Introduction
In the 1988 charter that announced its existence, Hamas introduced itself as “one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine.” The charter then informs the reader that the Brotherhood “is a universal organization that constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times.”1 That is no idle boast. The Brotherhood has scores of national branches across the globe. Among those branches, Hamas stands out for its unbroken record of violence and its readiness to massacre men, women, and children, as it did in southern Israel on October 7, 2023. Yet the ideas that animate Hamas are not unique; they are part of the Brotherhood’s common heritage. These ideas have also spread far beyond the Brotherhood, animating al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and many other lethal organizations.
The spectacular violence of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State ensures a forceful response from the United States and other victims. At the same time, their attacks contribute to a certain complacency regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, whose branches in the United States and Europe reject the use of violence within their host countries. Yet globally, the Brotherhood is a gateway to terrorism, infusing members with the religious doctrines and hatred that justify violence. The most determined of these members then form splinter groups or migrate individually to terrorist organizations.
In Egypt, the Brotherhood’s original branch gave rise to Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), which assassinated President Anwar Sadat in 1981 after he made peace with Israel. In 1993, Brotherhood alumnus Ayman al-Zawahiri took the reins of EIJ and merged it into al-Qaeda. That organization began as a partnership between Osama bin Laden and a Palestinian member of the Brotherhood, Abdullah Azzam, who gained fame among jihadists both for his writings and his unflagging efforts on behalf of their comrades battling Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Among Azzam’s best-known sayings is,
Love of jihad has taken over my life, my soul, my sensation, my heart, and my emotions. If preparing [for jihad] is terrorism, then we are terrorists. If defending our honor is extremism, then we are extremists. If jihad against our enemies is fundamentalism, then we are fundamentalists.”2
Despite this genealogy of terror, the Brotherhood continues to confound both policymakers and experts. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, there arose a school of thought that saw the Brotherhood as a moderating force and a partner for the West in the struggle against terrorism. Two advocates of this perspective wrote in 2007, “When it comes to the Muslim Brotherhood, the beginning of wisdom lies in differentiating it from radical Islam and recognizing the significant differences between national Brotherhood organizations.”3
There is considerable value in the second half of this statement since the differences between national branches of the Brotherhood are vast. Many have adhered to a policy of non-violence for decades. Yet it is almost always born of prudence, not principle. The Brotherhood tends to be far more conservative than al-Qaeda or the Islamic State when calculating the probable cost of a turn toward violence. Its branches hesitate to risk the wrath of national governments. The Brotherhood also places a premium on remaining able to gradually promote its brand of Islam, especially within Muslim majority countries. After the Arab Spring protests of 2011 brought down dictatorships across the Middle East, many Brotherhood branches even embraced elections as a means of seeking power. Yet this, too, was a tactical choice. They may accept leaders chosen by the people, but their bedrock conviction remains that no government is legitimate unless it rules according to the dictates of sharia, Islamic law.
In light of the substantial differences between branches of the Brotherhood, the United States and its allies should not have a single blanket policy toward the group. Rather, the need is for a policy that can be tailored to different settings and situations. Within the West, the primary need is for vigorous law enforcement as well as education about the nature of the Brotherhood. While eschewing violence, branches in the West, and specifically the United States, have seen their members and affiliates convicted of financing Hamas and al-Qaeda.4 Abroad, especially in the Mideast, Washington should consider the use of terror designations and other sanctions.5 There will be a need to carefully determine which branches merit designation; the purpose of this memo is to begin mapping the terrain by providing brief but incisive accounts of Brotherhood activity in six countries: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Sudan, and Yemen. Violence is part of the story in every country, yet it takes a different form in each.
In Egypt, government repression has mostly broken the Brotherhood, yet it has generated violent splinter groups. In Jordan, a branch that appeared to reject violence planned a major attack that authorities disrupted in April. In Lebanon, where it operates as the Islamic Group, the Brotherhood fought by Hezbollah’s side against Israel in 2023-2024.
In Sudan, the Brotherhood’s vehicle is the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM), which is now a party to the country’s civil war. Washington has sanctioned a pair of top SIM leaders but not the organization as a whole. In Yemen, the Brotherhood operates as al-Islah, which is now part of Yemen’s internationally recognized government (IRG). Yet Islah’s founder was a mentor to Osama bin Laden and there are indications that the party cooperates with Ansar Allah, the Iran-backed terrorist organization better known as the Houthis.
