Vladmir Putin’s recent visit to China, to attend the opening of the Winter Olympics in China and display solidarity with Xi Jinping against the Western diplomatic boycott of the games, was hailed as an economic as well as diplomatic success. The support of the economic giant next door is an important reassurance to Russia, against the threat of crippling Western sanctions in the event that Russia invades Ukraine. As the political scientist and columnist George Bovt put it: “[The solidarity on display] will allow the Russian leadership to feel a bit more confident in the upcoming new rounds of talks with the West, as well as to more soundly assess the consequences of the implementation of the numerous sanctions’ threats, via which attempts are being made to prompt Moscow to make concessions on Ukraine.
One key issue is whether China will go along with Western sanctions as it had largely done when sanctions were imposed upon the annexation of Crimea to Russia in 2014. Bovt believes that in the event of new and tougher sanctions China will act differently: ” However, given the background of growing US-Chinese tensions, as well as increasing American pressure on a number of Chinese high-tech companies, one cannot exclude the possibility that Chinese discipline with regards to compliance with the anti-Russian sanctions might be shaken.”[1]
Sergei Lukonin, who heads the Chinese Economy and Politics Sector at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations shares Bovt’s view.
“After the US sanctions were introduced against China, Chinese companies started to less strictly follow the sanctions against Russia. For example, back in 2014, 2015, and 2016 the following cases were recorded: Chinese companies, banks sometimes delayed payments, and didn’t cooperate. Now the situation is changing, China is now in Russia’s shoes, so Chinese companies will be less strict following the sanctions regime.”
This optimism was buoyed by the contracts concluded during the Putin – Xi Jinping talks. Over a period of 25 years, China will buy an additional 10 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia. Consequently, the total volume of Russian fuel supplies to China will grow, reaching 48 billion cubic meters per year.
Under a second contract Rosneft will supply 100 million tons of crude oil over a period of 10 years.
On the debit side observers noticed that with all the increase in trade volume, Russia still represented a drop in the bucket of Chine foreign trade and even the projected increase in trade turnover represented only a third of Russia’s trade with Europe. Nor have Russia and China, despite talk of de-dollarization succeeded in forming an effective substitute.[2]
Orientalist Alexander Saveliev, an adviser to an economic consultancy company and a columnist for the Regnum News Agency wrote an article titled “Russo-Chinese Unequal Marriage”, where he sought to puncture the glowing reports about the success of Putin-Xi Summit in terms of its economic aspect. Russia, declared Saveliev, was clearly a junior partner in the relationship, and was selling raw materials for high value-added imports. Russia, as a nuclear power was useful to China as a means for diverting the West, while China gained strategic parity. In a striking coda to his article, Saveliev indicts the Russian academic community for retroactively and slavishly defending any action by a Russian leadership willing to consign Russia to the role of China’s “economic appendage”.
Saveliev’s article follows below:[3]
“The results of the meeting between the Russian and Chinese presidents’, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are being discussed in Russia in a largely enthusiastic tone. This can only be explained in terms of state propaganda and against the backdrop of a joint confrontation with the collective West. The vague declarations and the sorry reality of the shape of bilateral foreign economic relations suggest that Russia is lagging far behind, making it a junior partner and a “raw materials appendage” not only for the West, but also for the East.
“According to Chinese customs authorities, in 2021, the foreign trade turnover between China and Russia totaled 147 billion USD, and that with the US was 755 billion USD. The total foreign trade turnover of the PRC in 2021 exceeded 6 trillion USD. Russia’s share in China’s foreign economic interests, represents a miniscule percentage, whereas for Russia, the PRC is second to the EU as the most important partner.
“Russia imports products with high added value both from China and the EU: from mechanical engineering goods to digital technologies. In return, Russia habitually sells off its subsoil and non-renewable resources. Products manufactured by the [Russian] military-technical complex are, probably, the only entry of Russian exports to China from the high-tech spectrum. Russia’s unique position in Eurasia, achieved during the course of history, and its subsoil are the main target of ambition for the country’s “partners,” be they from the West or the East.
“The signing of a contract for the supply of 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year is touted as a substantial achievement of the talks between the leaders of China and Russia. The contract is dubbed “Power of Siberia-3.” The first similar project, “Power of Siberia-1,” has been in operation for some years now, and its maximum capacity is about 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year.
