On Aug. 26, following a retaliatory strike by Hezbollah against Israel for the killing of senior commander Fuad Shukr at the end of July, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova expressed “deep concern over the dangerous increase in tensions in the Lebanese-Israeli border area” and urged all involved parties to exercise “maximum restraint.” Zakharova viewed this escalation as an extension of Israel’s ongoing war with Hamas and called for a “speedy cease-fire” in the Gaza Strip that would serve as a gateway to stabilizing the Middle East.
Russia’s consternation about an escalation of hostilities in Lebanon reflects its long-standing partnership with Hezbollah. Since Russia’s military intervention in Syria began in September 2015, Hezbollah has coordinated with Russian forces on preserving President Bashar al-Assad’s grip on power. Russia has also leveraged its partnership with Hezbollah to deepen its influence in Lebanon and utilized Hezbollah’s illicit financial networks for sanctions evasion purposes.
Due to this multidimensional relationship with Hezbollah, Russia has urged Iran to exercise restraint against Israel to prevent the outbreak of a destructive hot war in Lebanon. Despite outward confidence from Russian nationalist commentators about Hezbollah’s resilience, concerns endure in Moscow over Israel’s ability to severely degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities. If a war erupts regardless, Russia could provide Hezbollah with small-scale military assistance and training to help it counter Israel’s bombardments. Russia hopes that this assistance will prolong Hezbollah’s resistance and cause the US to redirect weapons to Israel that would otherwise reach Ukraine.
Russia’s multidimensional partnership with Hezbollah
Russia and Hezbollah’s shared pro-Assad stance in the Syrian Civil War laid the foundation for multifaceted cooperation. In November 2015, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov rejected the US’s designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and declared that it was a “legitimate socio-political force” as its members were elected to the Lebanese parliament. Bogdanov’s statement legitimized Russian military collaboration with Hezbollah in Syria. Intensified coordination between Russian airpower and Hezbollah’s infantry played a crucial role in Assad’s triumph in Aleppo in December 2016.
As their cooperation in Syria deepened, the Kremlin viewed a close relationship with Hezbollah as a stepping-stone for power projection in Lebanon. Six days after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Abu Dhabi in March 2021, a Hezbollah delegation led by Mohammed Raad travelled to Moscow. The presence of alleged Hezbollah financial advisor Hassan Moukalled, later sanctioned by the US government, in the delegation and subsequent meetings with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Bogdanov laid the foundation for potential commercial deals. Moukalled kickstarted negotiations with Russian company Hydro Engineering and Construction to rebuild the Zahrani refinery in Hezbollah-controlled southern Lebanon at a cost of $1.5 billion.
These public investment negotiations complemented well-established informal economic cooperation between Russia and Hezbollah, in flagrant violation of US sanctions. Russia-based Syrian national Mohammed Alchwiki coordinated with Hezbollah official Mohammed Qasir (both of whom have been sanctioned by the US government) on supplying funds to Iran and its proxies. Alchwiki’s Global Vision Group was a business partner of Russian Energy Ministry subsidiary Promsyrioimport. From 2014 onwards, Global Vision Group and Promsyrioimport are alleged to have illicitly funneled Iranian oil to Syria and covered their tracks by switching off Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals on oil-bearing Iranian vessels.
While the Lebanese Foreign Ministry immediately condemned Russia’s Feb. 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine, Hezbollah struck a decidedly different tone. In addition to predicting that the US would abandon Ukraine and framing the US and Britain as instigators of the war, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah opposed Lebanon’s public criticism of the invasion. He claimed that the Foreign Ministry’s response was “written at the US embassy” and that Lebanon should have abstained from the March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russian aggression. Nasrallah also expressed frustration that Lebanon did not respond to Russia’s offer to invest in an oil refinery, which would allow oil derivatives to be sold in Lebanese pound instead of US dollars.
While Nasrallah denied Ukraine’s allegations that 1,000 Syrian mercenaries and Hezbollah fighters were participating in Russia’s invasion, his rhetoric strengthened Hezbollah’s standing as Moscow’s crisis-proof Lebanese partner. Hezbollah media outlet Al-Manar has taken Nasrallah’s pro-Kremlin messaging to new heights, routinely sharing Russia’s propagandistic boasts about destroying NATO-class military hardware in Ukraine and claims that Ukraine’s defeat is an inevitability.
This rhetorical solidarity has coincided with sanctions-proof economic cooperation. After the US Treasury Department sanctioned Moukalled in January 2023, his engagements with Russian officials intensified. In March 2023, Moukalled met with Bogdanov in Moscow and discussed the inauguration of new Russian flight routes to Lebanon. These new transit paths have not materialized, as Russia discourages its citizens from travelling to Lebanon due to the risk of war with Israel. Nevertheless, it could create new sanctions evasion avenues between Russia and Hezbollah in a post-Gaza war scenario.