Qatar presents the most distinctive challenge. It has no native Brotherhood organization, yet the royal family is a long-time patron of Hamas and other branches. The Al Jazeera Media Network projects pro-Hamas and pro-Brotherhood narratives across the region. Doha presents itself as a mediator between warring parties, yet Qatari funding and sanctuary for terrorist leaders promote the violence Doha purports to resolve. Washington seems not to recognize this problem, granting Qatar the status of a “Major Non-NATO Ally.” A full review of policy is in order.
The assessments here are brief and may serve as a starting point for U.S. and allied policy. Undoubtedly, the U.S. and allied intelligence communities will have insights to offer on the intentions and capabilities of various Brotherhood branches. The assessments here are also intended to serve as a starting point for public discussion and debate as Washington begins to act against this network. A more systematic approach to the Brotherhood is long overdue.
Egypt: The Original Branch
By Mariam Wahba
Egyptian schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Its fusion of religious revival and political activism enabled its growth into a mass movement in Egypt while serving as a model for Islamist groups across the region. The inseparability of religion and politics served as the movement’s premise. In a passage well known to generations of Brothers, Banna rejected any limitation of the matters to which Islam applies because “its teachings are all inclusive.” He explained, “Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation and a nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed, holy text and sword.”6 Or in the words of the motto that Banna chose for the group, “The Quran is our constitution.”7
During the first Arab-Israeli war, the Brotherhood dispatched battalions of volunteers to fight against the nascent Jewish state. Some Brothers also carried out violent actions within Egypt, including the assassination of Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi. In 1954, another member attempted to kill Gamal Abdel Nasser, the junta leader and future president, triggering a nationwide crackdown that included the imprisonment of thousands.8
Ever since, the Brotherhood has operated on the fringes of legality, with alternating periods of greater and lesser state repression. Briefly, after the fall of the Hosni Mubarak regime in 2011, the Brotherhood was able to operate without restriction, forming a political party and winning a series of elections, with Mohammed Morsi becoming Egypt’s first elected president. Yet in 2013, a combination of mass protests and a military coup brought down Morsi and ushered in a new period of repression.9 Since then, Cairo has faced persistent allegations that it tortures Brotherhood prisoners.10
During Morsi’s tenure, footage surfaced of him, two years before taking office, describing Zionists as “bloodsuckers” and “descendants of apes and pigs.” He also called on Egyptians to “nurse our children and grandchildren on hatred.”11 Other senior figures in the Brotherhood also expressed antisemitic sentiments, a hallmark of the group since its founding. While Morsi held office, Egyptian Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie said Jews “spread corruption on earth,” a threat for which “holy jihad (struggle)” is the remedy.12
In the weeks following Morsi’s ouster, the Brotherhood and its supporters unleashed a wave of violence against those who backed his removal, particularly targeting the country’s Coptic Christian communities. In Nazla, a village 250 miles south of Cairo, Islamists torched, looted, and destroyed two local churches. Similar assaults erupted in Minya, Zerby, and other towns across Egypt, leaving dozens dead and injured.13
On the second anniversary of the October 7 massacre, the Egyptian Brotherhood’s Acting General Guide praised the assault and called for more like it. He said, “[I]t has awakened the cinder of jihad within the nation … and inspired those who are highly-motivated and committed to the mission to understand how to act for liberation.” He also urged the world to provide Gaza “with all forms of political, economic, and military support.”14
Violent Actions and Support for Terrorism
Prior to his final arrest and execution in 1966, Sayyid Qutb was part of an underground Brotherhood group preparing for armed conflict with the Egyptian state.15 The Brotherhood has not directly engaged in violence since the 1970s, yet many offshoots and splinters from the group would become prominent terrorist organizations.16 However, leaders in exile have advocated violence. Reda Fahmy, a former Brotherhood parliamentarian, called for “armed and revolutionary activism.”