“The contract for the commissioning and supplies of gas to China from the acclaimed “Power of Siberia-2,” with an annual capacity of 50 billion cubic meters of gas, has not yet been signed. Considering the persistent increase in Chinese energy consumption (which is happening against the backdrop of the frozen Power of Siberia-2′ project) the newly signed contract doesn’t look like a success for the strategic Russo-Chinese partnership. When and if it will be implemented, its contribution to China’s energy sector will be much less than 1%.
“A contract for long-term oil supplies to China looks more promising. Igor Sechin, with the help of his characteristic persistence, has for years strived to diversify the geography of oil supplies. This time he achieved his goal. Nevertheless, this contract also has its shortcomings (which are not connected to the price, or more precisely, the pricing formula). The main shortcoming it represents a continuation of supplying primary raw materials supplies, i.e. the contracts focuses not on the development of Russia, but on the export of its subsoil.
“Russia is not China’s foreign economic priority; it prioritizes: the US, the EU, as well as the regional states (from Japan and Taiwan to the Southeast Asian states).
“However, Russia’s status as a nuclear power that is ready to sharply escalate relations with the collective West (thus, providing China with the necessary time to achieve economic and military parity, primarily with the US), makes the country an advantageous junior partner for China. The willingness of our country’s leadership see Russia play the role of China’s raw materials appendage makes such cooperation even more lucrative for Beijing.
“The political component of Russo-Chinese relations, as expressed in the joint statement, looks even worse.
“The stock phrases about UN primacy and about equal and indivisible security have long meant nothing, as well as assertions about the unacceptability of NATO’s enlargement eastwards, or commitment to multipolarity, or Russia’s ‘One-China’ policy.
China is interested in Russia’s problems on its western borders only from two perspectives, i.e. it’s interested that Russia (as a nuclear power) should maintain its internal political stability, and the security of China’s interests in Russia, including those associated with the transit and export of raw materials. Destabilization in Russia is unbeneficial to China. The very style of the text of the joint statement betrays its authors, as the Russian Foreign Ministry tries too hard to cover up its many years of shortcomings on various fronts with a vacuous, eclectic text.
“The semblance of a new geopolitical alignment remains only that, a semblance, and it is unlikely that Western ‘partners’ have forgotten how to read the smallest nuances of not only declarative statements, but also of binding international agreements. The joint statement per se won’t frighten the West because it’s meaningless and eclectic. However, it will inevitably be exploited to incite anti-Russian and anti-Chinese hysteria.
“There are already examples of this. Taipei (The Chinese Republic of Taiwan) has already protested the joint statement’s support for the PRC’s territorial integrity and for the “One-China” policy. It is hard to recall when Taiwan authorities have ever addressed such angry statements to the US, the main supplier of arms to the island part of China [i.e. Taiwan], or to other countries, which likewise do not recognize the sovereignty of the island.
“Global spheres of influence are created by establishing a new information reality. Modern analysis of unfolding events is impossible without processing a significant volume of data and taking into account multiple and contradictory opinions. The fact that Russia’s leading China specialists avoid direct commentary and most avoid even assessing the summit, attests to the difficulty or unwillingness of acquiring such information.
The comments seen in the media or even on social media are, with few exceptions, either unprofessional or slavish. Russian Orientalists, scholars and analysts are forced to retroactively justify any action [by the authorities], often doing so according to the wishes of not only Russian, but also of foreign customers (irrespective of whether they are located to the East or to the West of Russia). There is no independent expert-analytical support for any direction of Moscow’s foreign policy, anti-state approaches to scientific, educational and analytical work dominate in Russia.
The meaningless of the joint statement can be largely attributed to the gap between the intellectual elite and the ruling class. A colleague, V. Kolotov, a professor at St. Petersburg State University and the long-time organizer of the most disturbing and realistic conference has accurately defined this situation as “A turn to the East without Orientalists,”. In these circumstances, it is difficult to expect anything but polite smiles from Eastern countries. It’s high time for the Kremlin to recall the famous painting by Vasili Pukirev, titled “Unequal Marriage”.