Russia’s cautious approach to a potential Israel-Hezbollah escalation
As the prospect of a major escalation in Lebanon looms, prominent members of Russia’s analytical community warn that Israel will regret opening a new front against Hezbollah. A July 4 Russian International Affairs Council report framed Israel’s escalatory actions toward Hezbollah as a cynical ploy to keep Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in power. This report, which was co-authored by Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) academics Murad Sagydzade and Sabina Ismailova, argues, “The survival of Netanyahu’s government depends on its ability to find a new enemy to unite the nation. The conflict with Lebanon can unite Israelis and give the authorities a chance to hold on, since Hamas is no longer fit for this role.” Netanyahu’s gambit is framed as potentially catastrophic as Iran’s backing of Hezbollah could create a full-scale regional war with global ripple effects.
Russian Telegram channels are reinforcing the contention that Israel is entering an unwinnable war with Hezbollah. Former Kremlin advisor Sergey Markov predicts that all of Lebanon and Syria will join Hezbollah in a war with Israel, and concludes, “When a ground war begins with the use of terrorist attacks, Shaheds and like, then Israel will be defeated.” Military analyst Boris Rozhin argues that Israel is “only capable of destroying the tunnel exits that they discover from time to time” and will not demolish Hezbollah’s underground tunnel infrastructure.
These predictions do not reflect a consensus opinion within the Russian expert community. Reserve Colonel Mikhail Khodaryonok, who presciently foresaw the struggles that the Russian military would face by invading Ukraine, contends that the US Navy will fire missiles at and carry out airstrikes against entrenched Hezbollah positions. Khodaryonok warns “the luxurious mansions of the organization’s leadership in southern Lebanon will be reduced to dust and rubble” and predicts that Hezbollah will not go beyond shelling Israel to show solidarity with Hamas.
In the event of war with Israel, Russia’s solidarity with Hezbollah will only extend so far. Russian diplomat Alexander Zasypkin, who praised Hezbollah’s counterterrorism contributions in Syria and described Israel as “part of the Western camp that is unifying against Russia” on the Hezbollah-aligned Al Mayadeen network, was replaced as ambassador to Lebanon by Alexander Rudakov in 2020. Zasypkin’s rhetoric challenged the Russian diplomatic consensus, which believed that Lebanon was too integrated with the West to follow Syria’s pro-Kremlin stance, and his replacement deprives Hezbollah of a key partner.
Russia’s past actions also do not point to large-scale military support for Hezbollah. During the 2006 Lebanon war, Hezbollah-aligned figures expressed frustration about Russia’s unwillingness to condemn Israeli actions. The perception that Nasrallah was a radical Islamist who was seeking to drag Lebanon into the global caliphate was a mainstream view among Russian media outlets. After Israel found evidence that Russian anti-tank missiles reached Hezbollah in 2006, the Kremlin furiously denied these allegations and did not participate meaningfully in Hezbollah’s post-war rearmament. Former Hezbollah official-turned-critic Sheikh Abbas al-Jawhari argues that Russia’s relationship with Hezbollah was always a “forced partnership” and highlighted Russia’s unwillingness to defend Hezbollah military infrastructure in Syria against Israeli airstrikes.
While Russian support for Hezbollah is unlikely to be a game-changer, there are still ways the Kremlin can support the armed group. In November 2023, US intelligence reports revealed that Assad and the Wagner Group coordinated on the potential distribution of SA-22 surface-to-air missiles to Hezbollah. White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby subsequently warned of air defense deliveries from Wagner to Hezbollah. The delivery of Pantsir S-1 air defense systems would be overseen by the Syrian Arab Army, which received custody of them after the partial liquidation of Wagner’s operations. Al-Jawhari claims that Russia could supply Hezbollah with offensive weapons to strike the Karish gas field, as it wants to restrict Israel’s gas extraction from the Mediterranean.
As many Russian analysts believe a protracted war in Lebanon will divert Western military resources from Ukraine, the Kremlin could provide enough arms shipments to Hezbollah to prolong the conflict. In exchange for these prospective arms deliveries, Hezbollah has reportedly leveraged its experience firing UAVs that evade Israeli air defense systems to train Russian forces in the use of Iranian Shahed drones. In February 2024, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed that Hezbollah commander Kamal Abu Sadiq, who manufactures and maintains drones, was training Russian forces at Syria’s Shayrat military airfield.
As the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon hangs on a knife’s edge as the two sides continue to carry out cross-border strikes, Russia is framing itself as a voice of de-escalation. The erosion of Russia-Israel relations over Ukraine and Gaza ensures that the Kremlin leans more strongly toward Hezbollah than it did in previous conflicts. Even if war does not break out, Russia will seek to leverage its partnership with Hezbollah to strengthen its influence in Lebanon.