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ): Founded in 1973, EIJ was responsible for the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Ayman al-Zawahiri became the group’s leader in 1993, later merging it with al-Qaeda.17
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group): The group emerged from Brotherhood circles and remained active through the 1990s. It was involved in the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and was responsible for the Luxor massacre that claimed 62 lives in 1997.18
HASM (The Arms of Egypt Movement): Responsible for attacks including a car bombing that killed 20 people outside an Egyptian hospital in 2019. The State Department designated HASM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2021.19 Egyptian authorities accuse the group of acting as the Brotherhood’s armed wing.20
Liwa al-Thawra (Battalion of the Revolution): Responsible for the assassination of an Egyptian general and an attack on a police station. The State Department added Liwa al-Thawra to the Specially Designated Global Terrorists list in 2018.21Funding Sources and Assets
The Brotherhood historically relied on member contributions, membership fees, and zakat, or alms. Additionally, the group has a network of wealthy sympathizers and collects profits from business investments. After 2013, much of its financial network was dismantled in Egypt, but fundraising continues abroad through diaspora communities, nongovernmental organizations, and allied networks in Turkey, Qatar, and Europe.22
Key Leaders and Ideologues
Mohamed Badie: Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood, currently imprisoned in Egypt23
Khayrat al-Shater: Deputy Supreme Guide, imprisoned in Egypt24
Saad El-Katatni: Former speaker of parliament and head of the Brotherhood’s political arm, imprisoned in Egypt25Associated Organizations
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP): The Brotherhood’s political wing, which won parliamentary elections after the 2011 revolution and held the presidency under Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013).26 Authorities banned the FJP in 2014.27
Egyptian Revolutionary Council: A coalition of exiled Brotherhood members established after the 2013 coup against Morsi. It coordinates opposition to the Sisi government and advocated for Morsi’s reinstatement prior to his death.28
Egyptian Engineers Syndicate, Egyptian Lawyers Syndicate, Egyptian Medical Syndicate, and Egyptian Teachers Syndicate: Professional unions historically dominated by Brotherhood cadres. Their control came to an end during the 2013 crackdown on Brotherhood members.29Jordan: Turning Toward Violence
By Ahmad Sharawi
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood reached a new height of influence amid the war in Gaza, but then suffered an unprecedented blow to its standing earlier this year. The political wing of the Jordanian Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), capitalized on widespread popular support for Hamas, winning more seats than any other party in the September 2024 parliamentary elections.30 Brotherhood-affiliated protesters often wore Hamas headbands and shouted, “All of Jordan is Hamas!” or, “We are your men, Mohammed Deif,” referring to the late Hamas military commander.31
While the Brotherhood itself had technically been illegal since 2020, the government allowed it to operate with relative freedom until April 2025, when authorities announced the arrest of 16 members for planning attacks aimed at “targeting national security, sowing chaos and sabotage.”32 (For details, see “Violent Actions and Support for Terrorism”) On April 23, Interior Minister Mazen al-Farayya announced the government would treat the Brotherhood as a fully illegal group, leading to the confiscation of its assets and a prohibition on promoting its ideology.33
The Jordanian Brotherhood was founded in 1945. It participated in elections in the late 1980s and early 1990s under the banner of the IAF. In 2015, a splinter group established the competing Muslim Brotherhood Organization, following disagreements over the group’s ties to the international Muslim Brotherhood and concerns about how those ties would affect its relationship with the Jordanian state.34 Following the split, Brotherhood-affiliated groups left the IAF to form the National Islamic Party, which now has seven seats in parliament compared to 31 for the IAF, which holds about a fourth of the body’s 138 seats.35 These two parties remain free to operate, yet Jordan’s ban on the Brotherhood is likely to inflict major financial damage to the broader network.
The Brotherhood’s relationship with the monarchy has long been tense, with antagonism growing as a result of the Brotherhood’s fierce opposition to the country’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel. Hamas had a strong presence in Jordan until 1999, when the kingdom mandated its expulsion as a result of U.S. and Israeli pressure.36 Over the past decade, Hamas’ influence within the Jordanian Brotherhood has grown. A 2017 assessment found that “Hamas worked in an organized fashion within the Jordanian Brotherhood … injecting huge amounts of money to recruit members.”37 This infiltration gave rise to a Hamas-aligned faction within the Brotherhood dominated by Jordanians of Palestinian origin, which today controls the organization’s Shura Council.38 The Hamas wing of the Brotherhood has been explicit in expressing support for Hamas’ return to Jordan. In 2021, one of its parliamentarians publicly called on the Jordanian government to “reopen Hamas’ offices in Jordan and improve relations with the resistance factions.”39
Violent Actions and Support for Terrorism
Prior to the April 2025 revelations, the Brotherhood had a limited history of violence in Jordan. In 2014, Israel reportedly exchanged intelligence with Jordan regarding a Muslim Brotherhood cell operating from Jordan that Israel accused of smuggling weapons to Palestinian buyers in the West Bank. The Jordanian authorities later arrested 31 individuals, mostly Palestinian students studying at Jordanian universities.40 In October 2024, two Jordanians affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood crossed into Israel and wounded two Israelis. Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Moath al-Khawaldeh said that the attackers were “members of the group and always participated in events in solidarity with Gaza and in support of the resistance.”41
