ON THE GEOPOLITICS OF TRANSCAUCASIA

The South Caucasus poses a serious problem for Russia. However, like all neighboring countries, with the exception of Belarus. Only with Minsk are relations fundamental and reliable. Everything else is highly problematic.

It’s all about the lack of a clear strategy. Over the past 30 years, Russia has been moving simultaneously in three directions:

sought to integrate into the Western-centric global world (at first on any terms, then, under Putin, subject to maintaining independence);
strengthened its own sovereignty (both in the face of the West and in the face of neighboring states);
tried to play a leading role in the post-Soviet (imperial) space and partially contribute (unsystematically, fragmentarily and inconsistently) to Eurasian integration.
All three vectors pulled the country in different directions and required mutually exclusive strategies. As a result, we found ourselves where we found ourselves after the start of the Northern Military District: in direct confrontation with the West over the post-Soviet space.

However, we still hesitate to publicly declare the goals of the North Military District in their geopolitical dimension. But it would be necessary to calmly and calmly admit that we will fight until the complete capitulation of the Nazi regime in Kiev and the establishment of direct military-political control (and this is the only meaning of demilitarization and denazification) over the entire territory of the former Ukraine. And we are ready to fight exactly as long as it takes for Victory. This would be clarity, which would immediately affect our entire strategy in the near abroad: Russia will not tolerate Russophobic regimes and tendencies on this territory anywhere and under any circumstances.

For all our inconsistency and unsystematic nature, geopolitics itself has demonstrated one very important law in recent decades. The territorial integrity of any post-Soviet state can only be guaranteed by positive or neutral relations with Russia. An attempt to go directly to the side of the enemy (and the West is the enemy, and this is an axiom of geopolitics; anyone who doubts it is apparently an ignoramus or a foreign agent) jeopardizes the territorial integrity of the country that decides to take such a step.

This started back in the 90s – Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh (at that time there was a Russophobic globalist government of the Popular Front in Azerbaijan ) , South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Transnistria is still frozen. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are torn off from Georgia in response to Saakashvili’s act of aggression, urged on by Soros and globalist forces (in particular, Henri-Bernard Levy). Armenia under Pashinyan challenged Russia, and Baku, on the contrary, acted skillfully and friendly – as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh became Azerbaijani from Armenian. While Kyiv was multi-vector, it had Crimea, Donbass, Kherson region, and Zaporozhye. Then territory after territory began to emerge from it, and since Russophobia did not subside and turned into a real war with the Russian world, Ukraine will no longer exist at all.

The West cannot guarantee territorial integrity to anyone on the territory of Eurasia; all its promises are a bluff. Yes, the West is still capable of causing serious harm to Russia – at the cost of destroying an entire country (as is now the case with Ukraine). But to save, protect, build, create, organize something… This is not for them.

But let’s return to Transcaucasia.

If we want true integration of the Eurasian space, we must have a consistent plan, and not just a series of reactive, albeit sometimes effective, steps. We must act proactively. After all, in fact, the West itself never believes in its promises to those countries neighboring Russia that take the path of direct geopolitical Russophobia. Whatever they come up with, the West only needs to start a conflict, and if as a result the ally is torn apart, dismembered and destroyed, it does not bother him. For Russia, they are something much more. Even without the pathos of friendship between peoples, this is simply our common, united land. And these are peoples united with us in their historical destiny. No matter how the treacherous elites paid by the West convinced them otherwise.

If the West now wants to open a second front in the South Caucasus, especially in light of the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, it will be quite easy for it to do so.

Pashinyan, who heads Armenia, still allied with Russia, is completely under Western control. He surrendered Karabakh and did not lift a finger to protect the Armenians. He led the country to destruction, and the West was obviously ready for this and contributed to this in every possible way.

But the Pashinyans come and disappear, but the people remain. Will it be moral for us, Russians, to calmly watch as Armenia turns into bloody chaos – following the path of Libya, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine?

Sitting and waiting until the awakened Armenians themselves realize that such a ruler is destructive for Armenia is unproductive. They don’t wake up and don’t wake up, only at our embassy they shout slogans prepared by Soros and burn Russian passports. This is only one – the most obvious – point of probable arson in the Caucasus.

Many fear that Turkey, which considers itself a full partner in Azerbaijan’s victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, will begin to take a more active position in a manner unfriendly to Russia in the South Caucasus. Most often, these fears are exaggerated, since Turkey’s priorities are to strengthen and maintain influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the zone of the former Ottoman Empire. And only then – and then mainly under pressure from NATO and the United States – does Ankara make plans for the Caucasus or the Turkic world of Eurasia. Turkey is not a direct antagonist of Russia, but if the South Caucasus flares up, then it will be every man for himself.

Be that as it may, we find ourselves in a difficult situation in the South Caucasus. In fact, the West can blow it up at any moment if it decides to open a second front. And all we have to do is react. Yes, we sometimes do this quite well – all the enemy’s calculations collapse and have the opposite effect. It happens. But not always.

Therefore, it is worthwhile, without wasting time, to begin full-fledged and decisive strategic planning: what do we want to see in the South Caucasus and how to bring this picture to life? And at the same time, make a final decision regarding the entire post-Soviet space. If we want to see it as friendly and allied, or even neutral, then we must make it exactly that way. By itself, it will not become so or will completely cease to be.

It’s time for Russia to go on the offensive. In Ukraine, in the South Caucasus, in Eurasia as a whole. We need offensive realism. Plans, cold and sober analysis and effective, strictly targeted actions.