009, Rachid Benzine handed over an unpublished note to Driss El Yazami, President of the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad (CCME). It was possible to obtain this note, in which he suggested the creation of a “Hassanian International University of Religious Sciences” that would teach the social sciences and humanities, literary criticism, historical criticism and would invite “academics from all over the world”. However, in a unique meeting with the Director of the Mohammed VI Institute, on Wednesday, 1 April 2015, Sheikh Abdeslam Lazâar reacted to the expression ’Moroccan Islam’ (as mentioned to him) by hammering out “Islam wahid” (there is only one Islam): that of the Qur’an and the Sunnah through the Prophet’s understanding, his companions (Sahaba) and their successors (Tabi’ûn and Tabi’ûn at tabi’in), which together constitute the ’pious predecessors’ (Salaf es salîh), built as a model of authentic Islam. In other words, the classical pattern that the aforementioned Hanbali-Wahhabism also refers to as Taqlid (imitation/conformity), rather than tajdid (renewal).
37
Yet at the beginning of 2016, at least two ’Moroccans residing abroad’ (MRE, in French), known for their innovative approaches to Islamic traditions were approached by the habous. Does this complex reality show possible tension between traditionalism and reformist tendencies in the Moroccan post-Arab Spring? Which path is the Mohammed VI Institute, the new flagship of African religious diplomacy in Morocco, on: the first path, the second, or a compromise between the two?
38
Even if Morocco has shown that it is capable of effectively mobilizing powerful symbolic religious resources [24], the path does not yet appear to be totally free from obstacles, between those who want the status quo on the religious level (traditional clergymen, the Islamist party Al’adl wa-l tinmyyia, closely linked to the government), modernists, who are yearning for reform within the Kingdom (the left, feminists, intellectuals and modernist academics, etc.) and transnational movements who are able to mobilize other resources to promote Hanbali-Wahhabism and even jihadism, which are knocking at the doors of the Sahel and Tunisia and are also enlisting many young Moroccans (numbering close to 2000, according to anthropologist Scott Atran) and who are often very opposed to Sufism, amongst others.
39
A more detailed investigation based on observations, a study of curriculum content and a wider range of interviews with the student and teacher population would make it possible to determine with even greater precision, which path the religious policy of Morocco is taking. Even if critical reviews and a comparison of official positions may—as conveyed—provide a wealth of knowledge, it is important to measure (aside from these declarations), the potential effects of implementing this religious policy through religious education [25] and social, political as well as legal practices (on the definition of religious otherness, heterodoxy, freedom of conscience and practice, etc.). Researchers on the ground can only be encouraged to give themselves the means to continue the investigation that has been partially opened here.