After the April arrests, authorities released information that indicated planning for a coordinated terror campaign. Amman’s General Intelligence Directorate reported that individuals affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood had engaged in “manufacturing rockets and drones, possession of explosives and firearms, and recruiting operatives in Jordan and abroad.”42 Authorities claim that the cells prepared strikes on “sensitive sites” in the Kingdom.43 Captured members said their top commander operates from Lebanon, where operatives received training and funds to acquire materials for making weapons.44 The rocket-manufacturing cell operated a production facility in the city of Zarqa where the cell members assembled rocket frames; confiscated video confirmed the rockets had an estimated range of 3-5 kilometers, posing a serious threat to domestic targets. The cell also had storage hubs in Amman for explosives such as TNT and C4.45
The Muslim Brotherhood denied any involvement in the plot,46 even though many of the cell members were part of its organization. The group claimed these individuals were acting independently to “support the resistance” amid the ongoing Hamas-Israel war,47 yet authorities indicated their activities dated back to 2021 — two years before the October 7 attacks.48
Funding Sources and Assets
In July, authorities said they had uncovered an illicit financial network the Brotherhood used to collect tens of millions of dollars “in recent years,” including millions seized from a warehouse north of Amman. The group purported to collect funds for humanitarian relief in Gaza but did not coordinate with official or humanitarian channels. Many of the entities that collected funds were tied to the IAF.49 In 2018, an Amman-based publication reported that Jordanian news sites affiliated with the Brotherhood receive monthly stipends from Turkey, with one collecting monthly payments of 5,000-15,000 Jordanian dinars, equivalent to $7,000-$21,000.50
Key Leaders and Ideologues
Hamzah Mansour: Former Brotherhood shura head, former secretary general of the IAF and head of multiple MB affiliated charities.51
Wael Saqqa: Secretary general of the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood’s shura council member.52
Ahmad al-Zarqan: Head of the IAF shura council, Brotherhood member since 1973 and member of its executive council.53 Al-Zarqan was imprisoned in April 2025 following the ban of the Brotherhood.54
Murad al-Adaileh: General Comptroller of the Brotherhood and former secretary general of the IAF.55 Al-Adaileh was arrested in June 2025 in connection with a case involving the Brotherhood’s foreign financial networks but was released later that same day.56Associated Organizations
Islamic Charity Center Society: The most prominent Islamic charity in Jordan.57
Forum for the Training and Empowerment of Women and Children: An NGO that focuses on issues related to women, children, and families.58
The Green Crescent Charity: A charitable society that sponsors orphans.59
Al-Urwah al-Wuthqa (Firmest Bond) Association: An organization that sponsors a wide range of humanitarian projects, including well drilling, emergency assistance, housing and food aid. 60
The Barari Flower Charity: Charitable society that sponsors orphans.61
Yarmouk TV: The Jordanian Brotherhood’s first satellite channel, launched in 2011.62 After October 7, Yarmouk began airing content from the U.S.-designated Hamas-affiliated Al-Aqsa TV. 63 In May 2024, Jordanian authorities shut down the channel. 64Lebanon: The Islamic Group
By David Daoud
Mohammed Takkoush, the secretary-general of al-Jamaa al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) said last year that, “Cooperating with a group like Hamas, the most honorable liberation movement, is an honor.” Takkoush also characterized his group’s relations with Shiite Hezbollah as “good and growing” as a result of their fighting together against Israel.65 Within Lebanon, the Islamic Group operates openly. It is a registered organization, as are its affiliates. Since its founding in 1964, the Group has advocated the gradual and incremental establishment of a political order based on sharia.66 However, Sunni Muslims comprise no more than a quarter of the Lebanese population. Since 1943, Lebanon’s unwritten National Pact has allocated power on a sectarian basis, and the quasi-constitutional Taif Agreement of 1989 ties the allocation to each religious community’s demographic strength. In addition, Lebanese Sunnis tend to have a moderate outlook, expressing little interest to pollsters in establishing a theocratic system.67 As a result, the demographic barriers to the imposition of Sunni sharia are effectively insuperable. Not surprisingly, the Islamic Group’s success at the polls has been minimal. In the 2022 elections, it fielded five candidates and captured a single seat out of the 120 in parliament.68
A shared enmity toward Israel has given Hezbollah and the Islamic Group a common cause, yet sectarian tensions have sometimes put them in opposing camps. In 2009, amid sharp tensions between Hezbollah and the so-called March 14 Camp, which included almost all Sunnis, the Islamic Group sided with the March 14 Camp.69 Still, key leaders within the group continued to favor cooperation with the Iran-led Resistance Axis, including Hezbollah.70 The late Sheikh Faisal al-Mawlawi, then-secretary-general of the Islamic Group, praised, “Iran, today, [for] supporting the Sunni and Shi’i resisting movements as part of its ideological project to liberate al-Quds [meaning, Jerusalem].”71 In the 2010s, the Syrian civil war stoked new tensions, with Hezbollah fighting Sunni jihadists in Syria on behalf of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In 2016, the Islamic Group’s secretary-general described Hezbollah’s actions as those of terrorist[s].”72 Yet the 2023-2025 Gaza war once again brought Hezbollah and the Islamic Group onto the same side.
The Islamic Group is also close to Hamas. In June 2024, deputy Politburo Chairman Bassam Hammoud described the group’s relationship with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as “a long history … of jihad, political, social, and proselytizing work.”73 Earlier that year, after Israel killed two Islamic Group members in a Beirut strike targeting senior Hamas official Saleh Al Arouri, Hammoud similarly stressed that the Islamic Group “and Hamas are two sides of the same coin in confronting the Zionist enemy,” vowing an “oath to the martyrs to continue [this] path until justice is achieved, the occupation is destroyed, and the land [meaning, Palestine] is liberated.”74
Violent Actions and Support for Terrorism
Shortly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, the Islamic Group established the Dawn Forces (Quwwat al-Fajr). They remained intermittently active until the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. In the July 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Dawn Forces reportedly clashed with Israeli ground troops in several locations.75 Following the massacre in southern Israel on October 7, 2023, the Islamic Group pressed for Hezbollah to launch a full-scale war on Israel’s northern front, even bemoaning the hesitancy of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.76 As of mid-2024, the group had a reported strength of as many as 500 fighters. 77 It acknowledged the death of several commanders as a result of Israeli strikes.78 In April, the IDF said it “had targeted and killed Hussain Izzat Mohammad Atwi, a prominent Islamic Group terrorist, near Naameh in Lebanon.” According to the IDF, Atwi had taken part in planning and executing attacks against IDF troops in northern Israel, infiltration attempts into Israeli territory, and plans to attack Israeli targets globally.79 The Islamic Group specifically took responsibility for seven rocket attacks on Israel, which took place on the following dates and with the stated targets:
October 18, 2023: northern Israel, no town specified80
October 19, 2023: northern Israel, no town specified 81
October 21, 2023: northern Israel, no town specified 82
October 29, 2023: Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel83
December 5, 2023: Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel84
January 6, 2024: Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel85
September 9, 2024: Moshav Beit Hillel in Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel86Funding Sources and Assets
The Islamic Group’s precise sources of funding are unclear. As far as can be determined from publicly available sources, the group relies on charitable donations, including money given directly to its various associated organizations. For example, its Al Iman Scouts (See “Associated Organizations”) has listed on its website both an American and a Lebanese bank account where donations can be made directly to the scouting organization.87
Key Leaders and Ideologues
Mohammed Takkoush: Secretary-general since 202288
Mohammed Shatila: Shura council chairman since 202289
Ali Abu Yassine: Chairman of the Politburo90
Bassam Hammoud: Deputy chairman of the Politburo91
Dr. Azzam al-Ayyoubi: Head of foreign affairs92
Dr. Imad Al Hout: The Islamic Group’s sole parliamentarian93
Dr. Wael Nejm: Head of the media bureau94
Jihad al-Mughrabi: Head of the Muslim Students League95
Khalid Badia: Dawn Forces commander overseeing Sidon, Tripoli, and Akkar96
Talal Al Hajjar: Dawn Forces commander, overseeing Iqlim Al Kharroub south of Beirut, and heavily Sunni areas on the Mount Lebanon Governorate coast and the Beqaa97
Maher Qalawoun: Head of the Dawn Forces Security Apparatus98Associated Organizations
The Muslim Students League: Recruits men and women from Lebanese universities. Like the Islamic Group, the League has a headquarters at the Islamic Dawa Center in the Aisha Bakkar neighborhood of Beirut.99
The Islamic Iman Scouts: A youth scouts arm with headquarters in Tripoli — it has 25 troops and 1,500 members100
The Irshad Charity Association: The Islamic Group’s charitable donations and fundraising arm, based in Tripoli101
Al Aman Weekly Newspapers: Official publication of the Islamic Group102
Islamic Education Association: The Islamic Group’s educational arm, which runs schools throughout Lebanon103
Al-Najat Social Committee: The Islamic Group’s social activism arm for women104
Association of Muslim Scholars: The Islamic Group’s association for Muslim clerics and scholars105
Islamic Medical Association–Lebanon: The Islamic Group’s charitable medical services arm106Qatar: The Brotherhood’s Patron
By Natalie Ecanow
Qatar’s most visible contributions to the Brotherhood’s cause are its decades of support for Hamas and its control of the Al Jazeera Media Network, yet Doha has supported numerous other Brotherhood ventures across Western Europe and North Africa. The Qatari branch of the Brotherhood dissolved in 1999, a reflection of the regime’s intolerance for any political force it does not completely control, but the global movement continues to receive support from Doha.
During the brief period when the Egyptian Brotherhood held the reins in Cairo, Al Jazeera provided positive coverage of President Mohammed Morsi’s administration while Doha pumped in $8 billion to alleviate the government’s financial difficulties.107 Qatar’s support for Morsi created tension with other Arab Gulf states. In 2013, the Qatari emir signed an agreement with the Saudi king and the Kuwaiti emir that prohibited financial or political support for “deviant” groups like the Brotherhood.108 A follow-on agreement the next year committed Doha to expel Brotherhood affiliates.109 Qatar took little action, however, spurring antagonism that contributed to the decisions of the Saudis, Bahrainis, Emiratis, and Egyptians to cut ties with Doha and impose a blockade in 2017. The dispute ended in 2021 with all parties restoring diplomatic relations.110
From October 7 onward, Qatar has publicly supported Hamas positions while portraying itself as an even-handed mediator. On the day of the massacre, Doha’s Foreign Ministry released a statement saying it “holds Israel solely responsible” for the escalating violence, with no acknowledgement of any atrocities.111 Senior members of Qatar’s royal family also support Hamas. The mother of Qatar’s emir, Sheikha Moza bint Nasser, posted a public eulogy for Yahya Sinwar after his death in October 2024.112 In April, Deputy Prime Minister Sa’oud bin Abd Al-Rahman Al Thani reportedly posted on X, “We Are all Hamas,” before taking down the comment.113
Violent Activity and Support for Terrorism
In 2012, five years after Hamas violently seized control of Gaza, the emir of Qatar — father of the current emir — became the first foreign head of state to visit the Hamas-controlled enclave, where he pledged $400 million in assistance.114 That same year, Hamas relocated its political headquarters to Qatar. Doha claims Washington asked it to host the group’s leadership; it remains unclear if Washington made the request or simply declined to oppose the move.115 As of 2021, Qatar had provided the Hamas-run government in Gaza with an estimated $1.8 billion, with payments reaching $30 million per month.116 The Israeli government signed off on the transfers, which continued until the October 7 massacre. Proponents justified the decision to allow the transfers on humanitarian grounds. Critics said it reflected the mistaken belief Hamas could be tamed with cash.117 While Qatar denies that any of the money was for weapons, Israeli forces captured internal Hamas documents in Gaza indicating that the Qatari emir had “agreed in principle to supply the resistance discreetly,” and that $11 million had already “been raised from the emir for the leadership of the movement.”118
In Gaza, Israeli troops have uncovered documents indicating coordination between Hamas and Al Jazeera on the Qatari network’s Gaza coverage. In a document from 2022, Hamas instructed the network to refrain from using the word “massacre” to describe a failed Islamic Jihad rocket launch that killed Palestinian civilians. Al Jazeera complied. The Israeli military has also released captured materials allegedly showing that correspondents for Al Jazeera served simultaneously as operatives in Hamas’s military apparatus. Some correspondents allegedly accompanied Hamas terrorists into Israel during the October 7 massacre.119
Key leaders and Ideologues
Ali al-Qaradaghi: Secretary-general of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS — see “Associated Organizations”)120
Khaled Meshaal: Member of the five-member Hamas leadership council, former head of Hamas’ politburo, Hamas official based in Qatar, resident in Qatar since 2012121
Khalil al-Hayya: Member of the five-member Hamas leadership council, chief negotiator of October ceasefire, based in Qatar since before the October 7 attack122Associated Organizations
Al Jazeera: The Qatari-owned and regime-controlled media network consistently promotes Brotherhood perspectives and narratives, including consistent pro-Hamas coverage of the war in Gaza.123 The network has long shielded the Brotherhood from scrutiny and regularly provides a platform for Brotherhood-aligned voices, including senior Hamas officials.124 The late Yusuf al-Qaradawi — Islamic theologian and unofficial chief ideologue for the Brotherhood — hosted a religious affairs show on the network entitled “Sharia and Life.” It ran for 17 years and reportedly had tens of millions of viewers.125 On October 7, 2023, the network aired a statement by Qatar-based Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh calling on Muslims “to join this battle, each in his own way, without delay or turning away.”126
The International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS): The IUMS is a global network of Islamic scholars based in Qatar that was founded mainly by clerics belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood.127 Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani sponsored the creation of the IUMS in 2004, and Qaradawi served as founding chairman. One former head of the union said, “It is a right and an obligation to question the Holocaust.”128 IUMS has also provided unstinting support for Hamas since the October 7 massacre, even featuring Ismail Haniyeh, the late Hamas politburo chief, at an IUMS event.129 Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt jointly placed the IUMS on a terrorism blacklist in 2017.130Sudan: Civil War Creates Opportunities for Islamists
By Hussain Abdul-Hussain
A military coup in 2021 ended Sudan’s brief period of civilian government. Civil war soon followed as a result of divisions among military leaders. Organized within the Broad Islamic Current, the country’s Islamists now fight on the side of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Gen. Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan.
Historically, the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) served as the cornerstone of the country’s Islamist networks. It emerged in the 1940s as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, then became a formal organization in 1954.131 During the 30-year tenure of dictator Omar al-Bashir, which began in 1989, SIM wielded immense influence, at times controlling state institutions and populating a majority of the officer corps.132
In April 2022, 10 Islamist factions came together to launch the Broad Islamic Current, whose leadership rotates every three months to maintain political balance.133 Nevertheless, SIM is the driving force within the coalition, which also includes two organizations that identify as the Muslim Brotherhood. Brotherhood leaders in Egypt and the United Kingdom recognize the smaller of the two, led by Adel Ala Allah, as part of the movement.134 During the brief interval of civilian rule from 2019 to 2021, Ala Allah condemned the government’s moves toward normalization with Israel and accused the government of seeking amendments to the constitution that “contradict explicit provisions in Islamic law.”135
Violent Activity and Support for Terrorism
The United States designated Sudan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism from 1993 until 2020, owing to the support and sanctuary that Bashir’s Islamist regime provided for al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations.136 Washington revoked the designation after Bashir’s regime collapsed in 2019, and a short-lived civilian government proved amenable to normalizing relations with Israel.137 The 2021 coup and outbreak of civil war in 2023 derailed the normalization effort. In September 2025, the United States issued a statement, together with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, in which it asserted, “Sudan’s future cannot be dictated by violent extremist groups part of, or evidently linked to, the Muslim Brotherhood, whose destabilizing influence has fueled violence and instability across the region.”138
The most prominent Islamist force in the current war is the al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade,139 on which Washington imposed sanctions in September 2025. The brigade, according to the Treasury Department, is an Islamist militia rooted in an earlier paramilitary organization associated with Bashir’s regime. The brigade has contributed upward of 20,000 fighters to the SAF-led coalition, “using training and weapons provided by the IRGC” — Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The brigade has been implicated in “arbitrary arrests, torture, and summary executions.”140 The group’s commander claimed, in July, that he plans to disband the brigade and turn it into a civilian organization, an announcement met with skepticism in Sudan.141
Key Leaders and Ideologues
Ali Karti: Secretary general of SIM since 2021, under U.S. and EU sanctions. Karti served Bashir as foreign minister from 2010 to 2015. When it sanctioned Karti, the State Department described SIM as a “hardline Islamist group that actively opposes Sudan’s democratic transition.”142
Mohammed Etta Elmoula Abbas: Head of SIM in Turkey and former intelligence chief under Bashir, under U.S. sanctions since 2023143
Adel Ala Allah: Head of the Muslim Brotherhood (recognized branch)144
Saifidean Arbab: Head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan145
Al-Musbah Abu Zaid: Commander of the al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade146Associated Organizations
Organization for Islamic Proselytization (MADA): A Brotherhood charity dissolved by the civilian government in 2020, then reinstated in 2022 after a military coup the previous year. MADA’s Dan Fodio Holding Corporation secured lucrative state contracts under Bashir.147
Yemen: Al-Islah
By Bridget Toomey
Abd-al Majid al-Zindani, a U.S.-designated Yemeni terrorist, spent the last years of his life in Turkey, where he passed away in April 2024 at the age of 82.148 In 2004, the Treasury Department blacklisted Zindani for his “long history of working with [Osama] bin Laden,” who considered Zindani a “spiritual leader.”149 As a student in Egypt in the 1950s, Zindani interacted with members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and became a prominent Islamist leader after his return to Yemen.150 In 1990, Zindani cofounded al-Islah (reform), formally known as the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, which has served ever since as the primary political vehicle for the Brotherhood in Yemen, although it also includes Salafists and tribal leaders.151
Since its founding, Islah has remained influential in Yemeni politics as part of both the government and the opposition. Islah insists it has no political or organizational ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, yet the enduring roles of key Brotherhood figures within the party are far more important than any formal links.152 In the 1990s and 2000s, following the reunification of North and South Yemen, Islah allied itself with the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, but broke with Saleh during the Arab Spring. The party later exercised substantial influence under Saleh’s successor, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, head of the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG).153 In 2022, Hadi ceded power to an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), whose current membership includes two Islah figures.
Islah’s political positions have much in common with other Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood branches. During Saleh’s tenure, Zindani helped secure a constitutional provision identifying sharia as the source of all legislation.154 Amid the Arab Spring protests, he told supporters, “An Islamic state is coming,” and, “After we get rid of this oppressor [Saleh], there will be justice —and the caliphate.”155
Violent Activities and Support for Terrorism
In addition to Zindani’s long-standing ties to al-Qaeda, the party has close connections to Hamas, which it supported throughout the current war in Gaza. In 2024, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Hamid al-Ahmar, son of an Islah cofounder and a leader in the party himself, who managed over $500 million worth of assets for Hamas.156 When Israeli forces killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, Islah praised him for being martyred while “fighting side by side with his people, carrying his weapon.”157
While Islah’s role on the PLC puts it on the opposite side of Yemen’s civil war from the Iran-backed Houthis, leading Islah figures have endorsed Houthi attacks against Israel and been photographed meeting with Houthi leaders.158 Officials in southern Yemen, including Aidarous al-Zubaidi, president of the Southern Transitional Council, have accused Islah of colluding with the Houthis and handing territory over to the group by removing forces under Islah control from areas into which the Houthis were advancing.159 There are also allegations that Islah leaders turned a blind eye to Houthi and al-Qaeda weapons smuggling in areas under Islah control.160
On the one-year anniversary of Hamas’s October 7 terror attack, Islah’s official website issued a statement that described the massacre as “a preemptive strike launched by the Al-Qassam Brigades [the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas] against the Israeli occupation.”161 It went on to celebrate Yemeni support, saying the people “took to the streets in many governorates hours after the start of Operation [al-Aqsa] Flood, declaring their absolute support for the battle and expressing their admiration for it.”162
Funding Sources and Assets
There is limited information available about Islah funding. Islah describes the party’s funding sources as member subscriptions, contributions, gifts, economic activities and investments, and government support.163 Saudi Arabia has also forged a cooperative relationship with Islah despite Riyadh’s general hostility toward the Muslim Brotherhood.164 This has reportedly entailed substantial donations to Islah by wealthy Saudis.165 In contrast, Islah has poor relations with the United Arab Emirates, which considers Islah to be no different than other branches of the Brotherhood.166
Key Leaders and Ideologues
Sultan Ali al-Arada: PLC member and governor of Marib, a strategic region with extensive natural resources167
Abdullah al-Alimi Bawazeer: PLC member and previously a close advisor to former President Hadi168
Mohammed Abdullah al-Yadoumi: Chairman of the Supreme Authority of Islah.169
Abdul-Wahab al-Ansi: Secretary-general of Islah170
Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar: Lieutenant general and member of Islah who served as a vice president in Yemen’s IRG prior to the formation of the PLC171Associated Organizations
Al-Iman University: Zindani founded the university in Sanaa in 1993172 but the Houthis shuttered it in 2014.173 Islah also ran a large network of elementary schools, which came under government control in 2002.174
Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW): Islah runs CSSW, which is a United Nations partner in humanitarian work,175 but has cooperated with al-Qaeda-run political organizations.176 The Southern Transitional Council (STC) closed the CSSW headquarters in Aden in 2021 “after monitoring suspicious activities carried out by the association.” However, the STC has sought to sideline political adversaries within its territory and may have chosen to close the office for political reasons.177
Suhail: An Islah-operated television channel network178
Al-Sahwa Net: The official newspaper of Islah179Conclusion
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded nearly a century ago. It has demonstrated considerable staying power in dramatically different political environments in scores of different countries. The challenge for Western policymakers is not to eliminate the Brotherhood, but to focus their efforts on those places where it poses the clearest threat. Policymakers will also need to select or develop the appropriate tools, since no blanket policy is suitable to address the many different forms the Brotherhood takes. Finally, to build support for this kind of tailored approach, elected and appointed leaders will need to initiate candid discussions of the threat. We hope this publication contributes to well-informed discussions.